Multi-Level Collaborative Management of Colorado\u27s Instream Flow Program by Kuranz, Abby Clair
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Environmental Studies Graduate Theses &
Dissertations Environmental Studies
Summer 7-22-2014
Multi-Level Collaborative Management of
Colorado's Instream Flow Program
Abby Clair Kuranz
University of Colorado Boulder, akuranz@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/envs_gradetds
Part of the Water Resource Management Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Environmental Studies at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Environmental
Studies Graduate Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact
cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kuranz, Abby Clair, "Multi-Level Collaborative Management of Colorado's Instream Flow Program" (2014). Environmental Studies
Graduate Theses & Dissertations. Paper 3.
 `MULTI-LEVEL COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT OF COLORADO’S INSTREAM 
FLOW PROGRAM` 
by 
ABBY KURANZ 
B.S., University of Wisconsin, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial 
fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Science Environmental Studies 
Program 
2014 
  
  
 
 
 
 
This thesis entitled: 
Multi-level Management of Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
written by Abby Kuranz 
has been approved for the Program of Environmental Studies 
 
 
 
Deserai Anderson Crow, PhD 
 
 
Katherine Dickinson, PhD 
 
 
Douglas Kenney, PhD 
 
 
 
 
Date_____________5/15/14_______________ 
 
 
The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we 
Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards 
Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. 
 
 
IRB protocol # _____ 14-0004 ________ 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
ABSTRACT 
Kuranz, Abby Clair (M.S. Environmental Studies) 
Multi-level Collaborative Management of Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Deserai Anderson Crow, Ph.D. 
 
   
Managing water in a way that maintains human welfare and meets the demands of surrounding 
ecosystems involves a variety of stakeholders, diverse sets of values and, subsequently, a wide 
range of competing uses. Since the early 1970s, instream flow uses, or water intentionally kept in 
a stream for the purpose of preserving or improving the natural environment of that stream, have 
become an increasing part of the conversation about water allocation in the West. The 
management of Colorado water involves numerous values and interests, many of which are in 
direct conflict to each other. As such, it is often difficult to translate those competing interests 
into a real world management regime in which all values are represented. Collaborative 
management, a process of identifying and developing general programs, specific projects, and 
the subsequent institutional structures to implement those projects in the real world (Gerlach, 
1995), offers a flexible, holistic, and balanced approach to water management and is particularly 
useful when considering instream flow protection in Colorado. The goal of the following 
analysis is to better understand the institutional arrangements that surround the implementation 
of Colorado’s ISF Program in order to better explain whether the role of collaborative 
management in Colorado water governance has been and will be a successful approach to 
protecting ISF in Colorado.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The quantity and quality of water available to a particular region is vital for ecological 
health, local and national economies, and functioning of government. Increased consumptive use 
threatens its availability for ecosystems and, consequently, future human use. Managing water in 
a way that maintains human welfare and meets the demands of surrounding ecosystems involves 
a variety of stakeholders, diverse sets of values and, subsequently, a wide range of competing 
uses. Additionally, in the Western U.S., water is appropriated using discrete property rights, 
which some argue are in contradiction to its continuity and connectivity as a resource, making 
competing claims and interests difficult to regulate (Easter and Tsur, 1995). Since the early 
1970s, instream flow (ISF) uses, or water intentionally kept in a stream for the purpose of 
preserving or improving the natural environment of that stream, have become an increasing part 
of the conversation about water allocation in the West. ISF is important for aquatic organisms, 
wildlife, riparian areas, recreation and aesthetics, environmental protection, hydropower, 
navigation and channel maintenance (Gillian & Brown, 1997). 
As water is appropriated and diverted for an increased number of beneficial uses, and as 
peak flows shift in magnitude and seasonality, human use will approach the limits as to the 
number of demands of what any given stream can supply (Leopold, 1994). Even with new 
technologies that maximize efficiency, there continues to be an overall trend of decreasing 
supply and increasing demand (Brown, et. al., 2013). Collaborative management, a process of 
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identifying and developing general programs, specific projects, and the subsequent institutional 
structures to implement those projects in the real world (Gerlach, 1995), offers a flexible, 
holistic, and balanced approach to water management and is particularly useful when considering 
Colorado water law and the preservation and improvement of the natural environment. The 
management of Colorado water involves numerous values and interests, many of which are in 
direct conflict to each other. As such, it is often difficult to translate those competing interests 
into a real world management regime in which all values are represented. Collaborative 
management allows different organizations with varying authority and goals, such as government 
agencies and NGOs, to leverage resources and skills in order to diversify available tools and 
create innovative and flexible management regimes that lead to greater on-the-ground success. 
An in depth case study of the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB), the only 
state agency allowed to hold a water right instream for environmental purposes, and the 
Colorado Water Trust (CWT), the only private entity and non-governmental organization 
actively working to secure water acquisitions for ISF uses on behalf of the CWCB, provides 
insight as to how the current institutional arrangements underlying Colorado’s Instream Flow 
Program are an example of collaborative management and how collaborative management has 
played a role in the past and current success of the Instream Flow Program.  
The following analysis uses 3-in-10 short-term leasing as a focal point from which to 
examine the broader institutional structures and context that surround the implementation of 
Colorado’s Instream Flow Program. 3-in-10 short-term leasing is one of four major tools, along 
with appropriations, permanent acquisitions, and long-term leasing, that can be used to protect 
and restore ISFs in Colorado. 3-in10 short-term leases are policy tools in which a water right 
user is able lease their water right to the CWCB for ISF purposes for 3 years in any 10-year 
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period for no more than 120 days at a time. The CWT is the only organization to date facilitating 
these STLs with the CWCB (CWCB, 2013, “Temporary Loans and Leases of Water Rights for 
Instream Flows”). While 3-in-10 leases are only one of four policy tools used to protect ISF in 
Colorado, it is the only ISF policy tool that is managed through an administrative process as 
opposed to a judicial process. 3-in-10 leases are unique in their administration and therefore a 
useful focal point to describe surrounding institutional arrangements. However, 3-in-10 leases 
have only been used to protect ISF in Colorado since 2012. Therefore, there is not much data to 
perform a complete analysis of trends and the Colorado ISF Program, including analyzing three 
other policy tools along with the 3-in-10 leases, is used to define the scope of this analysis. The 
following analysis draws on existing water management literature, publically accessible data on 
Colorado stream flows and water rights, and interviews with key CWCB and CWT personnel 
involved in the implementation of the Instream Flow Program. The goal of the analysis is to 
better understand the institutional arrangements that surround the implementation of Colorado’s 
ISF Program in order to better explain whether the role of collaborative management in Colorado 
water governance has been and will be a successful approach to protecting ISF in Colorado.   
This paper begins with a discussion of past and projected trends in water use in the West 
and in Colorado, specifically with respect to ISF use. This is followed by a presentation of past 
and current water management strategies and a review of Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
using a multi-level governance framework, which includes constitutional, collective, and 
operational levels. At the constitutional level, I provide a brief history of Colorado water law, 
including a review of ISF legislation to date. At the collective level, I discuss the main actors and 
respective responsibilities in the ISF program. At the operational level, I explain the available 
policy tools. I then provide an overview of the relevant research questions and the quantitative 
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and qualitative methods used to answer those questions. I present results and key findings and 
discuss the major themes of those findings. Lastly, I connect the major themes to relevant gaps in 
literature and discuss future research implications.  
 
Purpose of Study  
Water Use in the West 
Societies first started to manipulate water for human consumption with engineering 
projects used for flood control and eased navigation of waterways. As technology advanced, the 
years 1950-1980 marked the “Golden Age of Dam Building,” where societies met and supplied 
almost every new human demand with large infrastructure projects such as dams, reservoirs, and 
pipelines, allowing human population to expand into previously undeveloped lands (Allan & 
Castillo, 2007). Today, water management strategies continue to rely on engineered structures to 
regulate water storage and distribution, but infrastructure is built with a limited lifetime and 
depreciates in stability and efficiency as it degrades over time (Russell et. al., 2009). With 
changes in climate and land use practices and, subsequently, the hydrologic cycle, there will be 
shifts between agriculture, municipal, industrial, recreational, and environmental water uses. In 
the last half century, focus from professionals in the water community has shifted from solely 
how to efficiently divert water to off-stream locations to the challenges associated with how to 
keep water in the stream for a variety of non-consumptive uses (Martin, 2011). Current water 
management goals account for more than just human uses when trying to optimize water use: 
they also consider water use for aquatic life and habitat. Historically, natural resource conflicts 
have stemmed from efforts to repurpose or change some aspect of the way in which a resource is 
controlled (Folk-Williams, 1988). Even with increased efficiency in water use, changing climate 
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and growing demand make any changes in water use contentious, to say nothing of changes to 
uses that may be perceived as a lower priority, such as the preservation and improvement of the 
natural environment. 
Water right doctrines, including riparian law, prior appropriation, and dual systems, drive 
different state-level approaches to water management. Water policy and management in the 
Western U.S. is primarily defined by the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation and beneficial use, 
which is based on anti-speculation water right statutes and laws that date back to the second half 
of the 19
th
 century. The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation consists of two main tenets: 1) any 
amount of water diverted from a stream must be put to “beneficial use,” and 2) designated water 
rights are fulfilled hierarchically giving priority to those established at the earliest date (i.e. “first 
in time, first in right”) (Colorado Foundation for Water Education (CFWE), 2004). In times of 
scarcity, relatively junior rights are curtailed, thus relatively senior rights are more secure. The 
Doctrine of Prior Appropriation also includes an abandonment of right clause, which states that 
after 10 years of intentional non-use, the water right can be re-appropriated. However, it is worth 
noting that forfeiture of a water right due to the abandonment clause rarely occurs because an 
intent to abandon the water right must be demonstrated in addition to the non-use of the water 
right. Additionally, prior appropriation designates water rights as not appurtenant to the land, 
meaning water rights can be sold, leased, transferred, and bought within and outside of their 
designated watershed so long as the transfer does not harm other rights on the river that depend 
on those flows (Hobbs, 1997). 
Past trends and future projections regarding water security in the West indicate that 
current conflicting interests will only be exacerbated in the future by maintaining the status quo 
in water governance. With increasing conflict will come a need for more efficient use of 
 6 
available resources and greater collaboration between vested parties to find “win-win” solutions 
that satisfy competing interests. Governance regimes such as top-down regulation or pure market 
mechanisms do not sufficiently balance competing interests, particularly in the governance of 
natural resources where the environmental interests are often under-represented or their top-
down protection limits others interests. There is a demonstrated need for collaborative 
managment that proactively balances competing interests, in order to adapt to increasing water 
scarcity in the Western U.S.  
 
Water Use in Colorado 
History of Colorado Water Law  
It is difficult to examine values and goals surrounding Colorado water without briefly 
discussing the history of settlement in Colorado and the deep seeded, cultural values associated 
with that settlement. In 1861, Colorado became a territory, comprised mostly of miners, who 
were encouraged to settle public lands through the Homestead Act of 1862. This settlement of 
public lands ultimately led to an increase in agricultural land use practices (Hobbs, 1997). In 
1866, the Mining Act was passed, which allowed settlers to build ditches and reservoirs to divert 
water from public lands. Underlying all of Colorado water law was a fear that developers from 
the Eastern U.S. would speculate, purchase, and tie-up large amounts of water, preventing small 
farmers and settlers from maintaining their livelihoods in a new territory. Water policy in 
Colorado intended to equitably resolve conflicts by systematically issuing decrees between 
interested parties (Hobbs, 1997). Water in Colorado is constitutionally considered property of the 
public and water rights are usufructuary—the right is for the use of the resource and the public 
continues to own the resource (Loehman & Loomis, 2008). In the 1860s, Colorado created its 
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own water doctrine, which continues to be the purest form of prior appropriation in the Western 
U.S., to address the specific values and goals that emerged from its unique history of settlement 
(Crow, 2008). The Colorado Doctrine consists of four main tenets, which continue to influence 
the perception, values, and use surrounding water in Colorado today:  
1) all surface and ground water is a public resource for beneficial use by public agencies, 
2) a water right is a right to the use of a portion of the public’s water resources, 
3) water right holders may build facilities on the lands of others to divert, extract, or 
move water from a stream or aquifer to its place of use,  
4) water rights holders may use stream and aquifers for the transportation and storage of 
water (CFWE, 2004). 
In 1870, Nathan Meeker, agricultural editor for Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune, 
founded the Union Colony of Colorado just south of the Cache La Poudre River at what is 
currently the City of Greeley, and the colony quickly began irrigating agricultural land situated 
many miles away from the river. The success of irrigation at the Union Colony drove the 
colonization of many other settlements such as Camp Collins (later known as Fort Collins), 
which was located many miles north but still along the Cache La Poudre River (Colorado Water 
Institute (CWI), 2014). Shortly after, in 1872, the Territorial Supreme Court settled Yunker v. 
Nichols, which affirmed that water could be carried across public and private land in order to 
reach its place of beneficial use, further supporting the ability of agriculturalists to irrigate land 
located far off-stream and completely breaking ties with the water law of the East, the Riparian 
Doctrine (CFWE, 2004).  In 1874, the Cache La Poudre did not have enough water to meet the 
irrigation needs of both Camp Collins and the Union Colony, and since Camp Collins was 
located further upstream than the Union Colony, they were able to divert almost the full flow of 
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the river and left the Union Colony without sufficient water to irrigate their farmland. The Union 
Colony appealed to the local justice of the peace, claiming that they deserved the water since 
they had been irrigating the river first, who in turn appointed three commissioners to resolve the 
dispute. While there was no official court or established process for the Union Colonists to 
resolve their complaints, the two cities decided to agree to split the amount of water in the river, 
establishing a precedent for “first in time, first in right,” which was later codified into Colorado’s 
constitution in 1876 (CWI, 2014).  In 1879, Colorado passed the Act Concerning Irrigation, 
which called for the adjudication of irrigation water rights through 10 water districts, each with 
its own commissioner and court. Courts would prioritize and allocate water based on historic use 
and assign water rights to the water user, not the ditch operator (Hobbs, 1997). In 1891, the 
Colorado Supreme Court determined that agricultural rights could be sold and transferred to 
municipal uses as long as there was no injury to other water rights and as long as there was “just 
compensation” for the water right. The decision also states that changes in the use of a water 
right required public notification and an opportunity for anyone with objections to be heard 
(Hobbs, 1997). In 1903, Colorado Legislature provided “for the adjudication of domestic and all 
uses other than irrigation” (Hobbs, 1997, p. 11). Until this point, domestic use had been 
considered “incidental and non-injurious to agricultural use” (p. 11).  
The Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) was established in 1937 to aid in the 
protection and development of the state’s waters. Their current mission is “to Conserve, 
Develop, Protect and Manage Colorado’s Water for Present and Future Generations” (CWCB, 
2013, “About Us”). The 1969 Water Right Determination and Administration Act, created seven 
Colorado Water Court divisions, each staffed with an engineer, a water judge, a water referee, 
and a water clerk and essentially removed adjudication decisions from the far more numerous 
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and smaller water districts. Each division currently issues water decrees, which “confirm the 
priority date of the water right, its sources of supply, amount, point of diversion, type and place 
of use and includes conditions to protect against injury to other water rights” (CFWE, 2004, p. 
12). 
See Appendix A 
 
Trends in Colorado Water Use 
 The hydrologic cycle plays an important role in determining physical water availability in 
any region (Leopold, 1994). Western states encompass notoriously arid regions and rugged 
terrain, adding to the complexity of water management and future water availability predictions. 
The topography of Colorado has a major influence on the availability of water and hydrologic 
patterns across the state. Water supply is dependent on seasonal snowpack usually produced 
between late fall and early spring. It is estimated that up to 80% of Colorado’s surface stream 
flow originates from snowpack that accumulates during this period before melting in the April to 
July time-frame (McKee et al., 2000). However, drought is also very common throughout the 
state of Colorado. Single season droughts with precipitation of 75% or less of average for one to 
three months in a row occur nearly every year in Colorado (McKee et al., 2000). Despite all of 
the efforts to increase our scientific understanding of drought, there is still significant amount of 
uncertainty with respect to anticipating its arrival, duration, and severity. As Henz et. al. (2004), 
states in the Colorado Drought and Water Supply Assessment, “the only thing certain is that 
drought will come again” (p. 19). This has extremely important consequences as drought 
increases the vulnerability of relatively junior decreed water rights and can have a large impact 
on an aquatic ecosystems’ abilities to rebound after atypical hydrologic periods.  
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Observational measurements of less Snow Water Equivalent (SWE) during late spring 
indicates Colorado is receiving greater amounts of precipitation as rainfall as opposed to 
snowfall, which can affect the amount of snowpack across the state as well as subsequent timing 
and quantity of snowmelt (Regonda et. al., 2004). In the last half century, peak snowmelt 
streamflow timing has shifted a minimum of a 1-2 days up to 1–4 weeks earlier as shown by 
several evaluations of data from the Sierra Nevada Mountains, the Rocky Mountains, and the 
Pacific Northwest (Stewart et al., 2004; Regonda et. al., 2004). Earlier snowmelt has several 
consequences for Colorado, including a prolonged dry period in the summer. However, Colorado 
is also very topographically diverse which means these larger scale trends may not be accurate 
on a local scale. Overall, stream flows are shifting in timing and magnitude.  
Population growth and development in combination with a warmer and stormier climate 
makes society increasingly vulnerable to hydrologic variability. In 1950, Colorado’s population 
was 1.3 million. By the year 2000, it more than tripled, reaching 4.3 million. CWCB’s 2004 
Drought and Water Supply Assessment concluded that Colorado’s population is growing and 
will continue to grow in all seven major river basins, but will be disproportionately higher in 
certain basins. Among the fastest growing basins are the San Juan, South Platte, and the 
Colorado River basins. With changes in water availability and population growth, there is also a 
demonstrated need for specific interventions that will protect and improve current ISFs.  
 
Instream Flow in Colorado 
Currently, agriculture uses 86% of Colorado’s water, municipal uses 11%, and industry 
uses 3% (CWCB, 2013, “Colorado’s Water Needs”). According to Gillian and Brown (1997) 
water is only left as ISF without intentional policy interventions for four main reasons:  
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1) Geographic factors: water is difficult to obtain due to infrastructure constraints and 
high costs 
2) Senior water rights: water is left instream to reach a downstream senior diversion 
point 
3) Interstate allocations: water is left instream to reach a state border  
4) Surplus flow: water is not needed for off-stream use (Gillian & Brown, 1997).  
However, three of the four major river basins in Colorado’s are over-appropriated for beneficial 
use (CFWE, 2004).  
The CWCB defines ISF as “nonconsumptive, in-channel or in-lake uses of water made 
exclusively by the CWCB for minimum flows between specific points on a stream or levels in 
natural lakes” (CWCB, 2013, “Instream Flow Program”). ISF rights are meant to protect cold 
and warm water fisheries, waterfowl habitat, unique glacial ponds and hydrologic and geologic 
features, habitat for neotenic salamanders, riparian vegetation, and critical habitat for threatened 
and endangered fish (CWCB, 2013). According to Allan and Castillo (2007), stream features 
such as sediment, channel, riparian habitat, and longitudinal continuity are important for riverine 
ecosystem health. In many cases, these physical features provide the basis for ISF protection. 
In a 2005 report commissioned by the CWCB examining the state of ISF Programs across 
the 18 Western States, Charney (2005) broadly suggests an effective ISF program is one that: “1) 
actively seeks to secure instream flows, 2) manages and defends the instream flows it has 
acquired, 3) has an active and ongoing dialogue with the public, state and federal agencies and 
nonprofit organizations, and 4) operates with an open public process” (Charney, 2005, p. 21). 
The report proposes there are nine specific characteristics that underlie a successful ISF 
Program: 
 12 
1) Existence of legal mechanisms to protect instream flows 
2) Permanence of the instream flow rights, reservations or permits 
3) Resources available and dedicated to instream flow activities 
4) Legally and scientifically defensible quantification methodology 
5) Protection and enforcement of instream flow rights, reservation or permits 
6) Partnerships 
7) Planning/Needs identification 
8) Evolving and dynamic programs 
9) “On-the-ground” accomplishments (the volume of protected ISF or number of ISF 
water rights) (Charney, 2005, p. 21) 
While Charney’s nine characteristics offer a snapshot of Western U.S. ISF Programs, they do not 
directly explain why and how certain state programs are more likely to succeed compared to 
others or how success should be measured. However, out of the 18 Western states analyzed, 
those with water trusts (Colorado, Oregon, Washington, and Montana) have achieved the 
greatest success with respect to number of appropriations, acquisitions, and stream miles 
protected, see Table 1 (reprinted from Charney, 2005 Table 15), suggesting that there is 
something within these multi-level collaborative interactions that may increase the likelihood of 
on-the-ground success in protecting and restoring ISFs.  
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Table 1. On-the-ground Instream Flow Accomplishments for all 18 U.S. Western states. The table shows 
number, amount, and/or miles of instream flow appropriations and transfers for all 18 U.S. Western states and 
the number of state employees in 2005. The rows with asterisks (*) are those states with a state-wide water 
trust.  
Note. Table 15. Accomplishments. Reprinted from “Decades Down The Road: An Analysis of Instream Flow 
Programs in Colorado and the Western United States,” by S. Charney Colorado Water Conservation Board 
Report, p. 18. July 2005.  
* 
* 
* 
* 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
In order to understand collaborative management’s potential role in managing Colorado’ 
ISF Program, it is first necessary to define collaborative management in the context of past and 
current water management strategies, alongside each of their strengths and weaknesses.   
 
Water Management Strategies  
Water’s inherent ecological complexity, in combination with its utility for a wide variety 
of industries and importance for all life, makes management of the resource one of the most 
controversial and widely debated issues in natural resource scholarship. Water has attracted 
attention from scholars as a defining resource in economic efficiency, social equity, and 
environmental sustainability (Jonch-Clausen & Fugl, 2001). There is growing consensus that 
problems defining water scarcity do not stem solely from its physical or ecological availability, 
but rather the socio-economic and political factors that determine accessibility and use 
(Blomquist & Schlager, 2005). Water is also inconsistent over time and space, making 
management strategies hard to translate into different place-based contexts (Blomquist, 1995). 
Furthermore, wide consensus exists that water management is too complex for one institution to 
govern alone, indicating a need for collaborative management. Scholars are increasingly 
interested in institutional arrangements and the role they play in “allocating natural resource 
supplies, influencing demand, and overcoming conflict” (Blomquist, 1995, p. 55). According to 
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Blomquist (1995) there are two lessons to be learned from past water management literature: 1) 
including affected parties in any decision-making process is fundamental to successful 
management of water resources and 2) processes should be incremental and evolutionary; there 
are no comprehensive approaches or solutions to water management.  
Kidd and Shaw (2007) provide two broad categories for organizing management around 
watersheds: centralized and polycentric. Centralized management is a practice in which there is 
only one or one group of decision-makers. Polycentric management decentralizes management to 
create multiple foci of decision makers. Watersheds nest hierarchically within one another and 
span political boundaries at all levels including local, state, and national (Blomquist & Schlager, 
2005). However, in the United States there is no comprehensive federal water management 
policy. Consequently, water policies are made in an ad hoc, decentralized manner within the 
confines of arbitrary political boundaries with respect to physically defined watershed 
boundaries (Kidd and Shaw, 2007). While these arbitrary boundaries make comprehensive 
management difficult across a large regional scale, they also serve to contain the scope of 
complexity to a scale that does not overwhelm managers into inaction. Kid and Shaw (2007) 
contend that polycentric watershed-based organizing promotes active coordination between 
institutions across an entire river basin and presents the most “feasible, realistic, and effective” 
(p. 313) starting point in order to function within existing government arrangements. Kidd and 
Shaw (2007) also point out that polycentric basin-wide management promotes accountability by 
creating horizontal and vertical checks and balances between institutional counterparts and 
institutional hierarchies, respectively. However, watershed boundaries do not consider social or 
economic relationships between groups of people. In a case study Blomquist (1998) presents for 
the San Juan Basin Authority, he concludes that sub-watershed units, where stakeholders have 
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commonalities based on political identifications or affiliations, may be a more effective unit of 
governance compared to entire watershed units that encompass more diverse sets of 
stakeholders. While centralized governance allows for increased accountability and coordination, 
polycentric governance makes tasks such as resource allocation and information processing 
easier and increases flexibility to adapt to physical and economic changes (Easter & Tsur, 1995).  
Frameworks such as Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) are proposed as 
holistic approaches to water governance that address the relationship between natural and human 
systems. However, as observed by Jonch-Clausen and Fugl (2001), there is debate surrounding 
the definition of IWRM and interpretations of the word “integrated.”  Kidd and Shaw (2007) 
offer a concise summary of the multidimensional aspects of the word “integration” in IWRM as 
physical, sectoral and organizational. Fischhendler and Heikkila (2010) emphasize that more 
recent IWRM literature agrees with this assessment. Several authors see the “integration” 
definition provided by Kidd and Shaw (2007) as impractical, contending that it can only be 
successfully implemented on a small scale since larger scale management involves too many 
component to meaningfully integrate them all (Tarlock, 2000; Blomquist and Schlager, 2005).  
Biswas (2004) critiques water resource management frameworks in general by pointing out that 
there are numerous “process” models and management strategies developed, none of which are 
completely comprehensive or adequate for managing resources. IWRM lacks any explicit 
definition as to how these ideas can be translated into programs, projects, and outcomes.  
Many scholars advocate for market solutions to water management. Market advocates 
question the government’s ability to respond effectively and efficiently to market failures. They 
suggest that water rights holders are entrepreneurs capable of performing their own cost-benefit 
analyses and working within functioning markets (Loehman & Loomis, 2008). Because water 
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rights in the Western U.S. are treated as discrete property rights, they are predisposed to market 
mechanisms to promote efficient use of water resources. However, because water is such a 
uniquely connected and complex resource, these property rights are often difficult to define and 
subsequently difficult to agree upon (Grigg, 2011). Water’s connectivity makes exclusion and 
monitoring difficult, but Colorado’s system of prior appropriation makes it at least possible 
(Brewer, et. al., 2006). Any movement and transfer of water in time or place can have effects on 
third parties that divert, consume or use water downstream of the transferred water right.  In 
other words, water is inherently a common pool resource within the economic typology of 
goods; however, the institutional constraints surrounding Western water makes its management 
somewhere between a public and private good in that water rights are quantified, monitored, and 
enforced to varying degrees in order to make water more excludable and rivalrous than it would 
otherwise would be without those institutional arrangements.  
Water has two properties that are important in a water market: 1) water flows; and 2) 
water moves in a cycle. This means the value of water will change as it moves through space and 
time. Water market transactions can be separated into three categories: water sales, 1-year leases, 
and multi-year leases (Brewer, et. al., 2006). In the Western U.S., most water markets treat water 
as a homogeneous commodity. However, in reality, prior appropriation creates a “heterogeneous 
water product whose value varies with the seniority of its appropriation” date (Pritchett et. al., 
2008, p. 442). Water costs in the American West are associated with water quality, conveyance 
opportunities and local uses, and the security of the right, not only its scarcity value. There are 
also transaction costs associated with water’s transport and treatment as well as an increased 
value in the summer when there are ebbs and flows. Water markets are notoriously imperfect 
when trying to quantify the value of non-human interests. The subjectivity and variability 
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involved in valuing these terms is extreme and, consequently, water markets are easily 
manipulated (Brewer et. al., 2006). According to Griffin (2008), water markets have been largely 
used to quantify human use values and, consequently, have been largely misapplied when used to 
try to protect ISFs because ISFs are inherently meant for non-human uses. 
Most literature agrees that free markets are not an effective water management strategy 
on their own, but Loehman and Charney (2011) argue that economic strategies and water pricing 
are useful tools used in concert with ISF programs that focus on new appropriations and 
acquisitions as a way to collectively value entire water systems. They posit that market-based 
mechanisms are going to be increasingly used to facilitate ISF protection as inefficiency behind 
purely voluntary ISF Programs come to light. This is particularly true considering the 
willingness-to-pay for a water right often exceeds irrigated agricultural values and ISF programs 
will need to compete with private consumptive water users (Loehman & Loomis, 2008).  
In recent years, leasing agreements have become widely discussed market mechanism in 
water management literature. According to King, et. al. in 2004, several models existed for 
providing liability waivers to landowners involved in leasing conservation easements, but few 
had been implemented for ISF leasing. Typical characteristics of water users willing to lease 
include owning a large number of irrigated acres, having concern for rural communities, and 
being willing to work with municipalities and other organizations to arrange lease agreements. 
These characteristics limit the range and number of water users willing to participate in leasing 
water rights (Pritchett, et. al., 2011). A water user may be willing to voluntarily donate or lease 
that water right, but may also have concerns about federal programs or structural evaluations that 
may reduce their original water right (Jenkins, 2007). Pritchett, et. al. (2011), contend there is 
relative ambivalence toward water leases in Colorado, which may be explained due to the fact 
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that reservoir projects, increased municipal conservation, and interbasin pipelines are generally 
supported by the water community, such that water right holders may see leases as a relatively 
small part of the larger solutions to complex water demand issues.  
Overall, there are few case studies in the literature that discuss autonomous entities that 
have managed to successfully balance ISF protection and development in watershed 
management (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Kidd and Shaw, 2007). As Biswas (2004) sums up, 
“it is not very helpful to be long on concepts but short on their implementation potential” (p 
254). The real need in managing resources is addressing the success with which processes are 
translated into practices (Biswas, 2004). According to most water management literature, the 
problems with the systematic application of policies and legislation to “real world” scenarios can 
be summarized in two main points:  (1) the capacity and resources needed to implement 
management strategies (Fischhendler & Heikkila, 2010), and (2) the lack of empirical analysis to 
provide tools, methods, and frameworks for application (Medema & Jeffrey, 2005; Fischhendler 
& Heikkila, 2010; Geldorf, 1997). The challenges associated with translating theory into real 
world application is an almost universal theme in areas of resource management (Heikkila, 
2004). 
While proposed governance structures include river basin management, water demand 
management, ecosystem management, and IWRM, none are considered in the existing 
scholarship to be sufficiently comprehensive (Jonch-Clausen & Fugl, 2001). Collaborative 
management is not completely centralized or polycentric (Gerlach, 1995). It calls for multiple 
organizations and entities of different scales and specialized functions to correspond to the 
different tasks of water management (Blomquist, 1995). Gerlach (1995) further defines 
collaborative management as the process of identifying and developing general programs, 
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specific projects, and the subsequent institutional structures to implement those projects. 
Collaborative management allows different organizations with varying authority and goals, such 
as government agencies and NGOs, to leverage resources and skills in order to diversify 
available tools and create innovative and flexible management regimes appropriate for “real 
world” scenarios. Colorado’s Instream Flow Program is a state-wide program, which means it 
inherently spans multiple basins of varying scales. The CWCB and the CWT are both entities 
with state-wide purviews. Collaborative management typically examines how to integrate 
management across watershed boundaries and the CWCB and CWT, while managing at the 
state-level, must integrate their management practices across multiple watersheds with distinct 
values and vested interests in water. Furthermore, the CWCB and CWT have very distinct 
missions, goals, motivation, and authority with respect to protecting and restoring ISFs 
throughout Colorado. Therefore, collaborative management is, in theory, a management 
approach that will lead to successful protection of ISFs in Colorado. 
Multi-level collaborative management calls for multiple organizations and entities of 
different scales and specialized functions to address the different tasks of water management 
(Blomquist, 1995). Multi-level governance includes four levels of action situations as defined by 
Ostrom (2005) in the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD): operational, 
collective, constitutional, and meta-constitutional (Figure 1). Ostrom (2005) describes each of 
the situational levels as the following:  
 Operational: “directly affect day-to-day decisions made by the participants in any setting” 
(p. 58). 
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 Collective-choice: “affect operational activities and results through their effects in 
determining who is eligible to participate and the specific rules to be used in changing 
operational rules” (p. 58). 
 Constitutional: “first affect collective choice activities by determining who is eligible to 
participate and the rules used to be used in crafting a set of collective-choice rules that, in 
turn, affect the set of operational rules” (p. 58).  
 Meta-constitutional: underlies all others, but is not frequently analyzed. 
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The levels of analysis are particularly useful in describing Colorado’s ISF governance structures, 
including relevant actors and patterns of interactions.  
 
Collaboration between Government Entities and Non-governmental Organizations 
According to King et. al. (2004), ISF management requires more than just maintaining a 
basic amount of water instream. Research, monitoring, education, outreach, communication, 
Figure 1. Levels of analysis and outcomes as seen in Ostrom (2005). The four institutional levels of analysis 
include operational, collective-choice, constitutional, and meta-constitutional. 
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protection, and restoration are also fundamental to the success of ISF programs, which usually 
means an increase in the need for funding and improved governance. Government agencies 
continue to be one of the most influential actors in water management and water programs. 
However, government agencies are often limited by political boundaries, resources, capacity, and 
conflicting public mandates (Loehman & Charney, 2011). On the other hand, NGOs have the 
ability to work on many fronts including as legal advocates, owners and stewards of property for 
environmental purposes, and researches and publishers on scientific issues (Paretchan, 2002). 
There are often barriers to individuals doing the types of work NGOs are capable of such as 
funding, data gathering, verification and legal defense (Gillian & Brown, 1997). NGOs have the 
ability to understand and institute legal proceedings at the agency level and seek judicial review 
of decisions, where individuals may lack capacity and skill to do so. NGOs can also provide a 
friendly face to private property owners. In states where only public agencies are allowed to hold 
ISF rights, NGOs can play a valuable role by acting as the broker and facilitator for transfers of 
water rights to state agents to hold for ISF purposes (Paretchan, 2002). Paretchan (2002) 
contends water rights holders are more likely to buy, sell, lease, trade, and use tax credit to 
protect ISFs, for which NGOs are ideal facilitators, as opposed to litigating issues in courts.  
Capacity, resources, and governance structures are always limiting factors when 
implementing any natural resource management system. Collaboration between water 
organizations requires additional communication and sometimes time-intensive coordination 
between staff members, which can translate into additional costs for those actors involved 
(Fischhendler & Heikkila, 2010). NGOs in collaboration with government agencies can often 
connect communities most adversely affected by environmental conditions to appropriate 
programs (King et. al., 2004).  When non-government organizations (NGOs) and governments 
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work together to manage public programs, they can leverage the flexibility and non-regulatory 
roles of NGOs, while drawing legitimacy from government agencies in order to bridge the gap 
between government programs and disengaged populations. 
Both regulatory and voluntary approaches face difficulties and controversies when water 
basins are fully allocated. Loehman and Charney (2011) argue that pure voluntary and market 
solutions will underfund and underprovide water to meet ISF thresholds, which are pre-
determined and often state approved ecological or hydrologic analyses. Brewer, et. al. (2006) 
contends voluntary water transfers are typically sporadic and reactive, meaning there is no real 
strategic shift to sectors where water is needed or demanded most. Thus, neither approach is a 
panacea. Loehman and Charney (2011) suggest “some form of action by state authorities will be 
required to provide appropriate levels of protection for water quality and ISFs” (p. 878) but argue 
for more secure funding and governance in order to adequately do so. However, they also 
recognize the experience of NGOs and local watershed organizations, which might suggest that 
direct state involvement may not be as necessary if local watershed management can be 
sufficiently activated and funded.  
 
Trust & Legitimacy  
Capacity, resources, and governance structures are all important when describing 
collaboration between government entities and NGOs, however so are the values and behaviors 
of the individual actors associated with those organizations. Political theory literature provides 
two important concepts when describing political values and behaviors and the governing 
structures with which they interact: trust and legitimacy. 
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Trust 
Newton (2007) defines trust “as the belief that others will not, at worst, knowingly or 
willingly do you harm, and will, at best, act in your interests” (p. 343).  Levi (1998) also states, 
“Trust is not one thing and it does not have one source; it has a variety of forms and courses” (as 
cited in Newton, 2007, p. 343) The origins of trust are generally described in two ways: 1) it is 
an individual property associated with individual characteristics and demographic features; 2) it 
is a property of social systems from social and political institutions. Trust is a product of 
experience; hence, it changes with changing circumstances. Political behavior scholarship 
distinguishes between trust between people (social trust) and trust in institutions, systems, rules 
and fundamental procedures (political trust). Social trust is interpersonal or horizontal trust 
between citizens, while political trust is vertical trust between citizens and political elites or 
political institutions (Newton, 2007). Trust is essential in any management regime that involves 
multiple organizations and entities of different scales working together to achieve specific ends 
within a community. 
 
Legitimacy 
The scholarship surrounding the definition, meaning, and origins of legitimacy in 
governance varies greatly. According to Cash et. al. (2002), legitimacy “refers to whether an 
actor perceives the process in a system as unbiased and meeting standards of political and 
procedural fairness” (p. 5).  Hardin (2007), on the other hand, describes a more basic definition, 
which states a government has legitimacy if “the government is well established and it works in 
some important sense” (p. 239).  Although a decision or process may be considered legitimate 
according to a set of pre-established rules, it is possible for that decision or process to be 
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perceived as normatively illegitimate by different people in different contexts.  However, 
legitimacy should not to be confused with consent. While much of the political behavior 
scholarship argues consent is the basis of legitimacy, this definition only considers consent as it 
affects the perception of an entity’s or program’s legitimacy (Hardin, 2007). Legitimacy is 
essential for establishing processes that reduce the uncertainty of interactions between various 
actors across time and place.  
Trust and legitimacy between actors is key in understanding any natural resource 
management regime, but so is understanding the physical resource.  
 
Determining Instream Flow Thresholds 
It is also important to consider how thresholds and biophysical requirements are 
determined when considering natural resource management. These methods vary widely across 
water management regimes, particularly when considering ISF thresholds. Bradford, et. al. 
(2011) explains that there are two schools of thought in determining instream flow requirements. 
The first assumes a strong empirical relationship between flow variability and ecosystem 
processes as predictors of river health and attempts to minimize hydraulic variability to the 
natural hydrograph (i.e. the natural flow paradigm) (Poff et al., 1996). The second attempts to 
adjust flow regimes to accommodate specific ecological requirements of an ecosystem (e.g. a 
keystone species’ life history and habitat requirements). Caissie et al. (2007), point out that the 
second approach Bradford et. al. (2011) describes is a much more involved process requiring 
many more hydraulic and biological variables and that historic stream flow data from stream 
stations are a much simpler, less time and resource intensive method for evaluating ISFs. It is 
also important to note that literature surrounding ISFs in Colorado rarely mention the 
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effectiveness of ISF water rights in meeting pre-determined thresholds. When ISF water rights 
are mentioned with respect to effectiveness, it is usually to describe the relative junior priority of 
ISF water rights in Colorado and their vulnerability in dry years (Charney, 2005; Loehman and 
Charney, 2011).  
Overall, current water management scholarship lacks the development of frameworks and 
supporting case studies that demonstrate how processes can be successfully translated into 
practices. The literature suggests collaborative management is a potential approach to bridging 
that gap. Literature surrounding management of natural resources through collaboration between 
government and non-government entities largely focuses on the sharing of resources and 
increased capacity and as the direct outcomes of those partnerships. While there is some focus on 
NGOs acting as buffers between potential program participants or private right holders and the 
government, the NGO & government organization literature does not explicitly address concepts 
such as trust and legitimacy, which political theory tells us are important in any citizen-
government relationship or public program. References to an NGO being able to act as a buffer 
between citizens and government alludes to the broader concept of trust, but there is no direct 
mention of legitimacy when describing the government agency-non-government organization 
collaborative relationship.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE CASE OF COLORADO’S INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAM 
 
 
According to Ostrom’s (2005) Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, 
institutions are prescriptions in the form of any norms, informal, or formal rules (or lack thereof) 
that structure repeated interactions between actors that typically reduce the uncertainty of those 
interactions occurring or the outcome of those interactions in the future. Ostrom (2005) states: 
“The opportunities and constraints individuals face in any particular situation, the 
information they obtain, the benefits they obtain or are excluded from, and how they 
reason about the situation are all affected by the rules or absence of rules that structure 
the situation. Further, the rules affecting one situation are themselves crafted by 
individuals interacting in deeper-level situations. For example, the rules we use when 
driving to work every day were themselves crafted by officials acting within the 
collective-choice rules used to structure their deliberations and decisions. If the 
individuals who are crafting and modifying rules do not understand how particular 
combinations of rules affect actions and outcomes in a particular ecological and 
cultural environment, rule changes may produce unexpected and, at times, 
disastrous outcomes” (p. 30). 
The different levels of action situations Ostrom (2005) referred to in the preceding excerpt 
provide the structural framework for analyzing Colorado’s Instream Flow Program at multiple 
levels (i.e. multi-level analysis). The following analysis focuses on the actions taken by key 
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actors in and between the constitutional, collective, and operational levels (Figure 1). While the 
main actors examined in this paper, the CWCB and the CWT, are situated at the collective level, 
their actions are often determined by key legislation, Colorado Supreme Court decisions, and the 
Colorado Constitution, which in turn affects the day-to-day decisions of municipal, agricultural, 
industrial, recreational, and environmental water users at the operational level (Figure 2 & 3).  
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Figure 2. Pre-2001 Instream Flow Program Dynamics (with respect to Acquisitions).  Instream Flow Program dynamics pre-2001, before the creation of 
the Colorado Water Trust. The diagram shows the various interactions, actors, and level of governance associated with ISF management in Colorado.  
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Figure 3. Post-2001 Instream Flow Program Dynamics (with respect to Acquisitions).  Instream Flow Program dynamics post-2001, after the creation of 
the Colorado Water Trust. The diagram shows the various interactions, actors, and level of governance associated with ISF management in Colorado. 
32 
3
2
 
 
Governance of Colorado’s Instream Flow Program at the Constitutional-Level 
 
Federal Instream Flow Legislation 
One of the first pieces of legislation to explicitly recognize the need to protect water 
within a stream channel was federal, the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA passed in 1972 and 
was based on the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948. The CWA focuses on point 
source pollution released by manufacturing and construction, and the regulation, specific 
standards, and monitoring are all implemented at the state-level (Hobbs, 1997). While the CWA 
does not explicitly address issues of water quantity, minimum flow requirements are often 
established in order to reduce the concentration of pollutants. The passage of the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) in 1973 was one of the first federally legislated statutes that serves to 
explicitly protect water as a resource for something other than human use. The ESA describes the 
severe decline in the diversity of U.S. native species and acknowledges their “esthetic, 
ecological, educational, recreational, and scientific value to our Nation and its people” (U.S. Fish 
& Wildlife Service, 2013). The purpose of the ESA is to “protect and recover imperiled species 
and the ecosystems upon which they depend” (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 2013), which in 
many cases involves protecting aquatic habitat (e.g. water quantity and quality). However, the 
ESA and the CWA do not explicitly recognize water as a protected resource outside of providing 
for critical habitat or human consumption, therefore these are tools that indirectly protect ISF, 
but fail to provide flexibility and certainty for specific local contexts.  
State Instream Flow Legislation 
In the Western U.S, explicit water policies that designated ISF as “beneficial use” did not 
emerge until the latter half of the 20
th
 century (Charney, 2005). In the early 1970s, ISF protection 
programs emerged in several Western states, each uniquely addressing and working within the 
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state’s particular water rights system. In 1965, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld that an ISF 
was a riparian right, not consistent with the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation in Colorado River 
Water Conservation District v. Rocky Mountain Power. However, in 1973, the Colorado 
legislature passed SB 97 creating the state’s ISF Program, which recognized the need to 
“correlate the activities of mankind with some reasonable preservation of the natural 
environment,” allowing the CWCB “on behalf of the people of the state of Colorado, to 
appropriate or acquire… such waters of natural streams and lakes as may be required to preserve 
the natural environment to a reasonable degree” (as cited in Merriman & Janicki, 2013, p. 1). 
The statute was ultimately created in order to maintain state control over Colorado water in 
response to two events: 1) threats of a ballot initiative that would allow instream flow water 
rights to be held by private water users; 2) potential violation of a federal bypass flow 
requirement on the West Slope in the construction of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, a 
transbasin diversion, storage and delivery project which serves Southeastern Colorado, which 
was constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation from 1964 to 1981 (Bassi, 2014). SB 97 named 
the CWCB as the exclusive authority allowed to hold ISF rights through a reach of stream rather 
than just at a bypass point. Colorado is one of the only western states that limits the ability to 
appropriate, acquire, and protect ISFs to a single state agency. SB 97 effectively “removed the 
diversion requirement for the CWCB and allowed the Board to appropriate water ‘instream’” 
(Merriman & Janicki, 2013, p. 1). The first ISFs were appropriated in July of 1973 on several 
stream reaches downstream of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project (Bassi, 2014). In 1979, the 
Colorado Supreme Court upheld ISF water rights as constitutional in Colorado River District v. 
Colorado Water Conservation Board, in which the Colorado River District argued that because 
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there is no physical diversion associated with an ISF water right they should be void and 
subordinate to junior water rights (Bassi, 2014).  
In 1981, the Supreme Court raised concerns over ISF water rights interfering with water 
development. In response, SB 414 stipulates: 1) ISFs from water imported out of basin do not 
give the CWCB any claim against the importer, 2) ISFs are subject to uses or exchanges of water 
with existing appropriation dates, and 3) the CWCB cannot condemn private lands to acquire ISF 
rights. SB 414 also requires the CWCB to assess the natural environment, water availability, and 
injury to third parties (Bassi, 2014). SB 414 limited and clarified the CWCB’s ability to 
appropriate or acquire new water rights in order to decrease the potential that a decreed ISF 
water right would interfere with future water development.   
In 1986, the Colorado General Assembly clarified CWCB’s authority to acquire senior 
rights through purchase or donation in SB 91. This reaffirmed authority for acquiring water 
allowed the CWCB to more explicitly work with willing water users in order to restore flows to 
degraded stream systems on a voluntary basis (Loehman & Loomis, 2008). The legislation was 
introduced in response to proposed federal wilderness legislation in order to show federal entities 
that the state ISF Program could achieve federal stream protection goals (Bassi, 2014). 
In 1987, SB 212 reaffirmed the CWCB as the exclusive authority to appropriate ISFs in 
response to an ISF right decreed to the City of Fort Collins for “recreational and piscatorial” 
uses. Legislators were concerned about more water court applications for ISF uses by entities 
“wishing to command the flow of streams for their own aims” and effectively decreased the 
ability of other potential water right holders to apply for those types of applications (Bassi, 
2014).   
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In 1995, in Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Board, the 
Colorado Supreme Court determined that the CWCB cannot unilaterally reduce a decreed ISF 
water right without going to water court to change its decree (Bassi, 2014).  In response, SB 64 
was enacted in 1996 identifying procedures the CWCB must follow when reducing a decreed 
ISF water right, including filing with water court and a public notice and comment procedure, 
and clarified the Water Court’s role in adjudicating ISF water rights as reviewers of the three ISF 
appropriation determinations (natural environment, water availability, and no injury) (Bassi, 
2014).  
In 2000, HB 1438 repealed the ability of the CWCB to acquire conditional water rights 
for ISF uses. Conditional water rights are extremely valuable. They are rights in which the water 
court fixes the priority date of a beneficial use even though the water right has yet to be 
appropriated and put to beneficial use, or in other words, the water right has not been perfected. 
The water court reviews the right every six years to ensure that the water right holder has 
“diligently pursue[d] completion of the project” (DWR, 2014, “Water Rights Dictionary”). Once 
the right is perfected, by being put to use, the water court will decree the conditional water right 
as an absolute water right. Conditional water rights can be transferred through donation, sale, or 
lease to another beneficial use other than the use for which the priority date was fixed (except 
ISF uses). The inability to transfer conditional water rights to instream flow water rights 
effectively sets aside large quantities of water that will only ever be used for consumptive uses 
and most likely those uses will be municipal or industrial (DWR, 2014, “Water Rights 
Dictionary”)  
Initially, CWCB had to determine if the natural environment would be preserved to a 
“reasonable degree” in order to appropriate new ISF water rights. However in 2001, SB 156 
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passed allowing CWCB to not only preserve but also improve the natural environment as a 
compromise with environmental groups who wanted to introduce legislation that would allow for 
private ISF water rights. SB 156 also prohibited CWCB from acquiring water rights that would 
require the removal of existing infrastructure without the owner’s approval or that were acquired 
by condemnation (Bassi, 2014). SB 156 allows for a greater quantity of water to be appropriated 
and acquired for ISF uses by removing the ceiling that the “preserving” language imposed in 
limiting the assessment to the natural environment that already exists and extending it to the 
amount that can be determined as needed to “improve” the natural environment. However, the 
ISF quantity can still be limited by the “reasonable degree” requirement in which the CWCB or 
the water courts can subjectively determine an amount to be unreasonable and lower the quantity 
of the ISF right or deny the application altogether.  
In 2002, Colorado experienced a major drought highlighting the need to transfer water 
quickly in times of critical water shortage, especially when those critical needs could be met 
voluntarily, as was the case in 2002. Until this time, all water appropriations and acquisitions for 
surface waters needed to be approved by Colorado’s Water Courts. After the drought, HB 1320 
passed in 2003, allowing temporary loans of water to CWCB for ISF use in counties and basins 
with declared drought emergencies without the need to seek judicial approval. The process in 
2003 involved an administrative review by the Division Engineer (Merriman & Janicki, 2013). 
HB 1320 also established a notice and comment procedure requiring the Division Engineer to 
determine no injury in order to approve the loan (Bassi, 2014).  
In 2005, HB 1039 1) removed the requirement of a declaration of drought for temporary 
loans to ISF water uses, 2) limited the use of the loaned water for ISF to water short decreed ISF 
water rights, 3) limited the loan to no more than three years for 120 days in any ten-year period, 
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and 4) provided a process for parties to comment on potential injury after each year a loan is 
exercised (Bassi, 2014).  In 2005, in Colorado Water Conservation Board v. City of Central, the 
Colorado Supreme Court appealed a water court decision which approved an augmentation plan 
for the City of Central that did not protect ISFs from injury. The Colorado Supreme court upheld 
that augmentation plans are also subject to the principle that ISFs are fully adjudicated water 
rights and any augmentation plan with junior appropriations must not harm other water rights, 
including ISFs (Bassi, 2014).  
In 2007, HB 1012, provided that the period of time water is loaned to CWCB for ISF use 
will not result in a reduction in any future the historic consumptive use analysis and will not be 
considered as intent of the water user to abandon their water right. In 2008, HB 1280 provided 
that in any future water court proceeding to change a water right that was loaned to the CWCB 
for ISF use will not consider any period of non-use in the historic consumptive use analysis due 
to leasing water to CWCB and will not consider the water right abandoned if that water right is 
part of a contract with the CWCB for ISF use.  
In 2008, HB 1346 also passed allowing the CWCB to use up to $1 million of the 
severance tax fund annually for ISF leasing and purchasing water rights (Loehman & Loomis, 
2008). The Species Conservation Trust Fund also provides up to $500,000 annually for acquiring 
water to preserve habitat for declining native fish if the $1 million from the severance tax funds 
is fully appropriated under SB 156 (Benson, 2012). In 2009, an incentive tax credit was created 
though HB 1067 for water users who voluntarily and permanently donate their rights to the 
CWCB ISF Program (Benson, 2012). This is a refundable tax credit created for 50% of the value 
of the donated water right, capped at $2 million per year, and is not available in years when the 
general fund is not projected to grow by 6% over the previous fiscal year (Bassi, 2014).  In 2009, 
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SB 235 also made $500,000 available to CWCB if the $1 million from the severance tax funds is 
fully appropriated from the sale of Colorado wildlife habitat stamps (Bassi, 2014). In all, the 
CWCB has at $1 million dollars every year to spend on acquisitions and an additional $1 million 
if the first $1 million dollars is completely appropriated. 
As of 2012, the CWCB had protected over 9,005 stream miles out of the 39,479 stream 
miles in Colorado, or about 22.8% of all Colorado stream miles, for ISF use (CWCB, 2013, 
“Instream Flow Program”). Currently, Colorado’s ISF Program protects coldwater and warm 
water fisheries, waterfowl habitat, unique glacial ponds and habitat for neotenic salamanders, 
riparian vegetation, unique hydrologic and geologic features, and critical habitat for threatened or 
endangered native fish (CWCB, 2013, “Instream Flow Program”).  The CWCB implements the 
ISF Program through three main activities: applying for new ISF appropriations, acquitting water 
through a sale, donation, or lease, and monitoring and protecting decreed ISF water rights.  
Recently, ISF has been more holistically defined within the context of ‘environmental 
flow,’ which Loehman and Charney (2011) use to emphasize that “restoration is not simply a 
matter of water, because river health is not just a single dimension” (p. 873) and “that water 
management should be responsive to environmental and ecosystem needs” (p. 874). The value of 
ISF is recognized by a diverse set of professionals and stakeholders from a diverse set of 
disciplines, including lawyers, economists, biologists, planners, and environmental staffers 
(Loehman & Charney, 2011). Statutorily defined beneficial uses in Colorado currently include:  
“augmentation, CWCB ISF and natural lake levels, commercial, domestic, dust 
suppression, evaporation from a gravel pit, fire protection, fish and wildlife culture, flood 
control, industrial, irrigation, mined land reclamation, municipal, nature centers, power 
generation, produced water from gas production, recreation on reservoirs, recreational in-
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channel diversions, release from storage for boating and fishing, snowmaking, and stock 
watering” (CFWE, 2004, p. 7).  
Colorado’s approach of integrating ISF into the state’s water right allocation system places these 
water rights on an even plane with all other beneficial water uses. ISF water rights are 
permanent, fully adjudicated water rights consistent with Colorado’s Prior Appropriation 
Doctrine (Almy & Shellhorn, 2007; Loehman & Loomis, 2008). 
“Colorado water law is based on 150 years of legal, constitutional, and administrative 
precedent” (Crow, 2008, p. 645). While a majority of Colorado water law encourages traditional 
consumptive uses of water, “the water law system has evolved to include new codified uses of 
water” (Crow, 2008, p. 645). Overall, trends in legislation towards increasing flexibility are 
positive for achieving greater environmental protection. However most literature argues that ISF 
legislation alone will not be sufficient to protect and improve ISFs in the face of increasing 
variability and climate change (Adler, 2007; Almy & Shellhorn, 2007; Grigg, 2011; Loehman & 
Charney, 2011; Loehman & Loomis, 2008; Pritchett, et. al., 2008; Scott, et. al., 2013).  
See Appendix B 
 
Governance of Colorado’s Instream Flow Program at the Collective-Level 
Colorado Water Conservation Board 
Today, most water rights are decreed in the Colorado Water Courts with the sole aim of 
meeting some explicit human need or demand, save one: CWCB instream flows (ISF) and 
natural lake levels rights. The CWCB can add water to Colorado’s ISF Program in two ways: 1) 
appropriate un-appropriated water for a new ISF water right or 2) acquire water through a change 
of use case for absolute flow or storage rights on either a permanent or temporary basis (Beatie, 
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2009). The CWCB is composed of a fifteen member governing board with a seven member 
Stream and Lake Protraction Section staff that provides the board with legal and engineering 
analyses and monitors ISFs for legal and physical protection. The board has diverse geographical 
representation and must report to the Colorado General Assembly each year concerning spending 
(CWCB, 2013, “About the CWCB”).  
One of the main responsibilities of the CWCB board is to translate the restrictions and 
requirements laid out in any statute pertaining to ISFs into the “Rules Concerning the Colorado 
Instream Flow and Natural Lake Level Program” (ISF Rules), or Code of Colorado Regulations 
(CRS) 408-2. The CCRs are the administrative rules of Colorado’s executive agencies, which 
includes the CWCB. The ISF Rules guide the CWCB ISF staff in running the ISF Program and 
outline procedures for interacting with the water courts, outside agencies and organizations, and 
other water users:  
 ISF Rules 1-4 includes a title, explanation of purpose, statutory authority, and key 
definitions.  
 ISF Rule 5 describes the procedure, timeline, and requirements for recommending 
and contesting new appropriations.  
 ISF Rule 6 outlines the procedures, requirements, and limitations for acquiring a 
permanent or temporary water right for ISF purposes.  
 ISF Rule 7 outlines the CWCB’s response to inundation of decreed ISF water rights due 
to artificial impoundment of water.  
 ISF Rule 8 describes when and how the ISF staff will monitor and take action to 
protect ISF.  
 ISF Rule 9 explains when and how the CWCB can modify an existing ISF by reduction, 
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segmentation or subtraction of water.  
 ISF Rule 10 outlines procedures for entering into an enforcement agreement in order to 
preserve or improve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.  
The rules are comprehensive in guiding the CWCB in managing the ISF Program, however, rules 
5, 6, and 8 are most important for this paper as it focuses on new appropriation and acquisition 
policy tools.  
Several ISF Rules are just reiterations of the restrictions, requirements, and authority set 
forth in legislative statutes. However there are many ISF Rules that require the CWCB to 
interpret statutes in order to create more focused rules and procedures for the interactions 
between the CWCB board and staff with other entities, organizations, and individuals.   
For example, section 37-92-102 (4)(a) of the Colorado Code states, “Utilizing a public 
notice and comment procedure, the board, in its discretion, may determine whether or not to 
appropriate minimum stream flows or natural lake levels, or decrease such an appropriation, to 
preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.” They have since translated this 
constitutional-level rule into a collective-level rule: ISF Rule 5c. Board Approval Process, which 
describes a processing timeline for recommending and applying for a new appropriation (Figure 
4).  
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Section 37-92-102 also requires the CWCB to request recommendations for new ISF 
appropriation from state and federal agencies such as Colorado Department of Parks and 
Wildlife, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Department of Interior, as well as 
NGOs such as Trout Unlimited and The Nature Conservancy (Loehman & Loomis, 2008). 
Individuals are also allowed to appeal to the CWCB. These agencies, organizations and 
individuals must address the unique biological requirements of each stream reach with respect to 
water availability. The CWCB helps to further standardize this process by providing an Instream 
Flow Recommendation Questionnaire and accepting the R2CROSS method as a standard 
Figure 4. New Appropriation Processing Timeline as seen on CWCB website. The processing timeline outlines 
the various steps involved in developing, recommending, and contesting a recommendation for a new ISF 
appropriation up to the point at which the CWCB will file through the Water Court. The timeline shows that 
completely processing a recommendation can take up to 3 years—maybe longer if contested. 
http://cwcb.state.co.us/environment/instream-flow-
program/Documents/Appropriations/NewAppropriationsTimeline.pdf  
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measurement technique in quantifying how much water is needed to preserve or improve the 
environment to a reasonable degree. The R2CROSS system takes into account both hydrologic 
and biological measures, is efficient with respect to time and labor, and is fairly easy to 
understand from the general public’s perspective. Instructions and calculation tools are made 
accessible to anyone online in the form of a user manual and programmed excel file for 
calculations.  
Once the ISF recommendation is complete using the R2CROSS method, the CWCB staff 
will determine whether there is sufficient water in the stream system to meet the biologic and 
hydrologic requirements. If there is insufficient water, the CWCB staff may ask the cooperating 
agency to reconsider their recommendation and see if there is an alternative way to protect the 
aquatic ecosystem with the water available (Espegren, 1996). After reviewing and prioritizing 
recommendations and requests, the CWCB decides which recommendations to pursue as 
permanent, fully adjudicated ISF water rights through the Colorado Water Courts based on need 
and feasibility.  
Additionally, offers to acquire senior water rights for ISF uses are considered by the 
CWCB on an as-offered basis (Merriman & Janicki, 2013). The CWCB rarely takes a proactive 
role in acquiring water rights as most of their resources are devoted to strategic ISF appropriation 
planning and monitoring decreed ISF water rights. If a water right is offered for an acquisition 
agreement, the CWCB has 120 days to decide the terms and conditions of the offer if they 
choose to accept it at all. While there is a standardized formal process for a water right holder to 
offer their water right to the CWCB, there is not consistent or formalized program for 
accepting/agreeing to acquisitions as there is for new appropriations.   
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The CWCB’s strategic plan states the CWCB’s board intends to “continually work with 
key program stakeholders and the public to engage educate inform and create mechanisms to 
obtain feedback and understand stakeholder needs regarding the CWCB authorities, base 
programs, and program applications” (CWCB, 2013, “Stream and Lake Protection Section 2005 
Strategic Plan”). While the CWCB does not actively pursue or seek out new appropriations and 
acquisitions, they do work to make sure the ISF Program is constantly evolving to adapt to 
changing needs and concerns in the Colorado water community. The CWCB typically does this 
by working with key community partners, such as the CWT.  
 
Colorado Water Trust 
According to King, et. al. (2004), “water trusts are private, nonprofit organizations that 
acquire water rights in order to enhance instream flow for conservation purposes” (p. 494). 
According to Beatie (2009), “…water trusts have been formed to protect and enhance 
streamflows by using market-based, voluntary, cooperative transactions that put older, more 
defensible water rights back into streams for the benefit of aquatic ecosystems, the flora and 
fauna that depend on them, and the people who enjoy them” (p. 4). The Oregon Water Trust was 
established in 1993, followed by the Washington Water Trust in 1998. Water trusts are typically 
found in the Western U.S., where almost every state that follows the Prior Appropriation 
Doctrine also maintains their own ISF program. Water trusts are often seen as part of a larger 
trend in decentralization of federal and state authority in natural resource management. Water 
trusts also barrow heavily from the land trust models developed in the Eastern U.S. (King, et. al., 
2004).  
The Colorado Water Trust (CWT) is a registered 501(c)(3) non-profit organization 
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established in 2001 that “engages in and supports voluntary efforts to restore and protect 
streamflows in Colorado to sustain healthy aquatic ecosystems” (CWT, 2013, “Home”).  The 
diversity of tools the CWT has had at its disposal has changed over time. Current tools include: 
water rights sales, water rights donations, long-term leases, short-term leases, dry-year 
transactions, structural and alternative use solutions, water rights trust, conservation easements, 
and creative combinations of all of the above (CWT, 2013) According to Beatie (2009), the 
CWT “pursues and supports the following ISF program areas: (1) conducting water rights 
acquisitions; (2) implementing physical, structural, and management solutions to improve 
streamflows; and (3) providing technical support for land trusts with water issues that often arise 
in connection with their land conservation activities” (p. 10). The creation of the CWT 
effectively established an alternative pathway for private water right holders willing to donate, 
sell, or lease their water rights for ISF use (Figure 4 & 5). The CWT works within existing 
constitutional and collective institutional structures in order to achieve on-the-ground success in 
protecting and improving ISFs.  As such, the CWT often interacts with water users at the 
operational level.  
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In 2012, the CWT helped to implement 3-in-10 short-term leases for the first time by 
creating the Request for Water (RFW) program by translating the requirements and restrictions 
set out in the statutes and ISF Rules into a structured process for individual water users to follow.  
The CWT set guidelines for the RFW application process including offering a minimum of 1 
cubic feet per second (cfs) of water per offer form, setting expectations for preliminary and 
follow-up inspections, addressing additional considerations when the water right holder 
submitting the Offer is not the sole owner of the water right, and providing a complete picture of 
the entire short-term leasing process, as shown in Figure 5.  
Figure 5. Process/Timeline for 3-in-10 STLs as seen on CWT website. The timeline provides a clear picture of 
the 3-in-10 short-term leasing process from when the water right is offered through the point at which the water 
lessor will be compensated. The timeline specifies which steps are confidential as well as the distinct responsibilities 
of the various actors. http://www.coloradowatertrust.org/campaigns/request-for-water-2013  
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Governance of Colorado’s Instream Flow Program at the Operational-Level 
Decreased availability and growing demand make any changes to water use contentious, 
particularly when the new uses are inherently different than traditional consumptive beneficial 
uses, such as ISF uses. Accordingly, participation at the operational level in Colorado’s ISF 
program is strictly voluntary. The Colorado General Assembly has increasingly passed 
legislation that encourages voluntary participation in the ISF Program, by legislatively removing 
barriers and increasing incentives for participation, which provides organizations and entities 
with a greater diversity of tools use to protect and improve ISFs (Figure 6). Within a system that 
historically privileges consumptive water uses, the CWCB effectively translates their legislative 
authority to preserve and improve the natural environment into four main policy tools: 
Appropriation, Permanent Acquisitions, Long-term Leasing (LTL), and 3-in-10 Short-term 
Leasing (STL).  
 
Appropriations 
An ISF appropriation is an ISF water right that is recommended to the CWCB by an 
outside organization or agency such as CPW, BLM, or the USDA. New appropriations have 
been allowed since 1973 with SB 97, which created the Colorado Instream Flow and Natural 
Lake Level Program to be administered by the CWCB (CWCB, 2013, “Historic Timeline). ISF 
appropriations are permanent, fully adjudicated water rights administered in the same priority 
system as consumptive water rights. They must be decreed through one of the seven state water 
courts where the CWCB must show that the water right will preserve or improve the natural 
environment to a reasonable degree, there is water available for the water right, and that the new 
water right will cause no material injury to any other vested or decreed water right users 
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(CWCB, 2013, “Instream Flow Program”). ISF rights are vulnerable to calls from upstream 
senior water rights when there is not enough water in a stream to meet all decreed uses because 
they typically do not have appropriation dates that pre-date large consumptive uses. For this 
reason, ISF appropriations are effective tools for protecting ISFs and preventing stream flow 
conditions from worsening, but do not directly restore stream flow (Beatie, 2009).  
 
Permanent Acquisitions  
Acquisitions are ISF rights acquired by the CWCB from another water user. These are 
also known as change of use cases, where water rights are transferred through the water courts 
from one decreed beneficial use to another. In the case of ISF acquisitions, the change of use is 
from a consumptive beneficial use to a non-consumptive beneficial use. Acquisitions have also 
been allowed since 1973 with SB 97. ISF flow acquisitions are also permanent, full adjudicated 
water rights administered in the same priority system as consumptive water rights. An 
acquisition is a market mechanism, meaning that the CWCB or the CWT, in many cases, will 
pay the seller or lessor a fair market value for the use of the water (Loehman & Loomis, 2008). 
 
Long-term Leases and Contracts 
Long-term leasing (LTL) has also been statutorily allowed since 1973. A LTL is a 
temporary acquisition that must be decreed through Colorado’s water courts. In 2008, Colorado 
passed legislation (H.B. 1280) removing any reduction of the historic consumptive use due to 
non-use in years the water right is leased to the CWCB in any future water court cases and 
removed the presumption of abandonment  (CWCB, 2013, “Historic Timeline”). LTLs are not a 
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permanent change of use, meaning the lessor retains ownership of the water right, however the 
change of use still goes through a full adjudication process through the water courts.  
 
3-in-10 Short-term Leases  
3-in-10 Short term leases (STLs) have been allowed in times of drought since 2003, 
without a declaration of drought since 2005, and without a reduction to historic consumptive use 
or presumption of abandonment since 2008. An agricultural water user can lease their water right 
to the CWCB for ISF purposes for 3 years in any 10-year period for no more than 120 days at a 
time. 3-in10 leases require administrative approval from the Division Engineer’s Office. The 
CWT is the only organization to date facilitating these STLs with the CWCB (CWCB, 2013, 
“Temporary Loans and Leases of Water Rights for Instream Flows”).  
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Figure 6. Historic Instream Flow Timeline: Constitutional, Collective, and Operational Evolution. The top timeline shows the passage of key 
legislation since the ISF Program’s inception in 1973 to present (constitutional level). The middle timeline shows the establishment of the two main 
actors in this analysis in relation to the key ISF legislation (collective level).  The bottom bars show how the recognition of beneficial use has 
changed relative to the constitutional and collective changes (operational level). (See Appendix A for details on Senate and House Bills used in the 
figure).  
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1 To determine if a new appropriation water right filing is appropriate, the CWCB determines: 1) natural 
environment, 2) water availability, and 3) material injury (Rules Concerning the Colorado Instream Flow and 
Natural Lake Level Program, Section 5i). 
2 To determine the appropriateness of an acquisition, the CWCB considers the following: 1) the proposed 
reach of the stream or lake level, 2) the natural flow regime, 3) material injury, 4) historical consumptive use 
and historic return flows available for instream flow use, 5) the natural environment, 6) location of the water 
rights on the subject stream(s), 7) effects on relevant interstate compact issues, 8) effect on maximum 
utilization of state waters, 9) if the acquired water will be available for subsequent downstream use or reuse, 
ISF Policy 
Tool 
Key 
Legislation Effect of Legislation Characteristics 
Appropriations 
S.B. 97  
(1973) 
● Creates the Colorado 
Instream Flow and Natural 
Lake Level Program to be 
administered by the CWCB 
● Permanent, fully adjudicated 
rights  
● CWCB Required Findings: 
        -3 considerations
1
 
● Water Court Process 
● Depend on water availability 
● Junior to most consumptive 
water rights 
Acquisitions 
S.B. 91 
(1986) 
● Clarified CWCB's authority 
to acquire water rights through 
donation, acquisition or lease 
● Permanent, fully adjudicated 
rights  
● CWCB Evaluation: 
        -11 considerations
2
 
● Water Court Process 
● Potential relatively senior 
priority date 
● Water market mechanism 
(unless donated) 
Long-term 
Leases & 
Contracts 
S.B. 91 
(1986) 
● Clarified CWCB's authority 
to acquire water rights through 
donation, acquisition or lease ● Temporary water rights 
● Water court process 
● Water market mechanism H.B. 1280 
(2008) 
● No reduction of the historic 
consumptive use  
● No presumption of 
abandonment  
3-in-10 Short-
term Leases 
H.B. 1320 
(2003) 
● Authorizes temporary loan 
during times of drought or 
other emergency 
● Temporary water rights 
● Administrative review process 
● Water market mechanism 
H.B. 1039 
(2005) 
● Removes the drought 
declaration requirement  
H.B. 1280 
(2008) 
● No reduction of the historic 
consumptive use  
● No presumption of 
abandonment 
Table 2. Four Main ISF Policy Tools. The table describes the characteristics of each policy tool, the 
associated key legislation, the effect of that legislation, and notes the number of transfers to date associated 
with each of the tools.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODS 
 
 
Colorado is unique in the American West as the state with the purest form of Prior 
Appropriation and as the only state to completely manage surface water allocations through a 
judicial system. Within Colorado, the CWCB is the only entity allowed to hold ISF water rights, 
and, currently, the CWT is the only organization actively pursuing acquisitions on behalf of the 
CWCB.  Therefore, a holistic, in-depth single-case study design is appropriate for the following 
analysis (Yin, 2002). 
While the literature suggests collaborative management is an appropriate natural resource 
management approach for translating processes into on-the-ground practices and increased 
outcomes, particularly in the case of water management, it is important to have concrete case 
studies that can explicate how collaborative management is effective in protecting ISFs in 
Colorado, if at all. Therefore, the main research question for the following analysis is: RQ: Has 
multi-level collaborative management been and will it be a successful approach for protecting 
instream flow in Colorado?  
In order to answer this broad research question, several levels of sub-questions will guide 
separate sections of the analysis:  
RQ1:   Why and how has Colorado’s ISF Program been successful so far? 
RQ1a: How frequently have the four ISF policy tools been used over time? 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
10) costs associated with completing the transaction, 11) administrability of the acquired water right (Rules 
Concerning the Colorado Instream Flow and Natural Lake Level Program, Section 6e). 
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RQ1b: How often and when are decreed ISF water rights thresholds not met? 
RQ2: What barriers to and opportunities for the success of Colorado’s ISF program exist?  
RQ2a: How were the 3-in-10 short-term leases derived from legislation and translated 
into on-the-ground ISF protections?  
RQ2b: Does the CWT, as a non-governmental organization, provide trust in the 
implementation of Colorado’s ISF Program, while CWCB, as a government agency, 
provides legitimacy?  
RQ3: What role does and will collaborative management play in the past and future success of 
Colorado’s ISF Program?  
RQ3a: How has and will 3-in10 STLs affect future ISF legislation and ISF Program 
management decisions?  
The following methods include both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative 
approaches are used to describe trends in the use of ISF policy tools and efficacy of ISF water 
rights, while qualitative approaches are used to determine and describe the institutional 
arrangements underlying the role of collaborative management in the implementation of the ISF 
Program.  
 
Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis 
Instream Flow Policy Tool Trends 
The frequency of use of ISF policy tools is an important first step in understanding why 
the CWCB and CWT use certain policy tools at certain times. Therefore, ISF water right trends 
are analyzed in two ways: 1) the relative priority of ISF water rights compared to all other 
Colorado water rights using appropriation dates binned by year and 2) the frequency of use of all 
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four policy tools over time. The Colorado Decision Support System (CDSS) is a water 
management system developed by the CWCB and the DWR and maintained by the DWR for 
each of Colorado’s major water basins. The CDSS maintains various datasets that are easily 
exported from their public website. However, the CDSS does not allow for relational searches 
across datasets. Therefore, several datasets from the CDSS, CWCB staff, and online records 
were used in an ad hoc fashion to combine and cross reference relevant information. The datasets 
include: 
 Water Rights-Net Amounts List3 containing the current status of all water rights based on a 
history of all their court decreed actions. 
 Water Rights-Diversion Structures List4 containing physical, manmade structures used for 
diverting, storing, releasing, or measuring water and their associated stream systems 
 ArcGIS Attribute Table of decreed ISFs 5  containing the number of decreed ISF 
appropriations and acquisitions as of 2012 and their associated latitude and longitude 
locations, case numbers, and stream miles protected. 
 CWCB Dataset of Gages located within ISF Water rights 6  containing gage names, 
locations, and agencies and ISF case numbers, decreed amounts and times, and upper and 
lower terminus locations. 
 
                                                        
3
 This dataset can be accessed through the DWR’s HydroBase Bulk Data Exporter. 
https://data.colorado.gov/Information-Sharing/DWR-Water-Right-Net-Amounts/acsg-f33s  
 
4
 This dataset can be accessed through the DWR’s HydroBase Bulk Data Exporter. 
https://data.colorado.gov/Information-Sharing/DWR-Administrative-Structures/vz77-kxck  
 
5
 The ArcGIS database for ISFs was provided by the CWCB staff for analysis and the attribute table was 
subsequently exported as an excel file 
 
6
 An excel file was provided by the CWCB staff using information from their GIS database and was subsequently 
formatted for appropriate analysis and cross-referencing 
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 Customized dataset from the CWCB’s ISF database 7  containing all new ISF 
appropriations as of 2013, their associated watersheds, case numbers, decreed amounts and 
dates, and stream miles protected. 
 CWCB’s online searchable ISF database 8  containing priority dates for permanent 
acquisitions. 
 CWCB’s online record9 of completed transactions including permanent acquisitions, long-
term leases, and short-term leases and associated case numbers, priorities, and decreed 
amounts.  
In order to determine the overall priority of all ISF water rights in Colorado, I calculated 
the appropriation date frequency per year for all water rights in Colorado from Net Water Right 
Amounts dataset and subtracted the appropriation date frequency per year for ISF water rights.  
In order to track how often appropriations and acquisitions are used as policy tools, I took 
the first two numbers of each of their case numbers, which corresponds to the year in which the 
water right was applied for through the water courts. Acquisitions are often offered in an ad-hoc 
manner after which they are consolidated and applied for in one court case. They might cover 
various times of the year and various locations, but will be offered by the same water user or 
offered at the same location. However, the CWCB records these water court cases as one ISF 
water right.  
 
Instream Flow Biophysical Threshold Trends 
                                                        
7
 An excel file was provided by the CWCB staff using their internal ISF database and was subsequently formatted 
for appropriate analysis and cross-referencing 
 
8
 http://cwcb.state.co.us/technical-resources/instream-flow-water-rights-database/Pages/main.aspx 
  
9
 http://cwcb.state.co.us/environment/instream-flow-program/Pages/CompletedTransactions.aspx  
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Examining how often ISF thresholds are not met in a spectrum of wet to dry years will 
provide insight into how effective the current use of ISF policy tools is in keeping water in a 
stream channel. As previously mentioned, recommenders for new appropriations use the 
R2CROSS system to determine biophysical need because it considers both hydraulic and 
biological measures, is efficient with respect to time and labor, and fairly easy to understand 
from the general public’s perspective. The CWCB, on the other hand, determines water 
availability with modeling tools and gages located throughout Colorado. ISF protection and 
monitoring rests on the assumption that when a pre-established threshold is met or exceeded (i.e. 
the R2CROSS recommendation), it follows that the natural environment, including the 
underlying ecological and biological components, is preserved or improved. Therefore, gage data 
is an appropriate indicator for determining the extent to which ISFs are protected.  
The following data collection and analysis was performed in collaboration with a 
graduate student in the Department of Geology at CU Boulder. We downloaded discharge data 
from 56 United States Geological Society (USGS) gages located within the reach of a fully 
adjudicated ISF water right throughout the state of Colorado. ISF gages include those monitored 
by the USGS which are publically available and consistently updated on the Consortium of 
Universities for the Advancement of Hydrologic Science, Inc. (CUAHSI) online database.  
“The CUAHSI is a 501(c)3 research organization representing more than 100 U.S. 
universities and international water science-related organizations. CUAHSI receives 
support from the National Science Foundation (NSF) to support the advancement of 
water science in the United States” (CUAHSI, 2012). 
This database includes stream gages from 31 different agencies. Data from CUAHSI was 
downloaded using a specific Python Hydrologic Information System (PyHIS) module developed 
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by the Texas Water Development Board. This allows the data to be translated into WaterML for 
further coding in Python. Python was used to build statistical codes and interface options for user 
data selection and processing. For each gage, we downloaded the daily mean discharge and the 
annual discharge for the available period of record. Periods of record for each gage are 
inconsistent with respect to the number of range of years of data collection, which largely depend 
on USGS funding for each gage.    
 
Quartile Plots 
We paired each daily discharge measurement from the entire period of record for each 
USGS gage with the decreed ISF water right volume (cfs) and counted the total number of days 
over the period of record for which that ISF minimum right volume was not met. We compared 
these measurements against the annual discharge over the period of record to determine if the 
daily mean discharge is below the ISF threshold during wet, above average, below average, or 
dry years. A year is determined to be a “dry” year if the annual discharge is in fourth quartile and 
a “wet” year if the annual discharge is in the first quartile of the annual discharge for the entire 
period of record.  A year is determined to be “above median” or “below median” if the annual 
discharge was above or below the median annual discharge for the period of record, but not 
within the 4
th
 or 1
st
 quartile, respectively. 
For each gage, we labeled each day over the period of record in one of eight categories 
based on whether the daily mean discharge was above, at, or below the ISF right threshold and if 
the annual discharge was considered “wet,” “above median,” “below median,” or “dry.” We 
calculated the percentage of total number of daily mean discharges that meet or exceed the ISF 
threshold for each gage individually for each period of record.  We also aggregated the 
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percentages weighted evenly by gage for any gage that had a period of record from 2003-2014, 
as 2003 was the latest initial year for any period of record across all 56 gages.  Any gage that did 
not continue through 2014 was dropped from the sample, which left us with 52 gages total for 
the aggregated data.   
 
Proximity Plots 
The ISF water rights and associated gages are placed into four distinct categories based 
on five distinct trends in the percentage of the ISF threshold not met between all four quartiles. 
One ISF water right and gage is selected for the three most common trends and analyzed further 
by creating proximity plots totaling three example gages. The GIS maps provided by the DWR 
are not sufficiently precise with respect to stream lines, water right structures, and USGS gage 
locations in order to determine relative proximity of water rights to a specific gage location. 
Therefore, a 1 arc-second Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) elevation map was used to 
build a drainage network using a flow accumulation and drainage direction algorithm.  The 
algorithm creates a line along which the USGS gages are properly aligned. We found all water 
rights located along the flow path within 20 kilometers upstream and downstream of the USGS 
gage. For upstream water rights structure, the 20 kilometers includes any water right structure 
located on a tributary. However, downstream water rights structures located on tributaries will 
not affect upstream ISF rights independent of whether they are relatively junior or senior to that 
ISF right. Therefore, a 250-meter buffer was created along the flow path line to find water 
structures along what would be the main stem of the stream on which the USGS gage is located. 
We then calculated the distance of each water right structure located within 20 kilometers 
upstream and downstream of the gage. For the downstream water right structures, we found the 
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portion of the main stem that was closest to the water right structure to determine the starting 
point in order to calculate distance. Upstream distances were assigned a negative value and 
downstream distances were assigned a positive value. All water right structures located within 
the designated area were ordered by priority according to their administration number. Any water 
right that was administratively junior to the ISF was excluded from the data and the 20 most 
administratively senior consumptive water rights were ordered and categorized as either 
upstream or downstream of the USGS gage located within the ISF water right. 
The resulting plots are presented for three example gages and associated ISF water rights, 
which represent the most frequent trends in the data. While the quartile and proximity graphs do 
not allow for a comprehensive understanding of what is happening at each ISF location, they 
provide insight on key hydrographic differences between ISF locations and are used as a basis 
for generating potential water right administration scenarios. The examples were chosen, not as 
statistically representative cases of the four qualitative trends, but rather as cases that 
demonstrate distinct qualitative trends between all 56 gages and that have sufficient data to 
create a plausible narrative with respect to the consumptive senior water rights surrounding each 
gage location. This quantitative analysis is also supported with quotes from interviews with ISF 
practitioners to provide context for the interpretation of the observed patterns. 
 
Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis 
Understanding how collaborative management has been used in Colorado’s ISF Program 
in the past is important to understanding how collaborative management might help Colorado’s 
ISF Program adapt to an uncertain future. One-on-one interviews with key personnel at the 
CWCB and CWT provide valuable insight into how the ISF Program has been implemented 
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through the ISF policy tools to date as well as challenges for the future. Interviews are used to 
identify baseline biophysical and legal criteria for the 3-in-10 short-term leases, identify 
perceived characteristics pertaining to a water user’s willingness to participate in a 3-in-10 short-
term lease, the role of the CWCB and CWT in implementing the short-term leasing program, and 
future challenges of the ISF Program. 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
Interviewees 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with the Colorado Water Trust and Colorado 
Water Conservation Board employees. The Colorado Water Trust has seven full-time employees 
an including Executive Director, an Operations Manager, a Communications and Development 
staff member, a Transaction Specialist, a Colorado Open Lands Fellow, a Staff Attorney, and a 
Director of Engineering. The Colorado Water Conservation Board Stream and Lake Protection 
Section has seven full-time employees including a Section Chief, a Deputy Section Chief, a 
Senior Water Resource Specialist, a Water Resource Engineer, a Hydrologist, a Water Resource 
Specialist, and a Hydrographer. While there are a total of 14 potential interviewees between the 
CWT and CWCB, I chose participants based on their knowledge, experience, multiple 
perspectives, and ability to provide useful information about 3-in-10 short-term leasing in 
Colorado, which resulted in nine total interviews between the two entities. 
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Interview Design 
I followed what Rubin and Rubin (2005) describe as the tree-and-branch method in order 
to structure interviews. The interviews were divided into equal parts based on the following 
broad categories:  
 Staff member’s role in implementing the leasing program, if any 
 Baseline biophysical and legal criteria for short-term leasing  
 Perceived participant characteristics pertaining to short-term lessor’s willingness to 
participate  
 Role of the CWCB and CWT in the short-term leasing program 
 Future Challenges 
Each category had at least one main question, after which the interviews consisted of a series of 
follow-up questions and probes to accommodate for both detail and depth in responses. Each 
interview contained the same basic format and main questions to build in redundancy in order to 
check interviews for consistency (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  
I transcribed each recording within 2 weeks of the interview using intelligent verbatim 
level transcription as to include only the level of detail likely to be analyzed and likely to 
influence the interpretation of the transcription. I analyzed the qualitative data following the 
basic, seven step process outlined in Rubin and Rubin (2005). Before I transcribed the 
interviews, I developed an initial coding scheme based off on a review of current literature. 
However, according to Rubin and Rubin (2005) the coding process should accommodate any 
emergent themes and concepts. Therefore, I iteratively adjusted the code as I transcribed and 
reviewed the interviews in order to achieve more inclusive end-results.  
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1) The Recognition step included a review of all of the transcripts in order to identify initial 
concepts, themes, events, and topical markers pertaining to the four broad interview 
categories including the staff member’s role in the short-term leasing process, short-term 
lessor participation criteria, perceived characteristics for short-term lessor willingness to 
participate, and the role of the CWCB and CWT in the ISF Program. I merged emergent 
themes, concepts, events, and topical markers with the initial codes established from the 
current literature review. 
2) A second review of the transcripts served to iteratively Clarify, Synthesize, and Elaborate 
those key concepts, themes, events, and topical markers.  
3) I finally labeled the concepts, themes, events, and topical markers with a final Coding 
scheme in order to Sort the data units and ultimately Synthesize those concepts, themes, 
events, and topical markers. 
The final codebook, which includes coding instructions, is attached as Appendix C. I de-
identified interviewees during the coding process by assigning each transcript an individual 
alphanumeric code. The codes include the state, entity type, and subject identifier. For example, 
CO-GOV-01 is associated with the first interview transcribed for a staff member at the Colorado 
Water Conservation Board.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
RESULTS PART I 
 
Instream Flow Policy Tool Use and Biophysical Threshold Trends 
 
Past trends in ISF policy tool use and ISF biophysical thresholds are presented in 
this section. ISF water rights can be decreed through either an appropriation or an acquisition, 
which translates into four main policy tools: new appropriations, permanent acquisitions, long-
term leasing, and short-term leasing. Each of these tools has distinct requirements for use and 
vary in the extent to which they are able to protect and restore ISFs.  The goal of this analysis is 
to understand when each ISF policy tool has been used to date as well as the relative 
effectiveness of their use in order to understand why and how the CWCB and CWT choose to 
use the four policy tools and whether or not this is important to the collaboration between the 
two entities. Therefore the overarching research question guides this analyses: RQ1: Why and 
how has Colorado’s ISF Program been successful so far? 
In order to understand the overarching research question, three sub-questions guide the 
following analysis. Outside of legislative restrictions, the CWCB and CWT may choose to use 
one tool more than another for reasons such as resources, capacity, or political factors. Therefore, 
tracking the frequency of ISF policy tool use over time is a key first step in understanding why 
the CWCB and CWT use certain policy tools more frequently than others. The first sub-question 
begins this analysis: 
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Table 3 ISF Policy Tool Use. The table notes the number of transactions or transfers as of 2012 associated with 
each of the ISF policy tools.  
 
RQ1a: How frequently have the four ISF policy tools been used over time? 
As shown in Table 2, each of the four main policy tools has been used with varying frequency 
due to changes in statutes and actors involved. As of 2012, there were 146,455 decreed water 
rights in the state of Colorado and only 1,601 of those are designated ISF water rights (~1.1%) 
(Colorado Division of Water Resources, 2014, “Colorado Decision Support System: Water 
Rights”).   
 
 
 
Appropriations  
Of the 1,601 decreed ISF water rights, 1,582 of those are new appropriations, none of 
which will have appropriation dates before 1973. Table 2 shows that new appropriations have 
been the most frequently used approach thus far. However, the timeline of the use of 
appropriations and permanent acquisitions, tracked by the years in which the ISF right was 
applied for through the water courts (Figure 7), shows that the number of times new 
appropriations have been used is skewed towards the 1970s and has dropped off in recent years. 
Any single average number of number of appropriations created per year since 1973 would hide 
the decreasing trend, however one CWCB staff member stated that the new appropriations have 
averaged out in recent years to 10-15 per year. Although in 2013, the CWCB only received two 
ISF Policy Tool Number of Times Used  
Appropriations 1,582 
Permanent Acquisitions 19 (2 pending) 
Long-term Leases 6 
Short-term Leases 7  
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recommendations, indicating that the number of recommendations per year can still be variable 
(Personal Communication CO-GOV-04, May 3, 2014).  
 6
6
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Total Colorado ISF Cases : Appropriations and Permanent Acquisitions. The graph shows the frequency of ISF cases over-
time beginning in 1973. Cases are distinguished between appropriations (light green) and acquisitions (red). Note that ISF cases numbers 
and derived years were used to represent the year in which an ISF was applied for through a water court. This date does not represent the 
year in which the right was decreed by the water courts. 
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Permanent Acquisitions 
Since 1973, there have been 19 permanent ISF acquisitions agreements, with two 
currently pending (Figure 7). Acquisitions, or the change of use for an existing decreed water 
right to ISF use on either a permanent or temporary basis, can potentially have an appropriation 
date senior to consumptive diversions and restore ISF within a river basin (Figure 8).  
 
Long-term Leasing and Contracts 
Currently, there are six long-term leases and contracts in use by the CWCB (CWCB, 
2013, “Completed Transactions”). While long-term leasing has been statutorily allowed since 
1973 and reaffirmed in 1986, these transactions are more difficult to track over time because 
leasing terms and conditions end. Therefore, this number may not represent the total number of 
leases that have been completed since 1986. 
 
3-in-10 Short-term Leasing 
3-in-10 STLs have been statutorily allowed specifically for ISF without a declaration of 
drought since 2005 and the reduction of historic consumptive use penalties and presumption of 
abandonment was removed in 2008, but the 3-in-10 legislation was first implemented in 2012 
and thus far 7 leases have been approved.  
 
Overall, the data show a trend of less utilization of permanent on-the-ground policy 
solutions for ISF protection (i.e. appropriations) over time and variable use of policy tools that 
both restore and protect ISF permanently or temporarily (i.e. acquisitions). When ISF water 
rights are compared to all other water rights in terms of their priority dates, the trend shows that 
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most of the decreed ISFs priority dates fall after 1973 and a majority of all other water rights fall 
before 1973 (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Appropriation Date Frequency: All Water Rights vs. ISF Water Rights.  Histogram of current number of water rights decreed in 
Colorado, categorized by the year of their appropriation date. Light blue represents any decreed water right for beneficial use in Colorado. Red 
columns represent the subset of those decreed water rights as those decreed for instream flow use. Instream flow water rights comprise just 
over 1% of the total number of decreed water rights in Colorado.  
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Understanding the biophysical trends of ISF thresholds in Colorado and how often ISF 
thresholds are met across Colorado provides valuable insight into the relative effectiveness of the 
use of different policy tools. Every ISF water right has an associated decreed quantity of water 
(cfs) that is based on how much water is needed to preserve or improve the natural environment 
between two specific locations along a stream, how much water is available to preserve or 
improve that specific natural environment, and how much water can be decreed without causing 
injury to any other water right on the same stream. This threshold can change throughout the 
year as the amount of water in any given stream changes throughout the year. The two reasons 
this threshold is not met are 1) natural variability of water in the stream system and 2) the 
relative decreed timing, amount, and priority of nearby diversions. A majority of the academic 
literature on ISF water rights in Colorado notes that ISFs are relatively junior water rights 
because they were not legislated until 1973, which is accurate, but then go on to say that because 
ISFs are junior, these rights are most often not met in dry years. Examining how often ISF 
thresholds are not met in a spectrum of wet to dry years provides valuable insight into how 
effective the current use of ISF policy tools is in achieving the intended outcome of keeping 
water in a stream channel in order to preserve or improve the natural environment. The following 
sub-question guides this section of the analysis:  
RQ1b: How often and when are decreed ISF water rights thresholds not met? 
 Figure 9 shows the percentage of days in which an ISF is not met aggregated from 05-06-
2003 to 4-22-2014 for all gages across all 7 water divisions. Of the 52 gages sampled from 05-
06-2003 to 4-22-2014, 10.7% of the daily mean discharges of all of the days sampled were below 
the ISF threshold in a “Wet” year, 9.7% of the daily mean discharges were below the ISF 
threshold in an “Above Median” year, 21.3% of the daily mean discharges were below the ISF 
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threshold in a “Below Median” year, and 27.1% daily mean discharges were below the ISF 
threshold in a “Dry” year (Figure 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The overall trend in Figure 9 shows that in the past 11 years decreed ISF thresholds have 
been met for a majority of the time in which the ISF water right is supposed to protect a stream 
reach independent of whether or not it is a wet or dry year. While the trend in Figure 9 does not 
quantitatively mimic the natural hydrograph, qualitatively it follows the basic notion that when 
there is less water in the stream during dry years, ISF water rights (which are fulfilled when 
water is left in the stream between two specific points) would be fulfilled less often independent 
of administration. 
Figure 9. Percentage ISF threshold not exceeded for all USGS stations sampled. The percentage of days the ISF 
threshold was not exceeded is shown in red and the percentage of days the ISF was exceeded in show in blue across 
all USGS gages sampled.  This includes 52 of gages that have periods of record between 2003-present.  10.7% of the 
days that the ISF threshold was not met were in a wet year, 9.7% of the days that the ISF threshold was not met were 
in an above median year, 21.3% of the days that the ISF threshold was not met were in a below median year, and 
27.1% of the days that the ISF threshold was not met were in a dry year. 
 
72 
7
2
 
However, when these data are compared between gages over a larger and more variable 
period of record the pattern of ISF being met a majority of time but less in dry years does not 
always hold true. Out of the 56 total USGS gages sampled over their entire period of record, five 
categories of distinct qualitative trends appear. The following 5 categories describe the 
percentage of days the ISF threshold is not met ordered from most often to least often:  
1) dry years > below median years > above median years > wet years  
2) dry years > above median years > below median years> wet years  
3) below median years > dry years > above median years > wet years 
4) all years met 
5) only not met in dry years 
In the case of Colorado water, changes in the natural pattern of the hydrograph is most 
certainly associated with the number and quantity of diversions throughout the state. However, in 
the case of ISFs, the underlying notion that a junior water right will be filled less often than a 
senior water right when located within the same drainage system is made more complex by the 
fact that ISF water rights are met when water is left within the channel, not when water is 
diverted from the channel as is the case with most any other water right. Before walking through 
three examples detailing how individual ISF thresholds are met or not met to various degrees in 
relatively wet and dry years, it is important to explicitly outline four basic principles on which 
the analysis is based:  
1) A water right that is located upstream of an ISF water right and is junior to that ISF 
water right will not prevent surface water from reaching that ISF water right 
73 
7
3
 
2) A water right that is located downstream of an ISF water right and is junior to that 
ISF water right will not affect the amount of water that passes through the ISF water 
right 
3) A water right that is located upstream of an ISF water right and is senior to that ISF 
water right  
a. has the potential to prevent surface water from ever reaching that ISF water 
right  
b. will return a portion of that water right to the stream as return flow, which 
may occur below or within the downstream ISF water right (Figure 10) 
4) A water right that is located downstream of an ISF water right and is senior to that 
ISF water right has the potential to pull water through an upstream ISF water right by 
curtailing water rights that are upstream and senior to the ISF water right but are also 
junior to the senior downstream water right (Figure 11) 
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Figure 10.  ISF water right administration with a senior upstream water right. The upstream senior water 
right has the potential to prevent surface water from ever reaching the downstream ISF water right. The black 
lines are the diversion structures and upstream/downstream point of the ISF water right. The blue lines are the 
main stem and the grey shading is surface water in the stream or being pulled into a diversion structure.  
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  Figure 11. ISF water right administration with a senior upstream and downstream water right.  A senior water 
right that is located downstream of an ISF water right has the potential to pull water through an upstream ISF water 
right by curtailing water rights that are upstream and senior to the ISF water right but are also junior to the senior 
downstream water right. The black lines are the diversion structures and upstream/downstream point of the ISF water 
right. The blue lines are the main stem and the grey shading is surface water in the stream or being pulled into a 
diversion structure. 
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Examples 1: USGS Gage 09304500 
Period of Record: 10-01-1901 to 4-22-2014 
Days in Period of Record: 41,111 
ISF Threshold: 200 cfs from 1/1 to 12/31 
Segment Length: 43 Miles 
Type of ISF Water Right Transaction: Appropriation 
Case number: 5-77W3652C 
Location: Water Division 6, Yampa/White Basin, Water District 43, Rio Blanco 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USGS 09304500: 
WHITE RIVER NEAR MEEKER, CO 
Consumptive Water Rights Senior to the ISF Water Right 
 
Figure 13.  Consumptive Water Rights Senior to the ISF Water Right. Of the 20 most senior water rights 
by administration number located within 20 km upstream and downstream of the ISF water rights and within 
250 m of the stream on which the ISF water right is located, all 20 are downstream of the ISF water right.  
Figure 12. Percentage ISF threshold not exceeded for all USGS gage 09304500. The percentage of days the ISF 
threshold was not exceeded is shown in red and the percentage of days the ISF was exceeded in show in blue across 
all USGS gages sampled.  0.2% of the days that the ISF threshold was not met were in a wet year, 7.0% of the days 
that the ISF threshold was not met were in an above median year, 9.7% of the days that the ISF threshold was not 
met were in a below median year, and 83.2% of the days that the ISF threshold was not met were in a dry year. 
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Figure 12 shows that the percentage of days the ISF threshold is not met is greatest in dry 
years, followed by below median years, followed above median years, followed by wet years. 
This trend makes sense according to what we would expect if the percentage of days the ISF 
threshold is not met follows the natural hydrograph. However to really understand what is 
driving that trend it is important to examine the surrounding administrative structures. Figure 13 
shows that out of the 20 most senior water rights located within 20 km upstream of downstream 
of the gage are all located downstream of the ISF water right, meaning none are consumptive 
water rights preventing water from passing through the ISF water right. The following are two 
potential scenarios that explain the trend in Figure 12: 
Potential Scenario 1:  
If there is a consistent pre-determined amount of water that has to pass through the ISF 
water right in order to reach the downstream senior water rights with no upstream water right 
interference, the trend in the ISF threshold being met across all four quartiles should mimic the 
natural hydrograph if there is too little water in the stream to meet downstream senior water 
rights in dry years.  This scenario assumes that the aggregate amount of water needed to meet 
senior downstream water rights amounts to more than the decreed 200 cfs year-round ISF 
threshold.  
Potential Scenario 2:  
 If there is a consistent pre-determined amount of water that has to pass through the ISF 
water right in order to reach the downstream senior water rights with no upstream water right 
interference, but the aggregate amount of water needed to meet the senior downstream water 
rights is less than the decreed 200 cfs year-round ISF threshold, the trend in the ISF threshold 
being met may also mimic the natural hydrograph.  
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Examples 2: USGS Gage 09061600 
Period of Record: 06-08-2002 to 04-22-2014 
Days in Period of Record: 4,338 
ISF Threshold: 1.5 cfs from 1/1 to 12/31 
Segment Length: 37 miles 
Type of ISF Water Right Transaction: Appropriation 
Case number: 5-85CW262 
Location: Water Division 5, Colorado Basin, Water District 37, Eagle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USGS 09061600: 
EAST FORK EAGLE RIVER NEAR CLIMAX, CO 
Consumptive Water Rights Senior to the ISF Water Right 
 
Figure 14. Percentage ISF threshold not exceeded for all USGS gage 09061600. The percentage of days the 
ISF threshold was not exceeded is shown in red and the percentage of days the ISF was exceeded in show in 
blue across all USGS gages sampled. The ISF threshold was met 100% of the time in a wet, above median, 
below median, and dry years. 
Figure 15.  Consumptive Water Rights Senior to the ISF Water Right. Of the 20 most senior water rights 
by administration number located within 20 km upstream and downstream of the ISF water rights and within 
250 m of the stream on which the ISF water right is located, 18 are downstream of the ISF water right and 2 
are located upstream of the water right.  
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Figure 14 shows that the ISF water right at this location is met 100% of the time across 
all four quartiles. Figure 15 shows that out of the 20 most senior water rights located within 20 
km upstream of downstream or the gage, two are located downstream of the ISF water right, and 
18 are located upstream of the ISF water right. This means there are 18 consumptive senior water 
rights that could potentially prevent water from passing through the ISF water right. It is worth 
noting that the most senior water right out of the 20 most senior is located downstream of the ISF 
water right.  The following are two potential scenarios that explain the trend in Figure 14: 
Potential Scenario 1:  
The ISF water right and surrounding consumptive water rights are always met because 
there is always sufficient water in the stream to meet every use.  
Potential Scenario2:  
 The most senior water right out of the 20 most senior water rights located within 20 km 
upstream and downstream of the gage is located downstream of the ISF water right, which has 
only 1.5 cfs year-round threshold, and is a larger quantity than the ISF water right. In dry years 
that downstream senior right may curtail one or many of the consumptive water rights upstream 
of the ISF, pulling enough water through the ISF water right in any degree of dry years. 
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Examples 3: USGS Gage 06710385 
Period of Record: 08-01-1984 to 04-22-2014 
Days in Period of Record: 10,856 
ISF Threshold: 10 cfs from 4/15 to 10/15 
   5 cfs from 10/16 to 4/14 
Segment Length: 13.5 miles 
Type of ISF Water Right Transaction: Appropriation 
Case number: 1-94-CW258 
Location: Water Division 1, South Platte Basin, Water District 9, Jefferson County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Percentage ISF threshold not exceeded for all USGS gage 06710385. The percentage of days the ISF 
threshold was not exceeded is shown in red and the percentage of days the ISF was exceeded in show in blue across 
all USGS gages sampled. 0% of the days that the ISF threshold was not met were in a wet year, 36.1% of the days that 
the ISF threshold was not met were in an above median year, 0.6% of the days that the ISF threshold was not met 
were in a below median year, and 63.33% of the days that the ISF threshold was not met were in a dry year. 
 
Figure 17.  Consumptive Water Rights Senior to the ISF Water Right. Of the 20 most senior water rights by 
administration number located within 20 km upstream and downstream of the ISF water rights and within 250 m of 
the stream on which the ISF water right is located, 15 are downstream of the ISF water right and 5 are located 
upstream of the water right.  
USGS 06710385: 
BEAR CREEK ABOVE EVERGREEN, CO 
Consumptive Water Rights Senior to the ISF Water Right 
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Figure 16 shows that the percentage of days the ISF threshold is not met is greatest in dry 
years, followed by above median years, below median years, and finally wet years. However, 
this trend does not follow what we might expect according to the natural hydrograph, indicating 
that other factors play a role in determining whether or not an ISF threshold is met at any given 
point in time. Figure 17 shows that out of the 20 most senior water rights located within 20 km 
upstream of downstream of the gage, 15 are located downstream of the ISF water right, and 5 are 
located upstream of the ISF water right. This means there are 5 consumptive senior water rights 
that could potentially prevent water from passing through the ISF water right. The following are 
two potential scenarios that explain the trend in Figure 16: 
Potential Scenario 1:  
Wet Year 
The ISF water right and surrounding consumptive water rights are always met because 
there is sufficient water in the stream to meet them all.  
Above Median Year 
The senior consumptive water rights located upstream of the ISF are being met and 
diverted from the stream meaning there is not sufficient water to meet the downstream ISF water 
right as often as in a wet year. However, the return flow from the consumptive uses are sufficient 
in quantity, timing, and location to meet the downstream senior instream flows so that they are 
not curtailing enough of the upstream water rights and pulling water through the ISF water right.  
Below Median Year 
There is not enough water to fulfill both the consumptive water rights upstream of the 
ISF water right and the senior downstream water rights, the consumptive upstream water rights 
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are curtailed to the downstream senior water right, which pulls water through the ISF water right 
and the threshold is met more often than in an above median year.  
Dry Year 
There is not enough water to fully meet the downstream senior water rights, so even if 
they pull water through the ISF water right it is not sufficient to meet the ISF threshold.  
Potential Scenario 2:  
Wet Year 
The ISF water right and surrounding consumptive water rights are always met because 
there is sufficient water in the stream to meet them all.  
Above Median Year 
There is enough water to meet all 5 consumptive uses leaving insufficient water in the 
stream to meet the two seasonal ISF thresholds as often as in a wet year. 
Below Median Year 
There is not enough water to meet the least senior downstream water right, which curtails 
the least senior upstream water right, letting enough water through the ISF water right to meet 
both of its season thresholds more often than in an above median year.  
 Dry Year 
There is not enough water to meet all nine of the most senior downstream water rights, 
and the aggregate of those that can be met is much less than the seasonal ISF thresholds.   
 
Overall the three examples do not provide sufficient evidence in order to conclusively 
determine what is happening administratively at each gage, but they do provide enough evidence 
to suggest that ISF thresholds are not always met the least in dry years. Table 3 shows that out of 
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the 56 USGS gages analyzed, 32 USGS gages followed the trend in which most of the days in 
which the ISF threshold was not met fall in the dry years, followed by below median years, 
above median years, and finally wet years. This is a similar trend to Example 1 above. Twelve of 
the 56 USGS gages followed the trend in which most of the days in which the ISF threshold was 
not met fall in the dry years, followed by above median years, below median years, and finally 
the wet years. This trend is similar to Example 3 above. Only two of the 56 USGS gages 
followed a trend in which most of the days in which the ISF threshold was not met fall in below 
median years, followed by dry years, above median years, and finally the wet years. Five of the 
56 USGS gages showed the associated ISF water right only not met in dry years. Seven of the 56 
USGS gages showed the associated ISF right being met for 100% of the period of record for that 
gage. It is important to note that while Table 3 shows the frequency with which the 56 sampled 
USGS gages fit the qualitative trends, it says nothing about the extent or degree to which each 
gage fits each qualitative trend.  
 
  
 While more than 50% of the USGS gages in the analysis showed that ISF thresholds were 
not met most often in a relatively dry year, 25% of the gages sampled showed that ISF thresholds 
are not met most often in a below median or above median year. These results have important 
Qualitative Trend: Percentage of days the ISF threshold is not met ordered 
from most often to least often across quartiles from left to right 
Number of USGS 
Gages 
Dry Below Median Above Median Wet 32 
Dry Above Median Below Median Wet 12 
Below Median Dry Above Median Wet 2 
Only Not Met in Dry Years  5 
All Years Met 7 
Table 4. Frequency of 5 Distinct Trends in Percentage of Days ISF threshold is Not Met. The table shows 5 
qualitative trends across dry to wet year quartiles in which the percentage of days the ISF threshold is not met is 
ordered from most often to least often from left to right. 
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implications for how the CWCB and CWT determine when and where to use different ISF policy 
tools to protect and restore ISF.  
 A majority of literature surrounding ISFs in Colorado points to the fact that because ISFs 
were not legislatively recognized as a beneficial use until 1973 most ISF water rights have junior 
priority dates compared to most other consumptive water rights. Figure 8 shows that this is true. 
However, the results from RQ1b show that the assumption that relatively junior ISFs are not 
fulfilled in dry years in the same way relatively junior consumptive water rights with diversions 
are not met in dry years is not always true. This is a particularly important concept with the 
implementation of the 3-in-10 STLs, which were developed and implemented for the first time in 
response to an impending drought in 2012. Most ISF personnel and water managers who work 
on ISF issues or the administration of water rights on a daily basis are aware of this concept:  
“…in a really dry year, like in 2000, ‘oh no this is a really bad year. Instream flows are 
really going to suffer.’ Well they didn’t necessarily suffer because the call went all the 
way up and went to the smaller sub-basins. It wasn’t just a main stem Colorado River call 
… it went up all the way up the Colorado River and in smaller basins the call was moving 
way up into the headwaters areas so that instream flows, which are typically higher up, 
were benefiting because water was being called through the reach … So 2000 wasn’t 
necessarily a bad year for the instream flow program. And I think we’ve seen that in 
similar drought years … it’s going to vary depending on the stream.” (CO-GOV-04) 
 
 The 3-in-10 STLs, while developed as an ISF protection tool in response to a projected 
dry year, are not legislated as a drought tool. Statutorily a 3-in-10 STL can be used in any 
situation in which a decreed ISF water right is water short, which might occur as a result of 
drought, but it also might occur in a relatively wet year due to other administrative factors. This 
idea is explicitly recognized by several ISF practitioners:  
“… these short term projects are not just drought projects—they can work anywhere that 
an instream flow is water short. So if the CWCB has appropriated an instream flow and 
it’s generally water short we can bring water through the short-term leasing program to 
that water right … so it’s not just a drought tool.” (CO-NGO-04) 
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“…we also relied on some information that we gained from some of the other groups and 
also from internal knowledge of you know people that live in these areas and say that the 
river is short here every single year—it’s even worse in a drought.” (CO-NGO-01)  
 
 However, the narrative among some ISF practitioners exists that 3-in-10 STLs are tools 
used in response to drought or in dry years or at the very least that a dry year is when the tool 
would be most useful.  
“…it’s hard to know in advance if you’re going to need it. This year was a perfect 
example … the Water Trust I imagine had some thought of other partial years they could 
do but they didn’t really need it because we had a much wetter fall even though it was 
kind of dry overall.” (CO-GOV-01) 
 
“… one thing that that came up was because we’re using it in a dry year…” (CO-GOV-
05) 
   
“I think there’s a lot of expense and a lot of work that’s required in order for either a 
permanent acquisitions or … dry year leases …” (CO-GOV-04) 
 
“that it [offered water right] was of senior enough priority that it would still have water 
available to it in a dry year.” (CO-GOV-02) 
 
 While there seems to be an inherent assumption in the academic literature that ISF 
thresholds are met less often in drought years and somewhat among ISF practitioners that the 3-
in-10 STLs are a drought response tool, determining how to use ISF policy tools most effectively 
is extremely context dependent.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
RESULTS PART II 
 
 
Understanding the trends in the frequency of use of ISF policy tools and biophysical 
characteristics of ISF thresholds is only one part of a larger programmatic picture. The following 
findings focus on barriers and incentives to participating in Colorado’s ISF Program, the roles of 
the various actors involved, current and future challenges, the strengths and weaknesses of 
judicial and administrative processes, and the treatment of ISF under Colorado water law and by 
the Colorado water community. Colorado’s Instream flow program was established in 1973 and 
has been managed by the CWCB for over 40 years.  The goal of this analysis is to explicate the 
evolution of past and current institutional arrangements surrounding Colorado’s ISF Program in 
order to determine whether or not collaborative governance has played a role in the success of 
the ISF Program. Therefore the overarching research question is: RQ2: What barriers to and 
opportunities for the success of Colorado’s ISF program exist?  
 
 
Institutional Interactions 
 
  Legislation governing Colorado’s ISF Program has evolved over time to better clarify 
what can and cannot be done to protect ISFs as one of many vested water interests in Colorado. 
However, how that legislative evolution has been translated into new policy tools and by whom 
is not well explicated. A recently developed policy tool, the 3-in-10 STLs, provides a useful 
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example to understand if and how the implementation of ISF legislation is an example of 
collaborative management.  
RQ2a: How were the 3-in-10 short-term leases derived from legislation and translated into on-
the-ground ISF protections?  
Colorado’s ISF Program is not a regulatory program. Because ISFs are administered as 
any other beneficial use the only way the CWCB can acquire a water right is if a water right 
holder voluntary changes the use of their water rights permanently or temporarily. The only way 
the CWCB can appropriate water is if partner agencies make recommendation and other water 
right users do not have a legitimate reason to oppose the appropriation. Therefore voluntary 
participation and cooperation from the water community is necessary in order to protect and 
restore instream flows. Therefore, success of translating ISF legislation into on-the-ground ISF 
practices depends on perceived barriers and incentives to participation in the ISF Program on the 
part of private water right holders. It is important to note that much of the following section of 
analysis covers perceived barriers and incentives to participation in the ISF Program as a whole 
and not solely the 3-in-10 STL agreements. However, this is appropriate as it is difficult to de-
couple perceptions surrounding a single policy tool from a larger program of which it is a part.  
 
Tangible Barriers 
As Table 5 and Table 6 describe, based on interview data, barriers to participation in 
Colorado’s ISF Program can be tangible or intangible and vary between the four different policy 
tools. Tangible barriers to participation include those that come at a monetary or resource cost to 
the water right holder. Permanent acquisitions and LTLs require approval through the water 
courts which can be very expensive process for the water holder interested in donating, selling, 
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or leasing their water right and requires sole decision-making power on part of the water right 
holder. Acquisition agreements require an engineering report calculating the historic 
consumptive use of the offered water right. For temporary acquisitions, this analysis may expose 
the fact that the water right holder is using less water than reported or thought, or the analysis 
may interfere with the sale of the water right in the future if multiple independent analyses from 
multiple sources do not match. STLs also require a certain amount of capacity on the part of the 
water right holder. If the STL requires the water right holder to remove land from production, the 
water right holder will lose a source of income. However, depending on that water right holder’s 
degree of dependency on the income earned from the land being used, they may be more or less 
willing to remove part of their land from production. Multi-year contracts in which a water right 
holder has obligations to fulfill with a third party and cannot break the contract in order to lease 
the water temporarily can also logistically prevent a water right holder from entering into an 
acquisitions agreement.  
 
Intangible Barriers  
Conversely, intangible barriers to participation include those that come at a psychic or 
social cost to the water right holder. Trust is defined in two ways in this analysis: political, or 
vertical trust in institutions, and social, or horizontal trust in people. Interview responses suggest 
a perceived lack of political trust in the government, particularly when dealing with water rights. 
The government is often seen as taking a resource that belongs to private water right holders, one 
on which many of those private water right holders’ livelihoods depend. However, government is 
not the only source of distrust surrounding the ISF Program. Familiarity with water markets can 
also affect whether or not a water rights holder will be willing to participate in the ISF Program. 
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This level of familiarity refers to, for example, whether a water right holder understands how a 
water lease might work between any two water users, not necessarily just within the ISF 
Program. This familiarity may be further developed if the potentially interested water right 
holder knows and identifies with another water right holder that has participated in a contract 
that works within a water market. In other words, if there is a certain amount of social trust 
established between past and potential water market participants, a water rights holder might be 
more willing to participate in the ISF Program. Respondents also referred to the level of social 
trust between potential participants and the CWT as an important factor that might influence a 
water right holder’s willingness to participate. Water right holders that are more familiar with the 
CWT, including their staff, their work, or their reputation, seem more likely to have a 
conversation about using their water right to protect ISF.  Additionally, a water right holder may 
be reluctant to relinquish control over their own individual water rights in what they see as 
publicly owned and what should be a publicly operated resource. Interview respondents also 
suggested that many water right holders may see ISF water rights, both appropriations and 
acquisitions, as obstacles that will ultimately affect their ability to change the use, location, and 
timing of their decreed water right in the future. Other water right users may believe that the 
responsibility for keeping water in a stream lies with them and not the government.  Furthermore, 
water right holders may question the legitimacy of ISFs and the ISF Program. Respondents 
reported water right holder perceptions of ISFs as non-traditional water uses, and therefore, not a 
use of water that should exist. Or, in the case of the STLs, they may be skeptical of a policy tool, 
which before 2012, was never used. One respondent even described temporary acquisitions being 
grouped and conflated with permanent “Buy and Dry” transfers, which are largely opposed 
throughout Colorado. 
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Table 5. Tangible Barriers to Participation in Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
 
 
Instream 
Flow 
New 
Appropriations 
Permanent 
Acquisitions 
Temporary 
Long-term 
Leases 
Temporary Short-term 
Leases 
Relevant Quotes 
Financial  ● Water Court can be very expensive and uncertain for any of 
the parties involved in the process. 
"Well the barrier is water court--it’s expensive 
and it’s risky and people aren’t interested in 
doing it." (CO-NGO-02) 
Historic 
Consumptive 
Use Analysis 
  ● Exposure of reasonable estimate of historic 
consumptive use to public may affect the 
water right holder’s ability to sell the water 
right down the road 
"It’s an expedited process but it’s like an 
expedited mini-change case so you’re having 
to expose your historical consumptive use and 
a lot of people don’t really like doing … [an] 
attorney was just highly skeptical of even 
considering the program because of opening 
up the water right to eventually the public, 
even if we are very confidential, because once 
it goes to the State it gets noticed...." (CO-
NGO-03) 
Ownership  ● The water right holder Lacks sole decision making power 
over the water right. 
"A lot of water users also own water that is 
somehow not—they don’t have sole say over 
what happens so it’s either in a trust or it’s 
encumbered by a conservation easement so 
they are not the only person whose opinion 
goes into the decision." (CO-NGO-01) 
Capacity   ● Taking land out of 
production potentially takes 
away a source of income for 
water right holders  
● Third party, multi-year 
contracts may prevent a water 
right holder from leasing their 
water for certain periods of 
time in order to fulfill other 
obligations   
● A water right holder that 
greatly depends on their water 
right for their livelihood may 
not be willing to try something 
new that could pose risk to 
their livelihood  
"… the quintessential rancher—he needs that 
land year-in and year-out. You know if he’s 
built ... a particular genetic herd and they have 
a five year contract with somebody to provide 
beef  ... and may have multi-year contracts for 
the inputs for that herd ... they can’t really just 
like turn off one year and turn back on 
because everything is based on not just a 
yearly thing ... so I think that it’s harder to 
find the right fit for somebody who’s actually 
using that land for a living than these other 
groups but I also think ... with creative 
arrangement you can still get those folks in the 
program. " (CO-NGO-02) 
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Table 6. Intangible Barriers to Participation in Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
 Instream 
Flow 
New 
Appropriations 
Permanent 
Acquisitions 
Temporary 
Long-term 
Leases 
Temporary 
Short-term 
Leases 
Relevant Quotes 
Political 
Trust 
● Distrust the government by the water community and the view that government is 
taking a resource upon which people’s livelihoods depend. 
“But there’s always this trust issue that 
government’s coming in, taking something. I hear it 
called, even though it’s not a ‘takings’, I hear it 
called a ‘takings’ all the time…” (CO-GOV-04) 
 ● Lack of familiarity on water right holder’s part with 
the water market and water transactions 
Social 
Trust 
 ● Lack of familiarity on water right holder’s part with 
the CWT, their work, how they do their work, or their 
staff 
"... [if] they can talk to someone who has worked 
with us or talk with someone who has gotten checks 
from us and can say, ‘oh yea that the amount that I 
got for my water was what they said it was, 
everything worked out, they came out here, and 
they weren’t a pain in the ass.’ You know it speaks 
to how the program worked and how it impacted 
their daily life ..." (CO-NGO-01) 
 ● Water right 
holder’s awareness 
of other successful 
transactions and 
identification with 
those water users 
Relinquish
ing 
Control 
● Water community sees ISF rights as setting a bad precedent in limiting the way in 
which water can be used in the future 
● Water community does not see need for government involvement in protecting ISF 
"'There’s too many state employee. You’re taking 
all the water. This is our resource. We are out there. 
We will protect it—just leave it to us.' … A lot of 
the farmers and ranchers are actually very good 
stewards of the land ... but nobody has a crystal ball 
so if they sell their land or they’re running their 
head gate in a certain way ... and that’s why the 
program comes in ... " (CO-GOV-04) 
  ● Water right 
holders do not 
want to give up 
control of their 
private property. 
Legitimacy  ● ISF seen as a ‘non-traditional’ beneficial use by water 
right holder 
"We had some of our lessors just oppose, but not by 
people who would actually be injured but just based 
on the fact that they were a transfer of any kind to 
an environmental purpose or just out of their 
traditional purpose." (CO-NGO-01) 
  ● The 3-in-10 
statute had never 
been used for 
instream flow 
before 2012. 
Political  ● Perception on the water community’s part that 
transfers to instream flow is exactly the same as drying 
up agricultural lands through a transfer to municipal 
uses. 
“One big challenge for the leasing is the perception 
that it isn’t just another way of buy and dry … No 
one wants to be drying up agricultural land for any 
reason. For municipal use or for instream flows.” 
(CO-GOV-01) 
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Incentives 
In contrast to barriers, Table 7 describes incentives to participation in Colorado’s ISF 
Program, which also vary between the four different policy tools.  Incentives range from purely 
financial motivations, to more altruistically motivated efforts to protect the natural environment, 
to those that allow the potential water right holder to maintain flexibility in their choices.  
In any acquisition, if a water right holder is able to maintain either the full or partial 
income they would have earned using the full water right, participating in the ISF Program can 
be financially beneficial. For example, in the case of 3-in-10 STLs, agricultural compensation for 
partial or full replacement of a water right holder’s revenue from crop yield in a year when they 
will not be able to use their full water right due to water availability or any other subjective 
reason could leave the water right holder in a better financial position than if they did not 
participate in the lease agreement.  
ISF water rights can only be decreed if a natural environment exists, meaning if a water 
right holder or a member of the community takes part in decreeing an ISF water right, their 
efforts may have ultimately benefited the environment. Interview respondents suggested a water 
right holder or member of the water community may participate in establishing a new ISF water 
right, either through an appropriation or an acquisition, because they wish to protect the natural 
environment due a sense of stewardship or duty to the environment, such as an organization with 
environmentally focused mission or mandate.  On the other hand, a water right holder may want 
to protect the natural environment for other motivations that have to do with their enjoyment of 
natural resources, such as recreational opportunities.  
Acquisitions, permanent and temporary, under Colorado water law allow for wide variety 
of contract terms and conditions, which can be tailored to individual water right holders’ needs. 
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Respondents explained that the ability to participate in a program that offers a water right holder 
an alternative to selling their water right is a huge draw. The flexibility of the acquisition 
agreements allows for more opportunities for win-win situations. In the case of the STLs, there is 
no obligation on the part of the water right holder to participate. Instead both the lessor and 
lessee engage in a good faith conversation at the beginning of each year in order to determine if 
the lease makes sense for all parties involved. If it does not make sense for either party, neither is 
obligated to proceed. The STLs can also be used as a sort of trial run in order to see how a water 
right transfer will be received by other water users in a permanent change case, how a permanent 
change case process would work for that water right holder, how the different entities such as the 
CWT and the CWCB implement the ISF Program, and to see how subsequent years in a full 3-
in-10 STL would work after the first year. 
 
Overall, barriers and incentives were important considerations when the CWCB and 
CWT decided to translate never-before used legislation into a policy tool that depends on 
voluntary participation from water right holders. While some of the barriers and incentives could 
be planned for on both the CWT and CWCB’s part, most were and are still being elucidated as 
both entities gain more experience in using the 3-in-10 leasing tool. Implementing the 3-in-10 
leasing tool also provided an opportunity for both entities to learn about barriers and incentives 
to other policy tools and ISF Program in general as the STLs are inherently juxtaposed with other 
actions both entities take in the water community.  
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Table 7. Incentives to Participate in Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
 Instream 
Flow 
New 
Appropriation
s 
Permanent 
Acquisition
s 
Temporary 
Long-term 
Leases 
Temporary Short-term 
Leases 
Relevant Quotes 
Financial 
 
 ● Ability to maintain any form of revenue from instream 
flow (partial or full agricultural production, fishing rights, 
etc).  
“… if it looks like it’s going to be a dry year 
where their water right will still yield 
something that they would be able to lease but 
maybe not enough to successfully be able to 
irrigate their crop and if they’re being paid for 
the water in that year it might be better for 
them and less headache and maybe more 
profitable for them to enter into a lease with 
the Water Conservation Board.” (CO-GOV-
02) 
 ● Agricultural 
compensation for partial or 
full replacement of a water 
right holder’s revenue 
from total crop yield in a 
year when they will not be 
able to use their full water 
right due to water 
availability or any other 
subjective reason. 
Protection of 
Natural 
Resources 
 
● Water right holder might be an entity with an environmentally focused mission or mandate  
● Water right holder may have strong conservation values 
● Water right holder may want to preserve recreational opportunities associated with instream 
flow on or near their property. 
 
“It’s also you know for the communities to be 
able to recreate in the river and you know not 
have a horrible dry spot in the river right as it 
runs through town during the tourist season. 
So it's community, recreation, environmental, 
but yea…the biggest reason to invest even that 
amount of money for one year is to keep the 
river from crashing.” (CO-NGO-01) 
Flexibility 
 
 ● Acquisitions can be different types of contracts with 
different terms and conditions for each water right holder 
including different methods to value the water right use for 
compensation.  
“… I think is the flexibility of our program in 
that you know we can be flexible in how we 
value things but also the types of contracts that 
we get with folks.” (CO-GOV-05) 
 
“…you don’t pick the three years before going 
into the deal you know it’s not okay well it’s 
got to be 2013, 2014. If you have the 
discussion at the beginning of each year—
what do you want to do with your water right 
this year? Do you want to go ahead and 
irrigate? Do you want to put it in the program? 
… So they get to choose along the way…” 
(CO-GOV-05) 
 ● There is no obligation to 
lease with a 3-in-10 short-
term lease and the contract 
allows for some flexibility 
in determining when and 
how often the lease will 
occur (up to 3 years within 
the 10 year period). 
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Trial Run  ●The short-term leasing can 
be used to see how a water 
right transfer will be received 
by other water users, as a 
preview of a permanent 
change case (i.e. donation or 
sale) or long-term lease 
process, to try the CWT, 
CWCB on for size, or to see 
how subsequent years in a 
full 3-in-10 lease would 
work.  
“It’s a nice stepping stone to a 
permanent one if a water rights 
owner wants to see … how does this 
work and … who is concerned about 
it, so it’s a good trial.” (CO-GOV-
02) 
 
“The other thing the temporary tool 
does is allows somebody to try the 
Water Trust for size and the state on 
for size and the Instream Flow 
Program on for size so they don’t 
have to make a huge economic 
decision about what they are going 
to do with their water right.” (CO-
NGO-02) 
 
“They just wanted to do it that one 
year, and we said fine, we’ll use the 
3-in-10 statute but we’ll just request 
a 1-year approval. They came back 
the next year and said okay well 
now we want to do another one.” 
(CO-GOV-05) 
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After understanding the various barriers and incentives to participation in the ISF 
Program and particularly the 3-in-10 STL agreements, it is also important to understand which 
actors are involved in creating or overcoming those barriers and incentives and how.  Currently, 
the two main actors are the CWCB, a government agency, and the CWT, a non-profit 
organization. Literature surrounding management of natural resources through collaboration 
between government and non-government entities fails to explicitly address concepts such as 
trust and legitimacy. The CWCB seems well positioned to provide legitimacy as a state agency, 
where the CWT is best suited to build political trust with water rights holders as a non-
regulatory, non-advocacy non-government organization. Therefore, the following sub-question 
guides this analysis:  
RQ2b: Does the CWT, as a non-governmental organization, provide trust in the 
implementation of Colorado’s ISF Program, while CWCB, as a government agency, 
provides legitimacy?     
As shown in Table 8, the roles of the main actors (CWCB and CWT) and well as minor 
actors (Water Courts and Division of Water Resource Engineer’s Office) vary in level of 
involvement and responsibilities across all four ISF policy tools. 
 
Trust 
There are two forms of trust considered in this analysis: political trust and social trust. 
The lack of political trust, previously discussed as a barrier to participation, seems to stem from a 
general distrust of government which carries over to distrust of government agencies, like the 
CWCB. The staff at the CWCB seems to recognize that the agency evokes feeling of distrust by 
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its very nature. The staff sees addressing issues of trust as a part of their jobs and report working 
hard to ensure interactions with water right holders do not worsen that perception:  
“… sometimes you’ll have a county commissioner come up and point you in the chest 
and say you better not mess with my farmers and ranchers there won’t be enough of you 
… that type of hostility occurs. But I think what helps … in those situations is that our 
staff is very professional and we just take that as you know this is part of our job and … 
being professional actually diffuses a lot of those really tense situations.” (CO-GOV-04) 
 
While it seems most of the trust issues stem from a lack of political, or vertical, trust in 
government agencies by private water right holders, agencies and organizations are made up of 
people. Therefore, social trust is also important to consider. The CWT is well positioned to build 
political trust by establishing social trust between individual water right holders and staff 
members.  
“… the agricultural field, or community, is one that you need to spend a lot of time 
building relationships with so it’s not something that you’ll see necessarily tangible 
results from within one year … we got a lot of good results from the work that we put in 
but not in terms of like a lease on the ground. It was building relationships, understanding 
the problems that they had with the statute and the way that the statute required common 
ground …” (CO-NGO-01) 
 
As a third party, non-regulatory, non-government organization the CWT is able to act as a buffer 
between individual water holders who are less willing to work with a government agency, in 
order to establish a relationship and create an avenue for that water right holder to become more 
familiar with the ISF Program, which may eventually lead to increased political trust.  
 
Legitimacy  
Because this analysis uses a multi-level collaborative management framework that 
focuses on different actors, including one that is a non-governmental organization, the definition 
pf legitimacy is extended beyond government entities to any organization involved in 
establishing formal or informal institutional structures. The CWCB, CWT, Water Courts, DWR, 
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Colorado General Assembly and other environmental organizations establish legitimacy to 
varying degrees through their various roles in the ISF Program. The CWCB is perhaps the most 
important actor in establishing legitimacy in the ISF Program, as it is the only entity allowed to 
hold a water right instream in the entire state. As such, it is usually involved in almost every 
aspect of establishing an ISF water right, or at the very least, needs to be involved in establishing 
the formalized processes. The CWCB translates the requirements and restrictions laid out in any 
ISF statutes passed on by the Colorado General Assembly into ISF Rules, which dictate when, 
where and how various other entities can and should participate in the ISF Program as well as 
how the CWCB or CWCB staff will respond in each of those situations. The CWCB also 
provides independent evaluations of any new appropriation recommendation and is responsible 
for the legal and physical protection of decreed ISF water rights. They CWCB essentially 
establishes a process in which the uncertainty involved in whether or not an interaction between 
two actors will occur and when is largely reduced. In other words, the CWCB provides 
legitimacy in governing of the ISF Program by establishing processes that work consistently 
between all three levels of governance by interfacing with the Colorado General Assembly and 
Water Courts at the constitutional level, other entities and organization at the collective level, 
and private water right holders at the operational level.  
“We go through our analyses and bring it to the board and the board has to decide if they 
want to form their intent to appropriate or not. That’s letting everybody know that we’re 
going to file for this water right but there’s a process for people to oppose it still … it’s a 
lot of effort and a lot of work to put together almost like a trial for these things. Then the 
board could reconsider and decide that it—no they don’t want to get the ISF now or they 
could vote to approve it and then it goes to water court.” (CO-GOV-01) 
 
The CWT provided legitimacy with respect to establishing the 3-in-10 STLs through their 
2012 and 2013 Request for Water Program. The CWT provides legitimacy to governing the 
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RFW Program at the collective level, operating between the CWCB, also at the collective level, 
and individual water users at the operational level.  
“They [CWT] tried to accept as much of the burden and the weeding through as possible 
so they put the notice out, they received all of the applications, and I think they got I can’t 
remember if it was 30-40-50 applications—they had a lot of interest and then weeded 
those down to the top—or the ones that looked like they were going to go were like 
twelve and then we ended up processing four in the end.” (CO-GOV-05) 
 
The DWR plays a very important role in establishing legitimacy in that it is the agency 
responsible for enforcing the proper administration of water rights. In this respect, the DWR has 
water commissioners that are responsible for curtailing consumptive diversion when necessary 
and are the ones that will enforce any call the CWCB decides to make on a river in order to 
protect their decreed ISF rights. The DWR is also the entity that administratively approves the 3-
in-10 STLs.  
“So what they [DWR] did—there’s the substitute water supply request that they get and 
this is the format that they’re used that they’ve been doing for years and years … so 
they’re used to that process and what those approvals look like and so we used that as a 
model.” (CO-GOV-05). 
 
While both the CWCB and the CWT provide most of the legitimacy concerning 
establishing processes in which other water rights holders can participate, the Colorado General 
Assembly provides legitimacy in determining the institutional arrangements that dictate how the 
CWCB can exercise its authority to govern the ISF Program. Colorado’s seven Water Courts 
also provide a certain amount of legitimacy through Water Court rules, which govern the process 
by which water right holders can argue oppose water right applications and through which 
precedents are set. 
“… for the most part what her bill does is give sort of a blessing to what we already think 
could already probably happen in the right technical circumstances ... but it’s always 
easier rather than trying to convince somebody to run a test case or something if you have 
a law written in—somebody is going to be more willing to have that conversation” (CO-
NGO-02) 
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While trust and legitimacy are two of the most important concepts to consider in the 
collaborative management structures surrounding Colorado’s ISF Program, there are several 
other concepts that are just as important to consider when trying to fully explicate the roles of the 
CWT and CWCB in establishing trust and legitimacy.  
 
 
Resources and Capacity 
First, the CWCB and CWT both provide resources and capacity to implement the ISF 
Program, through appropriations and acquisitions, in the form of staff time, technical expertise, 
and funding, but do so in very different ways due to differences in institutional constraints. The 
CWCB is a government agency and as such must work within formalized rules that dictate how 
much funding it will have available to it in any given year and its ability to grow its staff. The 
CWT, on the other hand, is a private organization which has no formalized institutional 
constraints dictating how large it can grow its staff and in theory has no limits as to how much 
money it can raise, although there are various norms, informal rules, and interactions that may 
realistically limit this capability, such as availability of grants or capacity of private donors.  
“I think it’s working out really well having the Water Trust do the engineering portion … 
is probably a much better model than trying to do it in house especially with the whole 
thing of small government as opposed to larger government … So I think that the model 
where you have the outside working on it in sort of this collaborative effort is the best 
way at this point in time.” (CO-GOV-03) 
 
“… it’s essentially an extension of that understanding that we [CWT] would do all of the 
tire kicking we would raise the money we would essentially package everything up so 
that the CWCB could just go as soon as the water right acquisition was ready for them…” 
(CO-NGO-01) 
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While other entities and organizations have expressed interest in helping the CWCB secure new 
acquisitions, the CWT is already familiar with the process and requirements that make for a 
successful application. 
Other entities, like CPW, BLM and the USDA also provide resources for new 
appropriations in the form of technical expertise when they make recommendation for new ISFs. 
CPW in particular can help individuals with the engineering analyses and R2CROSS method in 
order to find and recommend locations where the natural environment could benefit from ISF 
protections.  
“We’d like to grow that program [appropriations] and get the basin round tables in the 
state who are trying to identify non-consumptive needs to use our program as a tool to 
meet those non-consumptive needs in their basin. So identify streams where there are 
Colorado cutthroat trout, where maybe we could partner with BLM, or Colorado Parks 
and Wildlife, or Trout Unlimited or whoever, bring it the basin roundtable, and say we 
collected the data … and this will meet your non-consumptive need or a portion of the 
non-consumptive need … but I think the staff that we have is adequate right now to do 
that kind of base work that’s going on with new appropriations.” (CO-GOV-03) 
 
The DWR also plays an informal role in monitoring decreed ISF rights as they are a sister 
agency to the CWCB and have staff whose jobs lend to noticing when a water right is out of 
priority in the administration system.  
“But I would say we get calls from all different types of people—we get calls from the 
Division Engineer’s Office a lot of times and they’re just water commissioners who [say] 
‘hey I noticed on this stream that this, you know, segment didn’t have what appears to be 
your instream flow reach, and I know because I’m on the steam that there are some junior 
ponds upstream that are junior to the instream flow water right and I can curtail them and 
put some more water in the stream if you place a call.’” (CO-GOV-03) 
 
 
Outreach 
Second, both the CWCB and the CWT lack a proactive approach to outreach to increase 
participation in the ISF protection and restoration activities, although the CWT has slowly started 
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to do more focused outreach in recent years as a result of their Request for Water Program. It is 
important to note that not being proactive does not mean either organization is not intentional 
about their outreach strategy. The CWCB tends to take a more reactive approach due to staffing 
and resource limitations, where the CWT tends to take a more reactive approach because they 
want to be careful in how they establish trust with the water community.   
 
Policy 
 Third, the CWCB and CWT approach policy in very different ways. The CWCB is a state 
agency whose governing board is a composed politically appointed individuals. They participate 
in the policy process and are ultimately the ones responsible for adopting ISF Rules according to 
policy decisions when appropriate. However, the CWCB is cautious about proposing new 
legislation because there is always a chance that the end results will leave ISF protection worse 
off than doing nothing. The CWT does not participate in policy decisions or advocacy, but 
makes sure to be aware of pertinent policy decisions when they affect their work.  
“But you know these are some areas of policy and law that would be interesting to work 
on but every time—if we and one of our allies takes things over to, as they say, the gold 
dome—things get chopped up and sometimes we end up with something worse than what 
we started with. So anytime we go into legislation we go in with a lot of caution…and, 
and buy-in from the community is probably very helpful before you go in and…” (CO-
GOV-05) 
 
“… the CWCB’s board has to go through a board process where they accept a proposed 
acquisition either permanent or like a long-term lease… and that can be political. So 
there’s always danger there that the State, like that body, could develop a policy saying 
that they didn’t want to look at instream flows in a particular basin or sourced from a 
particular stream or something like that so… we’re still dealing with a politically 
appointed body of individuals who get to decide which water rights can become instream 
flow water rights. So I see that as sort of like an on-going risk as well…” (CO-NGO-02) 
 
“…We’re [CWT] the only non-profit that works exclusively in the acquisitions and who 
sort of doesn’t point fingers at other people about how they use their water.” (CO-NGO-
02) 
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“We [CWT] generally don’t engage in any advocacy or policy work, but we also aren’t 
burying our heads in the sand we need to know what’s happening around us, so I 
generally stay in touch with what’s happening in the policy arena and determine if and 
how that will impact the work that we are trying to do and then if necessary come up with 
a response.” (CO-NGO-01)  
 
 The Colorado Water Congress is another non-profit organization that works to vet 
various water legislation in Colorado. They either come out in support or against proposed 
legislation and their input is well-recognized throughout the water community.  
“… certainly buy-in from Water Congress you know, have it well-vetted to see if 
anybody sees any problems with this before you go in there …” (CO-GOV-05) 
 
 
Innovation 
 Fourth, as a government agency and NGO, the CWCB and CWT are inherently able to 
take the initiative to implement new programs and policy tools to varying degrees. The CWT 
initiated the collaborative effort required to establish an almost entirely new process for restoring 
ISFs. The initial steps and formation of the tool was in response to what looked like a very low 
water year in 2012 and a lack of an adequately solidified plan to protect threatened ISFs on the 
part of the CWCB. The CWT approached the CWCB with the idea of using the 3-in-10 statute to 
approve STLs in order to meet expected water short decreed ISF water rights. This allowed the 
CWT to drive the creation of a new collaborative process using information from successes and 
failures of other efforts to use STLs protect ISF in the Pacific Northwest.  
“… we [CWT] were on a full call with the board members—we had been watching to 
know what’s been coming, what’s been coming, what’s been coming [drought]. We were 
talking about a totally separate project—the drought came up in the complication and the 
board member said what’s are—are we going to do something about the drought?” (CO-
NGO-04) 
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“… the board said go for it—do this thing, so we started building what it would look like, 
raising money, how do we solicit you know interest from people… so we looked at 
successes and failures in the PNW and … put together a sort of general structure of what 
the process would look like, forms, FAQs that kind of thing…” (CO-NGO-04) 
 
“The way that we work is that we really try to use every single tool that’s available under 
the law and try to use them in ways that are creative.” (CO-NGO-01) 
 
“…they [CWT] met with us first [CWCB] to sort of tell us they were going to do this and 
then they sort of kicked it out there and we were like okay what’s going to happen?  We 
work for the state, we’re completely understaffed, and have so much to do but we were 
excited about the program and we were like okay well how can we help, how can we 
make this work with the staff that we have and thank god [CWT] is really staffed up over 
there.” (CO-GOV-05) 
 
“The last two years you know the Water Trust has its request for water program which 
we’re really grateful that they took the bull by the horns and had a structured approach to 
it.” (CO-GOV-02) 
  
 While the CWT took on as much of the burden and workload of structuring what the 
application process would look like from their end, the CWCB was willing to try out the new 
arrangement and needed to work out what the application process would look like in getting 
administrative approval from DWR, as they are always named as the water holder with any ISF 
water right. 
“… we kicked those [short-term leases] off for the first time in 2012 and that as you 
know is a statute that has been on the books and had never been invoked so it was 
interesting paving the path and trying to figure out how that was going to work and to 
prevent injury to other users and a lot of work was needed on getting those established 
...” (CO-GOV-05) 
 
“I was kind of the liaison between all of that and trying to convince the DWR that this 
was going to be okay and they were trying to convince me that you know well if you if 
you want this then here are you know our expectations on this.” (CO-GOV-05) 
 
“I mean for instance when we turned in these requests upstairs they didn’t even have a 
code to enter them…and we were like okay well how much are we supposed to pay and 
you know….you figure all that out. It was fun to get a new statute going for the first time 
that had been around for a while. But it was certainly not without its challenges.” (CO-
GOV-05)  
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Overall, the results suggest that the CWT is best suited to establish trust with the water 
community and legitimacy is addressed by several actors, however the CWCB plays a 
particularly important role in establishing legitimacy. 
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0
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Table 8. Roles of different entities involved in Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
 CWCB CWT Water Courts DWR Other Entities 
Trust 
 
Lack of political trust in 
government and 
consequently 
government agencies 
Establishes and builds 
political trust via social 
trust as a non-
government organization 
N/A N/A N/A 
Legitimacy 
 
Provides legitimacy to 
entire ISF Program 
through Instream Flow 
Rules, independent 
evaluations, and legal 
and physical protection 
Provides legitimacy to 3-
in-10 short-term leasing 
tool through 2012 and 
2013 Request for Water 
Program 
Provides legitimacy to 
judicial process by 
establishing court rules, 
hearing opposing 
arguments, establishing 
precedent  
Provides legitimacy to 
entire ISF Program 
through physical 
protection enforcement 
and administrative 
approval process of 3-in-
10 short-term leases 
●Colorado General 
Assembly creates 
legislature that governs 
the ISF Rules 
● Environmental 
organization and other 
citizens alert CWCB to 
ISF violations 
Resources Institutional limitations 
on resources and staff; 
particularly for 
acquisitions 
No institutional 
limitations on resources 
and staff; particularly for 
acquisitions 
N/A N/A CPW, BLM, and USDA 
make recommendations 
for new ISF 
appropriations 
Capacity 
 
Lacks a true acquisitions 
program; maintains 
databases; physically and 
legally protects decreed 
ISFs 
Partially fills the void of 
true acquisitions program 
N/A Helps to physically and 
legally protect decreed 
ISF rights by alerting 
CWCB of violations 
Other entities are 
interested in facilitating 
acquisitions but are not 
familiar with the process 
Outreach 
 
Does not actively reach 
out to water users; 
reaches out when 
opportunities present 
themselves 
Has started to actively 
but very cautiously reach 
out to water users 
N/A N/A N/A 
Policy 
 
Participates and adopts 
ISF Rules according to 
policy decisions when 
appropriate 
Does not participate in 
policy decisions, but is 
aware of the surrounding 
policy arena 
N/A N/A Colorado Water 
Congress’ support is 
important for any new 
legislation 
Innovation 
 
Willing to try new 
creative arrangements  
Tries to use every tool 
under the law in creative 
ways 
N/A Willing to try new 
creative arrangements 
N/A 
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With projected changes in Colorado water supply and population growth, beneficial uses 
of water will increasingly come into conflict with one another. The majority of Colorado water 
law encourages consumptive uses of water, but the legislation has evolved over time to include 
non-consumptive uses, including ISFs. While collaborative management as defined in the 
literature focuses on translating processes into on-the-ground practices and outcomes, it is also 
important to consider how current practices might influence future processes. Therefore the 
overarching research question is: RQ3: What role does and will collaborative management play 
in the past and future success of Colorado’s ISF Program?  
Trends in legislation towards increasing flexibility can be positive for achieving greater 
ISF protection when they lead to a greater number of policy tool options. However, the success 
of on-the-ground ISF protection is an important feedback in determining future legislation and 
program implementation. The 3-in-10 STLs again provides a useful example in understanding 
what the development of the tool might mean for future legislation and management of the ISF 
Program, as they are the first ISF policy tool approved through an administrative process as 
opposed to a judicial process. The following sub-question is used to guide the following analysis:  
RQ3a: How has and will 3-in10 STLs affect future ISF legislation and ISF Program 
management decisions?  
 When asked about trends in the ISF Program over time and into the future, many 
responses referred to current and future challenges that would vary across all four ISF policy 
tools (Table 9). It is again important to note that much of the following section of analysis covers 
challenges to ISF Program as a whole and not solely the 3-in-10 STL agreements. However, this 
again is appropriate as it is difficult to de-couple the some challenges surrounding a single policy 
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tool from a larger program of which it is apart. 
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Table 9. Current and Future Challenges to Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
 Instream 
Flow 
New 
Appropriations 
Permanent 
Acquisitions 
Temporary 
Long-term 
Leases 
Temporary Short-term Leases Relevant Quotes 
Resources 
 
 
 ● Appraisal of water rights can vary greatly with time, location, use, and 
need making valuation of a water right difficult  
● Time and money to purchase and lease water for ISF 
● Balancing up front cost with long-term benefit of temporary tools 
compared to permanent tools 
“Paying for the water rights is 
expensive especially if you are 
only getting it on a temporary 
basis … We do the same amount 
of work to look at a water right for 
a temporary project as we do for a 
permanent project..” (CO-NGO-
01) 
 ● Easy to fundraise for innovative program 
in the beginning 
Capacity  ● Additional decreed ISFs corresponds with additional operation and management 
responsibilities for physical and legal protection 
● Opposition to growing government in order to CWCB to increase capacity 
“… I think that as we move 
forward with short-term leasing 
… one of the things that we’re 
going to run into is staffing 
limitations … in order to get more 
staff as a state agency you have to 
have a position item that goes 
through the Colorado State 
Legislature—they have to approve 
it … it’s very difficult.  For 
political reasons or whatever, it’s 
growing government …” (CO-
GOV-03) 
 ● Geographic limitations to finding new opportunities based on centralized 
location of staff in Denver 
● Time and money to find opportunities to purchase and lease water  
 ● Additional accounting and reporting 
required vs permanent change case 
● ~10 times the offers for leases compared 
to permanent acquisitions 
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Political ● Colorado Water community’s distrust of government in taking resources that belong to the public  
● CWCB potentially viewed as competing with other water users for un-appropriated or transferrable 
water  
● Opposition to Public Trust Doctrine and support of ISF Program as a substitution 
“... there’s a little political 
sensitivity about drying up ag 
[agriculture] and about the 
board’s competing with other 
potential lessees or buyers or 
water so we jus-it’s a voluntary 
program.” (CO-GOV-02) 
 ● Perception on the water community’s part that transfers to instream flow 
is exactly the same as drying up agricultural lands. 
Trust  ● Trust is variable depending on person and their individual situations 
● Farmers and ranchers would like to protect ISF themselves, but no guarantee 
● ISFs are still perceived as something new 
“…every water right is different 
so it just depends on the person 
and their expectations.” (CO-
GOV-05) 
Processes ● Judicial process can be expensive, unfair, and risky—especially with respect to ISFs “…it’s not necessarily the people 
that are attacking these change 
cases it’s just the nature of the 
beast of these change cases… not 
only because it’s adversarial but  
because it’s just such a 
cumbersome process—take it out 
of that realm and we can start 
seeing maybe more movement—
more movement, quicker.” (CO-
GOV-05) 
  
   ● Can never lease a water right again after 
participation in a 3-in-10 short-term lease  
● CWCB must be conservative about requests for 
temporary change of use to ISF in administrative 
approval process ● Difficult for the ‘quintessential 
farmer’ to plan for a short-term lease  
● Difficult to implement a short-term lease in real-
time 
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Resources  
 First, the biggest current and future challenge for the ISF Program with respect to 
resources is the acquisition process. Acquisitions are very labor intensive and, in terms of leases, 
are not permanent, meaning there is high up front cost for often very little water and, with the 
STLs, for a very short amount of time.  
 
Capacity 
 Second, capacity is an issue for both the appropriation and acquisition process. One 
major issue for the CWCB is that as the number of new ISFs protections are added to the ISF 
program, the obligation and workload associated with protecting those ISFs also increases. Need 
for increased physical protection requires increased monitoring. If there is an injury to an ISF 
right in which the CWCB would like to place call, they need to install a gage in order to show 
that their water right is physically not being met. Increased number of ISF water rights also 
increases the legal protection requirement, which is monitored by reviewing monthly law 
resumes for each of the seven divisions. Essentially, the need for ISF protection will continue to 
increase over time, while the ability of the CWCB to increase capacity through increased staff 
members is limited as a government agency. As acquisitions are quickly proving to be an 
effective tool for restoring ISFs, increased capacity will be needed to find those opportunities 
across the state. Another limitation is that all of the CWCB and CWT staff is based in Denver, 
which limits their ability to do on site visits and conduct outreach face to face with potential 
community members. With new STLs, there is also additional reporting and accounting required 
for each ISF lease compared to permanent acquisitions. As new policy tools, such as the 3-in-10 
STLs are developed, which remove barriers to participation, increased interest and number of 
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offers is also likely.  
 
Political 
 Third, distrust of the government is another current challenge that will most likely not 
change going forward. The CWCB in particular, as the only entity allowed to hold an ISF water 
right and as a government agency, is cautious about the number and types of ISF water rights it 
pursues since it does not want to be perceived as competing with other consumptive water users 
for either available or transferrable water. Other Western states have something called the Public 
Trust Doctrine as a form of ISF protection and restoration, however Colorado has had the ISF 
program for 40 years and many people in the water community consider this to be a great 
success as ISFs are administered on an equal footing with non-consumptive water rights. While 
this makes ISF protection politically feasible, establishing new ISF protections is limited by 
voluntary participation in the ISF Program and opposition from the water community in court 
cases.  
 
Trust  
Fourth, the most challenging aspect of establishing political or social trust between water 
right holders and the CWCB or CWT is the variability of every individual’s situation. This can 
also be undermined by the fact that many water right holders would like to be trusted with the 
responsibility of keeping water instream themselves and resent that the responsibility is 
centralized through a state agency. Others are still wary of any kind of ISF protection because 
they continue to see it as new use, even though it has been around for 40 years. ISFs are non-
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traditional in the sense that they keep water in the stream as opposed to putting water to 
consumptive beneficial use.  
 
Process 
Fifth, while the current judicial processes surrounding ISF approval has been largely 
successful to date, the process can be very cumbersome, expensive, risky, and often unfair. The 
3-in-10 STLs are the only ISF water rights that can go through an administrative approval with 
the Division Engineer’s Office, but once they are approved and the 10 years is over, that water 
right can never be leased again. The process for hearing opposition to those leases is limited 
compared to Water Courts. The DWR somewhat addresses this by only approving the amount 
included in the lease application in the strictest light. Additionally, the way 3-in-10 STLs are 
structured makes it difficult for what might considered to be the ‘quintessential famer’ to 
participate because they are typically more dependent on the water for their livelihood and 
cannot make decisions about their water right in the time frame needed to complete a 3-in-10 
STL. While 3-in-10 STLs can be processed and approved very quickly compared to a Water 
Court change case, they are still difficult to arrange in real-time in response to changing 
biophysical contexts.  
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The last category of current and future challenges prompts further questioning as to how 
the judicial and administrative approval processes compare. Colorado is the only Western prior 
appropriation state that uses a judicial system to administer their water rights. There are only two 
types of water right approvals that do no go through the water courts: Substitute Water Supply 
Plans and 3-in-10 STLs. As table 10 shows, the system of administration can affect the 
frequency of use and outcomes of various policy tools including the four ISF policy tools.  
New appropriations, permanent acquisitions, and long-term leases must go through Water 
Court for judicial approval, which due to recent court rules changes, must be settled in 2 years. 
The 3-in-10 short-term lease process takes up to 30-60 days. The judicial process is also more 
expensive with court fees alone, where the administrative approval process through the DWR for 
the 3-in-10 STLs costs $100. However, with Water Courts, the expense is put solely on the water 
right holders and the water community. Any increase in responsibility on part of the DWR, 
would require an increase in staff time and resources, which would put the expense on taxpayers, 
as DWR is a state agency. A full change of use case in Water Court also requires a complete 
historic consumptive use analysis, and in the case of new appropriations, an R2CROSS analysis 
to determine the need of the natural environment. The STLs only require an estimate of the 
historic consumptive use and can only serve a water short decreed ISF water right, which means 
there is no need for further analysis of the natural environment. While both systems allow for 
transactional, or contract, flexibility, the STL process can be somewhat more flexible simply 
because there are less statutory requirements for DRW to follow. For new appropriations, 
permanent acquisition and LTLs, there are legislatively mandated processes for hearing and 
considering opposition to proposed ISFs. The Water Courts must hear anyone who opposes and 
shows up to Water Court. Consequently, Water Court can be a little unfair in that the outcomes 
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are inconsistent between cases, users, and divisions. The outcomes very often depend on the 
actors who oppose the case, the capacity and resources they have, and the level of energy they 
are willing to expend to oppose that case. With respect to ISFs, the CWCB is the only actor 
allowed to file for an ISF water right and the only actor allowed to legally protect decreed water 
rights. The CWCB has one staff member devoted to filing new cases and opposing any injury 
from other proposed consumptive water rights. The CWCB has anywhere from 100-200 open 
cases at any one time. As a government agency, they have limitation as to how much money they 
can spend opposing cases that prose potential injury to their water rights.  
“Because permitting like it seems like it almost would kind of be treated the same but 
because it’s judicial, and I say adversarial because everybody here is an attorney, and you 
get in there and depending on the resources or the level or energy or the level of physical 
injury….it’s not necessarily fair.” (CO-GOV-05) 
 
“…but they [DWR] were saying because both the SWSP and our temporary loan requests 
did not go through the court and through the normal channels—I mean it is publicly 
noticed, which means it has a 30-day turn around—but DWR told us it needs to be as 
strict as possible. Because it didn’t go through that process so…so we realized we have to 
be very conservative in our request if we want them approved.” (CO-GOV-05) 
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Table 10. Judicial versus Administrative System  
 Judicial System Administrative System 
Instream 
Flow Policy 
Tools 
● New Appropriations, Acquisitions, Long-
term Leases must go through the Water Courts 
in order to be decreed.  
● Short-Term Leases must be approved by the 
Division of Water Resources-Engineer’s 
Office. 
Time 
Required 
● 2-year rule to streamline process 
 
● 30-60 day process 
 
Required 
Analysis 
● Water court trial requires a full engineering 
report for historic consumptive use analysis for 
change case  
● DWR Application for approval requires 
reasonable estimate of historic consumptive use 
analysis 
Expense ● Water Court is expensive  ● Administrative process is $100 
Treatment 
of ISF 
● Water users ask for full diversion amount in 
a change case and see who complains 
● Looks at SWSP and short-term lease requests 
in the strictest light 
Fairness ● Adversarial process  
● Not necessarily consistent outcomes: 
depends on the resources, level of energy of 
opposition, level of physical injury 
● Not adversarial 
 ● Every application is treated consistently.  
 
Flexibility 
 
● Allows for contract flexibility 
 ● More flexible requirements than a full Water 
Court change case 
Opposition ● Water Court rules mandate how to deal with 
opposition 
● Less strict mandates for DWR for how to 
deal with opposition 
Onus of 
Expense 
● Water Courts put expense of approving water 
rights in private hands of the water community  
● Need to make sure DWR is equipped with 
tax payer money 
 
 
 
 
117 
1
1
7
 
Comparing the two approval systems also raises the question as to how ISF is treated in 
the water community and through formalized institutional structures. Under Colorado water law, 
ISF is treated subordinately in several important ways: 
 Instream flow is the only beneficial use in Colorado that cannot accept a transfer from a 
conditional water right.  
 The CWCB is the only entity authorized to hold a water right instream, while private 
water right users are able to hold all other beneficial uses.  
 Most consumptive beneficial uses have been statutorily recognized in Colorado since 
1876, when Colorado became a state, while ISF rights have only been statutorily 
recognized as a beneficial use since 1973.  
Through the formalized institutional process, ISF is further disadvantaged through the Water 
Courts and DWR approval process. New beneficial uses are increasingly met by transferring 
water rights through the water courts from one decreed beneficial use to another. Consequently, 
decreed agricultural water rights, as the most common type of water use in the Colorado, are 
targets for these types of change of use cases (i.e. transfers). There is a marked trend of 
increasing agricultural to municipal water transfers. Consumptive water rights can also be 
transferred to an instream flow use. Permanently transferring water uses from agriculture to ISF 
is usually less financially beneficial for agricultural users compared to municipal transfers. ISF 
tends to be seen as a barrier to future water development by more traditional consumptive users 
like irrigators and municipal water suppliers. However, change of use cases to municipal and 
industrial uses do not see the same amount of opposition as change cases to ISF. 
 
 “… like the full water court process … to kind of vet that out with the water community, 
you know, ‘Here’s what normal change case looks like, we’re trying to mimic it. What is 
it we’re doing that doesn’t look the same?’ because we want it—to have it be just the 
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same—everybody’s used to these things so just treat them like it’s nothing new. Because 
right now they’re treated like they’re something new and crazy… that’s why the water 
court process gets so expensive.” (CO-GOV-05) 
 
“When you are changing a water right to instream flow …people seem to think of it as 
different, you know, you are doing something so different, and it’s like we’re trying to 
model them on standard changes because when you change a water right from irrigation 
to municipal uses, everybody’s pretty used to those, so I try to model as closely as 
possible—these change cases—on that, but it still brings up—the reaction is just—it’s 
different. It’s different because you are putting it in the river… but putting it in the river 
and taking it out of the river … still the numbers should be the same.” (CO-GOV-05) 
  
“… what is different about our program [ISF Program] is that we’re asking for the full 
diversion rate … So we want the full diversion rate from diversion point down to where 
the return flows came in. And we’re very explicit about that. In a normal change case—
let’s say again irrigation to municipal uses… they will ask for a quantification of the 
consumptive use…And they don’t really focus on the diversion so the diversion doesn’t 
get cut down because it’s just kind of a by the way…and I’ve been told it goes along with 
the water right so I’d like that to go along with our water rights too. That would be nice if 
we would get the full 6 [cfs] and we wouldn’t be scrutinized down to the 1.5 [AF]…I 
think what I’d like it to just model other change cases a little bit better because they are 
getting a lot more water than we are and we’re being a little too strict on ourselves—
we’re not even requesting it.” (CO-GOV-05) 
 
“It’s [ISF] the only water right in the entire state that cannot accept conditional water 
rights…it’s the only beneficial use—you can’t have an instream flow and start with a 
conditional water right and change it. Somebody went to legislature with a bill … that 
nobody should ever change a conditional water right. It’s conditional. It’s never been 
developed. It was made for this particular purpose, in this particular area. So you 
shouldn’t be able to change it for a different purpose somewhere else with that senior 
date on it. That got changed during the legislative process down to okay only an instream 
flow can’t take a conditional water right and put the water back in the river so…that’s a 
little—I guess it’s a little bit of a sore spot for us because conditional water rights have 
proven to be very valuable. Almost more valuable than absolute water rights.” (CO-
GOV-05) 
 
 
All of the challenges associated with the ISF Program will be important when 
considering future ISF legislation, not only with respect to political and administrative 
feasibility, but also when considering the cost-effectiveness of new policy tools with respect to 
time and resources.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Throughout this analysis six major themes come to light pertaining to the implementation 
of Colorado’s ISF Program: (1) past institutional arrangements at all levels of governance have 
led to ISF water rights that protect the natural environment from future degradation and less on 
restoring a previously degraded natural environment; (2) broadly, decreed ISF water right 
thresholds are most often not met in dry years, but this is highly variable for individual ISF water 
rights and depends as much on the surrounding administration of the water right as it does on the 
natural hydrograph; (3) 3-in-10 short-term leases are not legislated as a drought tool, but the 
narrative surrounding their development and use often implies that they are and will only be used 
in dry years; (4) current institutional arrangements have evolved in recent years to include more 
collaboration, particularly at the collective level of governance, which in turn have resulted in 
greater opportunity for on-the-ground success at the operational level; (5) the necessary division 
of programmatic roles between government agencies and NGOs lends towards a collaborative 
approach to establishing trust and legitimacy; and (6) future institutional arrangements 
surrounding Colorado’s ISF Program will depend on on-the-ground successes and failures of 
current ISF policy tools. 
Past trends in ISF policy tool use show us that appropriations have been and continue to 
be the most frequently used policy tool to protect ISFs, but only help to prevent further 
dewatering of a stream from the time they are appropriated and only to the extent that an 
appropriation has seniority within its relative administration system. Acquired water rights can 
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have prior appropriation dates that pre-date 1973 and can restore ISF to a stream, but again only 
to the extent that the acquisition has seniority within its relative administration system. 
Nevertheless, appropriations are a better-developed policy tool compared to acquisitions. The 
CWCB has a formalized recommendation process with which most organizations and individuals 
in the Colorado water community are familiar. The CWCB also relies on other entities and 
organizations to make recommendations for new ISF water rights, which are limited by 
determining a natural environment, water availability, and causing no injury to other water 
rights. Effectively, new appropriations require certain biophysical conditions to be met along a 
stream and adequate cooperation from the water community in order for the board of the CWCB 
to consider applying for a new ISF water right through the water courts. Unlike acquisitions, new 
appropriations do not rely on voluntary participation from water right holders. Additionally, the 
potential for injury is less with a new appropriation compared to an acquisition because the 
appropriation date will be junior to all other previously decreed water rights. Hence, there is 
typically less opposition from the water community for new appropriations, but opposition can 
still stem from other water users who are concerned about how the new ISF water right will 
affect their ability to change and use their own decreed water rights in the future. The injury 
associated with new appropriations is, in a sense, speculative. Acquisitions, on the other hand, 
have the potential to injure water users to a greater extent compared to new appropriations. 
Acquisitions require a change of use of a decreed water right, which means any water user who 
was relying on the time, location, or quantity of water associated with that water right could 
potentially be injured in real-time. This greater potential for injury can mean more opposition 
from the water community when attempting to acquire water. Acquisitions also have a 
formalized process, but require voluntary participation from water right holders and offers of 
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donations, sales, or leases are only considered on an as-offered basis. Acquisitions also need to 
consider more biophysical requirements, such as return flows and interstate compact agreement 
limitations. Consequently, acquisitions are more time and resource intensive than appropriations 
and, often, more widely opposed and subsequently litigated.  
However, as there is less un-appropriated water in river basins throughout Colorado, 
there will be fewer opportunities to appropriate new water for ISF. The effectiveness of new 
appropriations increases over time as they gain in relative seniority as new junior water rights are 
appropriated, whereas acquisitions result in an immediately relative senior water right that has 
the potential to restore water to the stream once it is approved through the water courts or DWR. 
New appropriations are an effective long-term tool, but are typically not appropriate for 
addressing more immediate threats to the degradation of a stream. Recognition of these 
differences drove the creation of the CWT in 2001, which has since been working to fill the lack 
of capacity and resources available to the CWCB to sustain a formalized acquisitions program. 
As a non-profit organization, the CWT does not have the same institutional constraints as the 
CWCB and is better able to access a wider diversity of resources and build capacity quicker. 
While the resulting collaboration between the CWT and CWCB has resulted in several 
acquisitions over the last 13 years, the formalized processes surrounding acquisitions are still 
nowhere as streamlined as the formalized processes underlying new appropriations. However, 
recent institutional changes in the governance structures surrounding acquisitions indicate that 
this may not always be the case in the future.  
The administrative context surrounding individual water rights is important when 
considering both consumptive and non-consumptive water rights. However, non-consumptive 
water rights do not follow the same principles as consumptive water rights that divert water from 
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the stream in order to use their water right. Pre-determined ISF thresholds are met when water is 
left within a stream, which can happen when an intentional policy tool keeps water in the stream 
or when some other administrative factor prevents water from being removed from the stream. 
Academic literatures focusing on ISFs that are administered within a prior appropriation system, 
and particularly in Colorado, fails to adequately explicate the inherent differences in fulfilling 
ISF water rights, save one: Gillian and Brown (1997). Gillian and Brown outline the four main 
reasons ISF are left within a stream system including geographic factors, downstream senior 
water rights, interstate allocations, and surplus flow. Senior water rights are particularly 
important when they are close enough in proximity and large enough in quantity to be able to 
affect how much water flows through a decreed ISF right. Senior water rights that are located 
upstream from an ISF water right can prevent sufficient water from passing through that ISF 
water right, while a senior water right located downstream of an ISF water right can potentially 
pull sufficient water though that ISF water right in order to meet its decreed threshold. However, 
these general principles can vary widely due the number of senior water rights located upstream 
and downstream of the ISF water right, their relative quantities, as well as the amount and timing 
of the decreed ISF water right.  Most of the academic literature seems to largely ignore to these 
nuances and the overall context dependency of when and how often ISF thresholds are met and 
default to the description that overall ISF water rights are junior and therefore not met in dry 
years. This is an important concept when considering how to maximize the efficiency of current 
ISF policy tool use.  
One current ISF policy tool, the 3-in-10 short-term leases, were developed and 
implemented for the first time in 2012 in reaction to what looked like it was going to be a very 
dry year across all of Colorado. As a result, much of the narrative surrounding the use and 
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implementation of 3-in-10 STLs focuses on how they have been used as a temporary tool in dry 
years. However, the 3-in-10 STLs are not legislated as a drought tool, as the requirement for a 
county drought emergency declaration was removed in 2005. One critique of the 3-in-10 STLs is 
that they provide only a very small amount of water for a very short amount of time at almost the 
same expense as a permanent acquisition. However, the counter-argument is that the STLs are a 
long-term solution in that they maintain the long-term health of stream system by preventing 
extensive damages to the ecosystem from which it would be difficult to rebound. While 3-in-10 
STLs have a role to play as a response option to oncoming drought, they cannot only be seen and 
used as a reactive response to drought. Once a 3-in-10 agreement is established, although the 
lessor is able to, s/he is under no obligation to lease their water. They solely agree to have a 
conversation about leasing in any year that they are still allowed under the 3-in-10 STL 
agreement and determine whether or not the biophysical conditions suit both the lessor and 
lessee to a degree that they agree to move forward with the exchange. This means if a 3-in-10 
STL is established in a dry year with the option to renew for the full 3 years, the benefit derived 
from the exchange will most likely be limited, at the very least, to the same or similar 
biophysical conditions that prompted the exchange in the first year, to say nothing of any other 
non-biophysical subjective reason a lessor or lessee may not want to go forward with the 
exchange. If 3-in-10 STLs are constrained by their yearly and uncertain biophysical contexts, 
using 3-in-10 leases only as a drought response might limit their future use to only drought years. 
However, there are a number of situations in which an ISF threshold is not met, or in other words 
water short, other than drought such as a large upstream senior water use. While this idea is very 
explicitly recognized by staff at the CWT, the narrative that explains 3-in-10 leasing as drought 
tool persists.  
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Water management literature specifically calls for better-explicated governance structures 
that help to bridge the gap between process and practice. The development and implementation 
of the 3-in-10 STL tool is en excellent example of how a policy tool that very quickly resulted in 
on-the-ground ISF protection was derived from the informal and formal changes to institutional 
arrangements across all three levels of governance. Formal and informal institutional 
arrangements surrounding the ISF Program have evolved in recent years across all three levels of 
governance to address the past trends and challenges associated with using acquisitions to restore 
ISF. It is important to consider acquisitions as three distinct tools: permanent acquisitions, 
temporary long-term leases, and temporary short-term leases. These distinctions are important 
when considering the formal and informal institutional barriers and incentives to voluntary 
participation in an acquisition agreement, particularly when considering future use. Permanent 
acquisitions are permanent changes of use to ISF through a donation or sale, meaning the 
original water right holder will no longer have anything to do with the water right in the future. 
Leases, on the other hand, are temporary changes of use to ISF, which means a water right holder 
maintains ownership and must consider how the temporary change of use will affect the use or 
sale of their water right in the future. Constitutionally, because acquisitions rely on voluntary 
participation, statutes have been revised to remove fundamental formalized barriers to 
participation. The statutory changes that took place were an incremental evolution of Colorado 
water law and institutional structures as opposed to any singular change. The 2003 statute 
allowing leases or loans of water for instream flows in times of drought emergency built on an 
already codified formal rule (C.R.S. 37-83-105), which allowed transactions between agriculture 
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users in times of drought. The 2005 statute fine-tuned the 2003 statute by amending C.R.S. 37-
83-105 to restrict the loan and lease of water through the STL tool to water short decreed ISF 
water rights and for 3 years in any 10-year period for no more than 120 days and most 
importantly removed the need for a declaration of drought. These statutes effectively removed 
formalized barriers to when and where the leases could be used across all users. A 2008 statute 
removed one of the largest formalized barriers to voluntary participation, the presumption of 
abandonment and formalized penalties to historic consumptive use, in which a water right user 
could have ended up worse off after leasing their water to the CWCB for any period of time. 
These changes at the constitutional level of governance were incremental, piecemeal, and slow. 
In this sense, the constitutional level changes resulted in more flexibility and policy options for 
protecting ISF, but there was no comprehensive or intentional shift towards using any sort of 
well-defined tool or process in mind when these changes occurred. Collectively, barriers and 
incentives were addressed through the formalized Request for Water Program in which 3-in-10 
STLs for ISF were implemented for the first time in 2012 by the CWT. The lag-time between the 
removal of formalized barriers at the constitutional level to the formation of new intuitional 
structures at the collective level shows the importance collaborative management at the 
collective level. In 2012, the CWT had been working for 11 years on permanent acquisitions and 
LTLs with water users at the operational level, including irrigators and municipalities, in order to 
address the lack of capacity at the CWCB to concentrate on a formalized acquisitions program. 
As a non-profit (i.e. not a government agency), the CWT was able to build capacity very quickly 
with new leadership, starting in 2007. The CWT does not have to consider the political 
ramifications that go along with ‘growing government’ like the CWCB does, and are able to 
solicit public and private funding and, therefore, effectively do not have an institutionally 
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formalized funding ceiling like the CWCB. The CWCB can only receive more funding for 
acquisitions if that source of funding is legislatively approved.  
The lack of institutional constraints on the CWT ultimately led to increased innovation at 
the collective level. Innovation, in this case, was twofold. First, there was the operational 
innovation that took place in recognizing the status quo approach to physical and legal ISF 
protection had not been and would not be sufficient to protect many decreed ISFs with the 
approaching drought in 2012 and that the change in the biophysical context might change the 
operational efficiency of water use across different consumptive and non-consumptive decreed 
water rights. For example, a decrease in widespread water supply within stream systems 
administered by prior appropriation will most likely not curtail the most senior rights, will 
partially curtail relatively junior water rights, and will fully curtail the most junior water rights 
within a basin. This creates a situation in which water rights that are partially met may not be as 
useful or valuable to the water user, particularly when considering irrigation uses. Second, there 
was the innovation that took place in creating a formalized pathway at the collective-level to 
work within formalized institutional structures at the constitutional-level. The CWT was 
instrumental in recognizing the need for and taking the initiative to begin a conversation about 
using the statutorily allowed 3-in-10 STLs in response to an oncoming drought. Because they 
were familiar with the formalized processes established by the CWCB, they were able to 
approach that conversation with a proposed structured approach to how they would help handle 
voluntary participation at the operational level. However, the CWCB and DWR still needed to 
figure out if and how that process would work as an administratively approved application that 
still followed the constitutional level rules laid out in the aforementioned statutes. Once the 
CWCB and DWR decided on what the application should look like, the CWT was integral in 
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creating a formalized process through the Request for Water Program in which individual actors 
at the operational level could understand and participate. CWT’s activity at the collective level in 
collaboration with the CWCB affected participation from water users on the operational level, 
ultimately due to incremental increases in flexibility in legislation at the constitutional level. This 
multi-level collaborative management structure ultimately facilitated the development of a new 
policy to protect and restore ISFs in Colorado lending support to the assertion that collaborative 
mangement is an appropriate management approach for Colorado’s ISF Program, particularly 
when it occurs at the collective level.  
The collaboration between the CWCB and CWT at the collective level reflects the 
academic literature in their sharing of resources and capacity. The CWCB is very resource and 
staff limited, which actually drove the creation of the CWT in 2001. However, the underlying 
missions of the CWCB and CWT are very different in that the CWCB must balance 
conservation, protection, and development of the state’s waters, the CWT has a much narrower 
mission of protecting stream flows to sustain the aquatic health of streams. In this sense, only 
part of what the CWCB and CWT aim to do overlap. Consequently, the CWT only focuses on 
the acquisitions portion of the ISF Program, but is able to fundraise and grow their staff much 
faster than the CWCB. The lack of the same institutional constraints as the CWCB, affords the 
CWT more flexibility in their ability to generate new resources, which is invaluable to a program 
that is continually resource and staff limited. The overall division of roles between the CWT and 
CWCB, particularly with respect to the CWT providing additional resource and capacity for 
acquisitions, is an important to the overall success of the ISF Program and is fundamental to the 
ways in which each entity interacts with the Colorado water community.  
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Ultimately, collaboration between government agencies and NGOs is much more 
nuanced and complex than the literature might suggest, particularly with respect to trust and 
legitimacy. While there is significant coverage in the literature of how government agencies and 
non-profits can work together collaboratively to share resources and build capacity and how non-
profits can act as a buffer or liaison between those that do or do no trust the government, the 
literature lacks specific mention of trust and legitimacy, two concepts derived from political 
theory scholarship that seem to underlie most citizen-government relationships. One reason for 
this could be that the literature lacks any focus on the individuals that make up those government 
agencies and non-profits, their expertise, or their past experience with the community with which 
they are trying to connect or provide a service to. For example, the CWT is a non-profit 
organization comprised of technical experts, not advocates or decision-makers. However the 
literature rarely distinguished between the different kinds of NGOs and the different composition 
of staff members that make up a non-profit organization. This non-advocacy, non-regulatory, 
non-government role is a something the CWT can leverage when establishing social trust with 
individuals in the water community. Establishing social trust can, in turn, help to slowly establish 
greater political trust in the CWCB and the ISF Program, if the CWT helps to facilitate an 
acquisition for the ISF Program. The CWCB, on the other hand, is often immediately associated 
with deep seeded values that go along with distrust of government and, consequently, so is their 
staff. Instead of seeing the CWCB as taking a balanced approach to developing and protecting 
the state’s water, the water community typically views the CWCB as ‘taking’ a resource that 
belongs to them. However their staff is well aware of this and acts to at the very least not 
exacerbate those feelings of distrust. In this sense, the CWT is well-positioned to build trust, 
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particularly at the operational-level of governance, while in many cases the most the CWCB can 
do it not contribute to distrust.  
However, the CWCB may have a role to play in tangentially establishing political trust 
when they establish legitimacy. Legitimacy in this analysis is defined as some process being well 
established and working in some important sense. The CWCB plays an important role in 
establishing legitimacy in the ISF Program, as they are the only entity allowed to hold a water 
right instream and manages the ISF Program by creating ISF Rules. These rules set the 
governing processes for protecting ISF throughout Colorado and dictate the ways in which the 
CWCB interacts with private water right holders, sister agencies, private organizations, and other 
entities. When a water right holder donates, sells, or leases their water right to the CWCB and 
sees that it is protected and used in the way in which is supposed to be according to the ISF 
Rules, they may have more trust in the CWCB and the ISF Program. The centralized manner in 
which ISF water right ownership is managed through the CWCB is also advantageous with 
respect to tracking ISFs, data management, and the operations and management that go into 
protecting and monitoring those water rights after they are decreed. ISF monitoring and 
protection is very resource intensive because the nature of ISFs is different. There is no diversion 
structure and therefore no head gate to tightly regulate flow rates. The physical monitoring relies 
heavily on informal reporting from the DWR or citizens, and if the CWCB ever wants to place a 
call on the river they need to have a gage in place to do so. Effectively, ISFs are more vulnerable 
than consumptive water rights and require constant legal protection and monitoring. The expense 
and resources required to do this are all centralized through the CWCB Stream and Lake 
Protection Section where the staff can streamline processes and management as opposed to 
privatizing ISFs where the protection and monitoring would be fragmented, potentially 
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redundant, and even counterproductive. The CWCB ultimately provides legitimacy to the ISF 
Program independent of distrust. The centralized management helps to ensure that ISFs are used 
properly to protect or restore ISF. The CWT even recognizes this fact in their Frequently Asked 
Questions document for the Request for Water Program, where they state, “If you lease your 
water through CWT’s Request for Water program, it will be protected as an instream flow 
through Colorado’s Instream Flow Program. CWT will work closely with the CWCB to ensure 
your water right is being used properly for flow restoration” (Request For Water FAQ, p. 3).  
The CWT also plays a role in establishing legitimacy in a less formal sense, particularly 
when they created the Request for Water Program in 2012, in order to process offers for the 3-in-
10 STL agreements. Creating a program and structure with which water right holders could 
interact consistently helped to establish the legitimacy of the 3-in-10 STLs. The Water Courts 
and DWR play smaller, but important roles in establishing legitimacy for the ISF Program. The 
Water Court and DWR are the entities that approve and help enforce decisions involved in the 
STL Program. They are the actors that ensure the established processes in the ISF Program are 
followed according to Colorado water law. Ultimately, the results emphasize the importance of 
NGOs in being able to leverage the legitimacy of a government agency by working through 
established government programs, while simultaneously distancing themselves from government 
agencies in order to establish trust with a community. The relationship and division of roles 
between CWT and CWCB allows these two entities to collaboratively address trust in and 
legitimacy of the ISF Program.  
Future challenges to the ISF Program will include many of the same challenges the 
program currently faces such as adequate resources and building capacity. Others include those 
that stem from the effective use of the ISF policy tools and the acceptance of ISF water rights by 
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the water community. The CWCB is currently adequately staffed for new appropriations 
applications, but even with the CWT helping to facilitate acquisitions there is still a need to 
increase the effectiveness of the acquisitions process. While permanent acquisitions can be very 
effective in restoring ISFs, particularly if they have a relatively senior priority date, they are a 
long-term permanent solution that involves a very slow, cumbersome, expensive and risky 
judicial process. STLs, which go through an administrative approval process, may be more 
effective with respect to making progress in protecting ISFs in real-time, but are limited in the 
length of time in which they can protect an ISF water right. They also cannot be used to create a 
new ISF protection, but rather can only support an already decreed water short ISF water right. 
Although a temporary tool, 3-in-10 STLs are a long-term solution biologically and ecologically 
because they can prevent a river from cratering. It is also difficult to de-couple the effectiveness 
of a temporary acquisition that may later lead to a permanent acquisition. In the future, the 
effectiveness of the ISF Program will rely on the number and effectiveness of acquisitions it can 
secure. At the collective level, the CWCB and the CWT can do this in two ways: 1) use 
temporary solutions to fulfill immediate and temporary needs while permanent solutions are 
streamlined and 2) streamline the permanent acquisition process. These are both directly related 
to not only voluntary participation of water right holders, but also cooperation from the water 
community.  
In order to increase voluntary participation in acquisition agreements, the CWCB will 
need to work to reduce institutional barriers, while highlighting institutional incentives. Many of 
the tangible barriers to participation are not necessarily things that can be changed at the 
collective level. However, recognizing those barriers can help the CWCB streamline which 
potential water right holders are not only more willing to participate in the ISF Program but also 
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water rights that are more likely to meet the formalized requirements. Trust is one the most 
important intangible barriers to voluntary participation and will continue to be a challenge in the 
future. However, the CWCB is not well positioned to address trust as it is a government agency 
and a generalized distrust of government usually stems from core values of individuals, rather 
than more easily addressed misconceptions or bad experiences, although those are also important 
to consider. The CWT, on the other hand, is well positioned to establish social trust with 
individuals in the water community as a non-governmental organization.  
One of the biggest current and future challenges to streamlining the acquisitions process 
is the judicial approval process. Water courts are one way for water users to express concerns 
about the use of state water, as it is a publicly owned resource. In theory, this allows changes in 
state water use to reflect the changing values of state water users. This idea of other water users 
being able to oppose an application for the use of a public resource is vital to understanding the 
strengths and weaknesses of both the judicial approval process and administrative approval 
process.  
The cumbersomeness of the judicial system is very much related to the number and type 
of water users that oppose the application. Effectively, the more opposition to an application the 
more likely it will get tied up in water court (up to 2 years) and the riskier and more expensive 
the application becomes. As a state agency with limited resources, the CWCB cannot afford to 
address every single opposition or injury to its water rights, even if they are successful in 
identifying injury to one of its water rights. ISFs are physically and inherently different than 
consumptive water rights, but are set on an equal footing with other water rights within the prior 
appropriation system in terms of administration. However, just because ISF water rights are 
administered equally, they are still treated subordinately in terms of the formal and informal 
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institutions that surround them. The formal, constitutional level institutions that govern the 
judicial process for water rights puts ISF water right cases at a disadvantage. The CWCB is a 
state agency, dependent on taxes and legislatively administered funds to purchase or lease ISF 
water rights. Due to politically motivated factors, the CWCB can only grow their staff so much, 
something private water right holders do not have to consider. The CWCB Stream and Lake 
Protection Section has one staff member dedicated to addressing legal protection on a staff of 
seven. Working within a judicial system in which the outcomes of a case depend on not only the 
evidence and due diligence, but also the number and type of stakeholders that choose to oppose 
that case, the CWCB is not on an equal footing with other water right holders with respect to 
time and resources when it comes to defending a case in court. Part of the streamlining process 
will be to decrease the amount of opposition to change of use cases with ISFs. 
Alternatively, the administrative approval process, which currently is only used for 
Substitute Water Supply Plans and 3-in10 STLs, in theory, treats every application by the same 
set of rules with a limited number of expected outcomes for each application. However, the 
opportunity for water users to oppose those applications is limited. The DWR addresses this 
issue by viewing any application for temporary approval in the strictest light possible in order to 
minimize the amount of what would be opposition to a change of water use. Temporary tools 
like the 3-in-10 STLs are useful for addressing overall barriers to participation in the ISF 
Program such as water right holder’s reluctance in relinquishing control, concerns about ISFs 
interfering with future water development, and a lack of familiarity with a water market or the 
ISF Program in general. In addition to the need for a tool to address oncoming drought, the 3-in-
10 STL’s ability to address those barriers may explain why the tool was developed and 
implemented so quickly resulting in immediate on-the-ground ISF Protection. 
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The successful 3-in-10 STL agreements will create a literature of past successes from which the 
CWCB and CWT can draw when creating narratives about the ISF Program. While there is risk 
associated with taking decisions surrounding water use out of the water court for fear that the 
decisions surrounding water use across the state will no longer reflect the values of the water 
community, approval of the 3-in-10 STLs through the administrative process is inherently more 
efficient with respect to time and resources for everyone involved. The administrative approval 
process will become more important as Colorado experiences increased changes in the 
biophysical conditions of water resources, creating an increased need proactive institutional 
changes that will allow for flexible decision-making when water managers need to adapt to 
changing conditions without harming ISFs. The novelty of this approval process for ISF 
protection has important future considerations.  
While the 3-in-10 STLs are a useful example in explicating how incremental changes to 
ISF legislation at the constitutional level, allowed for greater innovation at the collective-level, 
and ultimately led to increase ISF protection at the operational level. However, with the 
successful on-the-ground application of the 3-in-10 STLs and new administrative approval 
process for ISFs, these on-the-ground accomplishments provide an important feedback 
mechanism, which could have important implications for new ISF legislation.  The multi-level 
structure used in this analysis allows us to see that feedback between institutional levels is not 
unidirectional, but rather on-the-ground accomplishments (or lack thereof) at the operational 
level can also influence changes at the constitutional level (see Figure 11 as a reminder of 
Colorado ISF Program’s institutional levels as of 2001).   
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Overall, the findings suggest that collaborative management has led to varying levels of 
success in the implementation of Colorado’s ISF Program. At the collective level, collaborative 
management between the CWT and CWCB has resulted in alternatives pathways for interaction 
between operational water right holders and the CWCB, which has increased capacity for ISF 
water right acquisitions via CWT staff and resources. Collaborative management between the 
CWT and CWCB has also been successful in partially shifting ISF protection from the judicial 
system, where it is inherently disadvantaged compared to other uses, to an administrative system, 
where it will in theory be treated more equitably, through the implementation of 3-in-10 STLs. 
Figure 18. Post-2001 Instream Flow Program Dynamics (with respect to Acquisitions).  Instream Flow 
Program dynamics post-2001, after the creation of the Colorado Water Trust. The diagram shows the various 
interactions, actors, and level of governance associated with ISF management in Colorado. 
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At the operational level, 3-in-10 leases have increased the number of options for water right 
holders to participate in the ISF Program and have resulted in seven STLs leases in just two 
years, which is a much faster rate of realization compared to permanent acquisitions.  
On the other hand, collaborative management between the CWT and CWCB has been 
limited in its success with respect to the number and effectiveness of the ISF protections at the 
operational level. 3-in-10 STLs are temporary and consequently have a limited potential for 
preventing further degradation of a stream system. An increase in capacity for acquisitions since 
2001, with the creation of the CWT, has yet to lead to an increase in the number of permanent 
acquisitions. While the creation of the CWT itself is still a fairly recent development in the 
context of Colorado water, trends in ISF protection over time show that the policy tools that are 
most effective in restoring and further protecting a stream system from being further degraded, 
acquisitions, are still only a small fraction of the total number of ISF water rights that exist. 
Additionally, a majority of ISF water rights in Colorado are appropriated ISF water rights that 
are very small quantities, which may or may not meet the originally recommended quantity 
needed to maintain the ecological health of the stream and, furthermore, may or may not be met 
at certain times of the year when the ecological health of a stream is at greatest risk.  
Collaborative management has successfully resulted in new institutional structures, which 
have increased the number of ways to increase ISF protections at the operational level, but this 
initial quantitative analysis suggests that this may not be sufficient to adapt to projected 
biophysical changes in stream flow in Colorado as it does not address the quantity of the ISF 
protections. While ISF thresholds are met a majority of the time, the quantity of the ISF water 
right is also important to consider as it may not necessarily lead to an increase in ecological 
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health. However, an analysis of the effectiveness of the quantity of the ISF water rights on 
ecological health is outside the scope of this analysis.  
 The findings suggest that institutional structures have recently changed in important 
ways due to collaborative management, which show promise in helping to address future ISF 
needs. The findings highlight the need to understand how collaborative management, 
institutional structures, and on-the-ground outcomes at the operational governance level interact.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While the findings in this analysis are very specific to the intuitional arrangements and 
patterns of interactions in the Colorado water community they are important for the broader 
understanding of multi-level collaborative management as a way to balance flexibility and 
certainty in natural resource management.  The findings also provide an important case study for 
what seems to be lacking in the collaborative management literature, which is the application of 
a conceptual frameworks to on-the-ground implementation. Understanding how patterns of 
interactions between actors within and between governance levels provides insight into the 
degree of institutional flexibility and uncertainty at each governance level. Institutional 
arrangements can help drive collaboration and collaboration, in turn, can change institutional 
arrangements, which in the case of the ISF Program has been effective but incremental.  
While the findings provide one example of collaborative management in water 
management across multiple governance levels, the findings have several limitations. First, 
Colorado is a state with one of the purest forms of prior appropriation, limiting the extent to 
which the findings specific to the Colorado ISF Program can be applied to other state ISF 
Programs. Second, while nine staff members out of the 14 potential CWCB and CWT interview 
subjects were interviewed, the results may have benefited from interviewing staff members from 
some of the other agencies involved such as the DWR. Third, results about perceived barriers 
and incentives to participation in the ISF Program on part of water right holders are all from 
third-party observers, not the water right holders themselves, which may have limited the 
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number of reported barriers and incentives or affected the way in which they were framed. 
Fourth, results describing how often and when ISF decreed water right thresholds are not met are 
limited to the number of water rights that have gages located within the decreed stream reach. 
There are 135 ISF rights that contain gages, however the availability of resulting reported gage 
data also limited the number of gages we chose to use to only those monitored by the USGS. 
Fifth, the way in which water right data is managed and publically accessible was a major 
limitation to the ability to track ISF policy tool use over time as the decreed dates for 
acquisitions or change of use cases are not recorded consistently within the CDSS system. There 
is no single, relational database for Colorado water rights, which limits the extent to which 
different aspects of water rights can be analyzed to determine important correlations.  
The findings also have numerous implications for future studies. Interviewing staff 
members from the CWCB and CWT was beneficial as a first step in explicating potential 
incentives and barriers to participation in the ISF Program, but it would also beneficial to try to 
better understand if what ISF practitioners perceive as barriers and incentives match up with 
what potential program participants perceive as barriers and incentives. Additionally, knowing if 
there are any important patterns or correlations as to geographic locations water right holders 
have certain perceptions of barriers and incentives could have important implications for 
outreach strategies. It would also be beneficial to try to obtain a larger sample size of for gage 
data for instream flows in order to elucidate other key qualitative trends and try to match those 
trends with potential administrative patterns or specific actions. Future work should also consider 
the quantities of the ISF water rights and the effectiveness in protecting the biological and 
ecological needs of stream systems. Particularly the discrepancies in recommended quantities of 
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ISF thresholds and realized quantities in the appropriation process. These would all have 
important implications for using ISF policy tools most effectively.  
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X. KEY TERMS AND ACRONYMS: 
 
Acre-Foot Volumetric measurement of water used for quantifying reservoir storage capacity and 
historic consumptive use. This is the amount of water that will cover an acre of land at a depth of 
one foot, or 325,851 gallons of water.
10  
 
Acquisition: change of use case specific to instream flows (also referred to a change of use; 
change case; transfer; acquisition) 
 
Adjudication: The process for obtaining a water court decree for a conditional water right, a 
finding of reasonable diligence, an absolute water right, an exchange, an augmentation plan, a 
change of water right, or a right to withdraw non-tributary water or Denver Basin groundwater 
that is outside of a designated groundwater basin. 10 
 
Administration Number: A calculated number developed by the Division of Water Resources 
to provide a simple and efficient method of ranking decrees in order of seniority.
11
 
 
Appropriation Date: Placement of a specified portion of the waters of the state to a beneficial 
use pursuant to the procedures prescribed by law. Speculation is prohibited. The appropriator 
must have its own use for the water or have a contract to serve the customers that the water will 
benefit. Only previously un-appropriated surface or tributary groundwater water can be 
appropriated. The appropriator must have a plan to divert, store, or otherwise capture, possess 
and control the water for beneficial use.10 
 
Call Demand for administration of water rights. In times of water shortage, the owner of a 
decreed water right will make a “call” for water. The call results in curtailment orders against 
undecreed water uses and decreed junior water rights as necessary to fill the beneficial use need 
of the decreed senior calling right.10 
 
Case Number: the case number of the Water Court action. 
 
Cubic Feet Per Second (cfs) Measurement of flow rate of water in running stream or taken as 
direct diversion from the stream. Water flowing at 1 cfs will deliver 448.8 gallons per minute or 
648,000 gallons per day or approximately 2 acre feet per day.10 
 
Colorado Revised Statutes (C.R.S.) The annual compilation of Colorado statutes and court 
rules published by the Colorado General Assembly. Also called “the red books.”10 
                                                        
10 Information compiled from Colorado Foundation for Water Education’s Citizen’s Guide to Colorado Water 
Law https://www.yourwatercolorado.org/flip/catalog.php?catalog=waterlaw 
11
 Information compiled from DWR’s database dictionaries 
ftp://dwrftp.state.co.us/cdss/webtools/data_dictionary_CallChronology.pdf 
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Consumptive Use Water use that permanently withdraws water from its source; water that is no 
longer available because it has evaporated, been transpired by plants, incorporated into products 
or crops, consumed by people or livestock, or otherwise removed from the immediate water 
environment.10  
 
CWCB: Colorado Water Conservation Board 
 
CWT: Colorado Water Trust; also referred to by some interviewees as the Trust or the Water 
Trust 
 
DWR: Colorado Department of Water Resources (also referred to as the Division Engineer’s 
Office/Office of the Division Engineer) 
 
Injury: The action of another that causes or may cause the holders of decreed water rights to 
suffer loss of water at the time, place and amount they would be entitled to use under their water 
rights if the action had not occurred. Injury is a significant issue in any water court proceeding 
and in determinations of the State and Division Engineers.10 
 
Priority: The ranking of a water right vis-à-vis all other water rights drawing on the surface 
stream and tributary groundwater system. Priority is determined by the year in which the 
application for the water right was filed. The date the appropriation was initiated determines the 
relative priority of water rights for which the applications were filed in the same year. Priority is 
the most valuable aspect of a water right because priorities determine who may divert and use 
water in time of short water supply.10 
 
Preserve or Improve: refers to language written into the statute allowing the CWCB to protect 
instream flows in order to preserve or improve the natural environment 
 
Protect and Restore: refers to the actions taken to protect instream flow or restore instream 
flow 
 
Statute A law enacted by a legislative body such as the U.S. Congress or the Colorado General 
Assembly.10 
 
Substitute Supply Plan: A State Engineer-approved temporary plan of replacement supply 
allowing an out-of-priority diversion while a plan for augmentation is proceeding through the 
water court. The State Engineer may also approve substitute supply plans for water exchanges, 
water uses that will not exceed 5 years and limited emergency situations affecting public health 
or safety.10 
 
Stream reach: the length of stream located between two points 
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XI. APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
 
History of Foundational Federal and ColoradoWater Laws and Policies
12
 
Year Act or Court Case Outcome 
1861 Colorado becomes a Territory Increased growth and economic prosperity depended on ability 
to obtain land and water rights 
1862 Homestead Act Allowed settlers to settle public lands 
1866 Mining Act Allowed settlers to build ditches and reservoirs and divert water 
on public lands to reach place of beneficial use 
1872 Yunker vs. Nichols Allowed water to be diverted from public lands, across private 
lands 
1876 Union Colony vs. Greely Established "First in time, first in right" precedent 
1879 Adjudication Act Puts General Assembly in charge or priority dates and 
quantities; Foundation for judicial as opposed to administrative 
water right system 
1891 Strickler vs. City of Colorado Springs  Agricultural rights could be sold and transferred to municipal 
uses but required public notification and anyone with objections 
the opportunity to be heard.  
1902 Reclamation Act Later became Bureau of Reclamation 
1903 Adjudication Act Domestic uses are now adjudicated along with irrigation uses 
1937 Creation of Colorado Water 
Conservation Board 
Established to aid in the protection and development of the 
state’s waters 
1968 Creation of Colorado Department of 
Natural Resources  
CWCB becomes a division within DNR 
1969 Water Right Determination and 
Administration Act 
Created 7 Colorado Water Court divisions to issue water decrees 
1970 National Environmental Protection 
Act 
Requires federal agencies to integrate environmental values into 
their decision making processes by considering the 
environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable 
alternatives to those actions 
1972 Clean Water Act Recognizes water quality as a protected resource in providing 
for critical habitat or human consumption 
1973 Endangered Species Act Describes severe decline in diversity of U.S. native species and 
acknowledges their “esthetic, ecological, educational, 
recreational, and scientific value to our Nation and its people” 
 
  
                                                        
12 Information compiled from combination of Colorado Foundation for Water Education’s 
Citizen’s Guide to Colorado Water Law and CWCB’s Historical Timeline  
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Appendix B 
Key Instream Flow Legislation
13
 
Year 
Colorado 
Assembly Bills Change in Implementation 
1973 S.B. 97 
Creates the Colorado Instream Flow and Natural Lake Level Program to be administered by the 
Colorado Water Conservation Board 
1979 
Colorado River 
District v. CWCB 
Upheld that ISF rights are constitutional 
1981 S.B. 414 
ISF appropriations based upon water imported from one basin to another do not give CWCB any 
right or claim against the importer of the water, are subject to uses or exchanges of water existing 
on the date ISF appropriated, and the state and others may not condemn private land to gain access 
to ISF water rights. 
CWCB to must assess natural environment, water availability, and no material injury to water 
rights before applying to water court for an ISF water right. 
1986 S.B. 91 
Clarifies CWCB's authority to acquire water, water rights or interests in water to preserve the 
natural environment 
1987 S.B. 212 Reaffirms CWCB as exclusive authority to hold an instream flow water right 
1995 
Aspen Wilderness 
Workshop, Inc. v 
CWCB 
CWCB must go through Water Court to receive a decree in order to modify or reduce a decreed 
ISF water right 
1996 S.B. 64 
Outlined the procedure CWCB must follow in order to modify an existing decreed ISF, including 
filing through Water Court and issuing a public notice 
2000 H.B. 1438 Repealed power of CWCB to acquire conditional water rights for instream flow use 
2001 S.B. 156 
Authorizes CWCB to acquire water, water rights or interests in water for the purpose of improving 
natural environment as opposed to solely preserving natural environmental 
2001 S.B. 216 Establishes recreational in-channel diversions as a beneficial use of water in Colorado 
2003 H.B. 1320 
Authorizes temporary loan of water rights for instream flow use during times of drought or other 
emergency and designates the DWR with power of approval and establishes process for public 
notice and comment 
2005 
H.B. 1039 
Removes the drought declaration requirement for loan of water rights for instream flow use, limit 
the exercise of a loan to no more than three years in any ten year period and provide a process for 
parties to comment on potential injury after each year a loan is exercised 
CWCB v. City of 
Central 
Upheld that augmentation plans are also subject to the principle that ISFs are fully adjudicated 
water rights and any augmentation plan with junior appropriations much protect other water right, 
including ISFs 
2007 H.B. 1012 
Provides that the period of time water is loaned to CWCB for ISF use will not result in a reduction 
in any future the historic consumptive use analysis and will not be considered as intent of the water 
user to abandon their water right. 
2008 
H.B. 1280 
Provides that leasing water to the CWCB for instream flow use will not result in a reduction of the 
historic consumptive use for the leased water right in any future water court proceeding to change 
that water right, and will not give rise to a presumption of abandonment of that water right.  
H.B. 1346  $1 million appropriation from the Severance Tax Trust Fund Perpetual Base Account for ISFs 
S.B. 168 
Allocates $500,000 from the Species Conservation Trust Fund for instream flow acquisitions for 
ISF purposes if Severance Tax is fully appropriated 
2009 
H.B. 1067 
Allows CWCB to approve instream flow incentive tax credit for permanent transfers of water 
rights to the ISF Program. 
S.B. 235 
Made $500,000 available to CWCB if the $1 million from the severance tax funds is fully 
appropriated from the sale of the Colorado wildlife habitat stamps 
                                                        
13 Information compiled using CWCB’s Historical Timeline (2013) 
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Appendix C 
 
Multi-level Governance of Colorado’s Instream Flow Program Codebook 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION: 
Research Question: Has multi-level collaborative management been and will it be a successful 
approach for protecting instream flow in Colorado?  
In order to answer this broad research question, several levels of sub-questions will guide 
separate sections of the analysis:  
RQ1:   Why and how has Colorado’s ISF Program been successful so far? 
RQ1a: How frequently have the four ISF policy tools been used over time? 
RQ1b: How often and when are decreed ISF water rights thresholds not met? 
RQ2: What barriers to and opportunities for the success of Colorado’s ISF program exist?  
RQ2a: How were the 3-in-10 short-term leases derived from legislation and translated 
into on-the-ground ISF protections?  
RQ2b: Does the CWT, as a non-governmental organization, provide trust in the 
implementation of Colorado’s ISF Program, while CWCB, as a government agency, 
provides legitimacy?  
RQ3: What role does and will collaborative management play in the past and future success of 
Colorado’s ISF Program?  
RQ3a: How has and will 3-in10 STLs affect future ISF legislation and ISF Program 
management decisions?  
 
CODING INSTRUCTIONS: 
 Coders should read through the full transcript prior to beginning coding 
 Coders should review codebook before coding 
 When coding, coders should: 
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o Code entire sentences, including any necessary contextual information around that 
sentence (when appropriate or necessary) 
o If coding for a single word using a ‘find’ search, read the entire question response 
by the subject in order to capture any context surrounding the word in question 
o Code for a single category of code at a time (i.e. code an entire document for all 
codes under super-code ‘roletype’ and then return to the beginning of the 
transcript to code for all codes under super-code ‘stlreq’) 
CODEBOOK 
 ROLETYPE – the different roles the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB), the 
Colorado Water Trust (CWT), the Division of Water Resources (DWR), and the Water 
Courts (WC) 
o CWCB – mentions of the Colorado Water Conservation Board with respect to 
their role in managing Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
 TRU – mentions of trust as a role the CWCB fulfills 
 LEG – mentions of legitimacy as a role the CWCB fulfills, including 
references to consistent monitoring and enforcement of Colorado’s 
Instream Flow Program  
 RES – mentions of resources as a role the CWCB fulfills 
 OTR – mentions of outreach as a role the CWCB fulfills 
 CAP – mentions of capacity as a role the CWCB fulfills 
 POLY– mentions of policy as a role the CWCB fulfills 
 INNOV– mentions of innovation as a role the CWCB fulfills 
 IMPL– mentions of implementation as a role the CWCB fulfills 
o CWT – mentions of the Colorado Water Trust with respect to their role in 
managing Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
 TRU – mentions of trust as a role the CWT fulfills 
 LEG – mentions of legitimacy as a role the CWT fulfills, including 
references to consistent monitoring and enforcement of Colorado’s 
Instream Flow Program  
 RES – mentions of resources as a role the CWT fulfills 
 OTR – mentions of outreach as a role the CWT fulfills 
 CAP – mentions of capacity as a role the CWT fulfills 
 POLY– mentions of policy as a role the CWT fulfills 
 INNOV– mentions of innovation as a role the CWT fulfills 
 IMPL– mentions of implementation as a role the CWT fulfills 
o DWR – mentions of the Division of Water Resources with respect to their role in 
managing Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
 TRU – mentions of trust as a role the DWR fulfills 
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 LEG – mentions of legitimacy as a role the CWCB fulfills, including 
references to consistent monitoring and enforcement of Colorado’s 
Instream Flow Program  
 RES – mentions of resources as a role the DWR fulfills 
 OTR – mentions of outreach as a role the DWR fulfills 
 CAP – mentions of capacity as a role the DWR fulfills 
 POLY– mentions of policy as a role the DWR fulfills 
 INNOV– mentions of innovation as a role the DWR fulfills 
 IMPL– mentions of implementation as a role the DWR fulfills 
o WC – mentions of the Water Court with respect to their role in managing 
Colorado’s Instream Flow Program 
 TRU – mentions of trust as a role the WC fulfills 
 LEG – mentions of legitimacy as a role the WC fulfills, including 
references to consistent monitoring and enforcement of Colorado’s 
Instream Flow Program  
 RES – mentions of resources as a role the WC fulfills 
 OTR – mentions of outreach as a role the WC fulfills 
 CAP – mentions of capacity as a role the WC fulfills 
 POLY– mentions of policy as a role the WC fulfills 
 INNOV– mentions of innovation as a role the WC fulfills 
 IMPL– mentions of implementation as a role the WC fulfills 
o OTHENT 
 TRU – mentions of trust as a role that other entities fulfill 
 LEG – mentions of legitimacy as a role that other entities fulfill, including 
references to consistent monitoring and enforcement of Colorado’s 
Instream Flow Program  
 RES – mentions of resources as a role that other entities fulfill 
 OTR – mentions of outreach as a role that other entities fulfill 
 CAP – mentions of capacity as a role that other entities fulfill 
 POLY– mentions of policy as a role that other entities fulfill s 
 INNOV– mentions of innovation as a role the role that other entities fulfill 
 IMPL– mentions of implementation as a role the role that other entities 
fulfill 
 
 POLYTLS – the different attributes, characteristics, abilities of policy tools available to 
protect instream flow  
o NWAPP – mentions of the characteristics of new appropriations  
o ACQ – mentions of the characteristics of acquisitions 
o PERM – mentions of the characteristics permanent acquisitions (i.e. transfers, i.e. 
change cases). These are specific only to permanent acquisition; not temporary 
leases (long-term or short-term). 
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o STL – mentions of the characteristics of short-term leases 
o LTL – mentions of the characteristics long-term leases  
o SWSP – mentions of the characteristics substitute water supply plan  
o NEWLEG – mentions of the characteristics new legislative tools (i.e. efficiency 
transfer, flex tools)  
 
 STLREQ – the basic biophysical and legal or statutory requirements needed for a short-
term lease for instream flow protection or improvement 
o BIOPHY – mentions of the biophysical requirements needed protect instream 
flow under a short-term lease (i.e. location, instream flow threshold) 
o LEGSTAT– mentions of the legal or statutory requirements needed to enter into a 
short-term lease by either the Colorado Water Conservation Board or the private 
water rights holder 
 
 BARPART – perceived barriers to voluntary participation by a water rights holder in a 
short-term lease by CWCB and CWT staff 
o FIN – mentions of finances as perceived barriers to a private water right holder 
participating in a short-term lease  
o CAP – mentions of capacity as perceived barriers to a private water right holder 
participating in a short-term lease (e.g. irrigator with lots of acres can fallow part 
of fields) 
o POLT – mentions of politics as perceived barriers to a private water right holder 
participating in a short-term lease (e.g. government control) 
o TRU – mentions of trust as perceived barriers to a private water right holder 
participating in a short-term lease  
o LEG – mentions of legitimacy (i.e. monitoring end enforcement) as perceived 
barriers to a private water right holder participating in a short-term lease 
o CTRL – mentions of control as perceived barriers to a private water right holder 
participating in a short-term lease (i.e. can choose to participate or not) 
o HCUA– mentions of historic consumptive use analysis as perceived barriers to a 
private water right holder participating in a short-term lease 
o OTHER – mentions of anything other than the above barriers 
 
 INCPART – perceived barriers to voluntary participation by a water rights holder in a 
short-term lease by CWCB and CWT staff 
o FIN – mentions of financial as a perceived incentive for a private water right 
holder to participate in a short-term lease 
o EE – mentions of an environmental ethic as a perceived incentive for a private 
water right holder to participate in a short-term lease 
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o PNR – mentions of preserving natural resources as a non-monetary benefit as a 
perceived incentive for a private water right holder to participate in a short-term 
lease 
o TRI– mentions of using the short-term leasing as a trial run as a perceived 
incentive for a private water right holder to participate in a short-term lease 
o FLEX– mentions of flexibility of the program or contracts as a perceived 
incentive for a private water right holder to participate in a short-term lease 
 
 CURCHALL – current challenges to protecting and improving instream flow in Colorado 
through the Colorado Instream Flow Program 
o RES – mentions resources as a current challenge to protecting and improving 
instream flow 
o CAP – mentions capacity as a current challenge to protecting and improving 
instream flow 
o POLT – mentions politics as a current challenge to protecting and improving 
instream flow 
o TRU – mentions trust as a current challenge to protecting and improving instream 
flow 
o PROC – mentions the system or process as a challenge to protecting and 
improving instream flow 
  
 FUTCHALL – current challenges to protecting and improving instream flow in Colorado 
through the Colorado Instream Flow Program 
o RES – mentions resources as a future challenge to protecting and improving 
instream flow 
o CAP – mentions capacity as a future challenge to protecting and improving 
instream flow 
o POLT – mentions politics as a future challenge to protecting and improving 
instream flow 
o TRU – mentions trust as a future challenge to protecting and improving instream 
flow 
o PROC – mentions the system or process as a future challenge to protecting and 
improving instream flow 
 
 ISFDIFF- how instream flows are perceived or institutionally treated by individuals, 
groups, legislature, or the judiciary in the Colorado water community 
o PERCDIFF – mentions of how instream flows are still perceived as new 
beneficial use compared to other non-consumptive or consumptive uses 
o SUBORD – mentions of how instream flows are treated differently than other 
beneficial uses in legislation and implementation 
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 SYST – specifically refers to either an judicial or administrative process 
o ADM – mentions of an administrative process 
o JUDIC – mentions of a judicial process 
 
 MISC – any other unexpected or important quotes worth note 
 
